


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Gebhardt,
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DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION FOR ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT: THE BITTERROOT
NATIONAL FOREST CASE

COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE FOREST SERVICE AND ITS CONSTITUENTS: A LITERATURE-BASED PROGRESS REPORT



**USDA Forest Service, Bitterroot National Forest
Bitterroot Ecosystem Management Research Project**

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Collaboration between the Forest Service and its Constituents: a Literature-based Progress Report

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Abstract:

The use and availability of environmental collaboration is increasing in a number of ways. Included in the expanding list of parties utilizing facilitation and mediation is the U.S. Forest Service. This Agency, once characterized by scientific (or synoptic) management, timber primacy, and decentralization, developed a culture largely unresponsive to emerging public values and needs. Protest over forest decisions, often in the form of numerous appeals, along with the greater complexity encountered by planners, forced policy-makers to look for new ways of making decisions on managing forests. Congress and officials in the Forest Service attempted to remedy this situation with statutory and non-statutory policy changes, some of which included instituting collaborative measures. Although, theoretically more beneficial than synoptic planning, evaluators have rated attempts to institute and implement facilitation and mediation in this Agency as only marginally successful.

Introduction:

The history of using collaborative decision-making in the environmental arena started in 1973, when Washington Governor Daniel J. Evans used mediators to help resolve a dispute concerning a proposed flood control dam on the Snoqualmie River in 1973. Since then, collaboration has played an important role in environmental policy-making; increasing slowly during the 1970s and then accelerating during the 80s. By 1984, over 160 disputes had incorporated mediation and facilitation (Bingham 1986).

Advances in the field extend beyond an increase in the number of disputes utilizing collaborative methods. First, the number of mediators and facilitators has grown dramatically in the past two decades. Second, dispute resolution has expanded from a strictly case-by-case basis to an institutionalization of procedures (by statute, regulation, or policy adjustment). Third, a network of information providers now exists for those individuals who want to attempt mediation or facilitation as a way to deal with environmental conflict. Finally, the types of environmental cases have broadened to include: land-use, water resources, energy, air quality, toxics, and natural resource management and use of public lands (Bingham 1986).

An examination of this last category, natural resource management and use of public lands, is the subject of this report. More specifically, this paper examined recent collaborative decision-making efforts of the USDA Forest Service. To better understand the transition from other, less interactive planning and

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management techniques (i.e. synoptic methods), to collaboration, this research will: define keywords, present events leading up to adoption of collaborative decision-making by the Forest Service, explore theoretical advantages of using mediation and facilitation, and finally, look at some shortcomings of the Agency's efforts.

Defining Keywords: understanding the jargon

Like other specialists or professionals, mediators and facilitators have developed a unique vocabulary for their profession. Understandably, people from outside the field struggle to decipher the meanings of these terms. Furthermore, an additional impediment to understanding this vocabulary is that proponents of multiple collaborative theories associate different meanings with the same word. For these reasons, keywords will be defined to ensure that there is a common understanding of the terms used in this paper.

Natural resource conflict is an ongoing event (Daniels and Walker 1994 work in progress) which occurs "when there is disagreement over values or scarce resources (Daniels et al. 1993:2)." Conflicts inevitably occur in public natural resource management due to questions about for whom, for what, where, and how resources should be used.

Natural resource dispute is an identifiable, issue-specific episode of a conflict which is settled when parties find a mutually acceptable basis for overcoming the issues that they disagree on. The conflict or underlying difference in values often continues despite parties successfully resolving a dispute (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, Daniels et al. 1993). As products of conflict, disputes are also inevitable in natural resource management.

Collaborative Process is a broad term encompassing facilitation, mediation, arbitration and other, similar forms of conflict management. Collaborative processes are theoretically more inclusive of all parties affected by a conflict, and focus more on problem solving than conventional procedures. The capacity for collaborative approaches to resolve differences is based upon parties' willingness and ability to verbalize, accommodate, and package interests (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

Facilitation is one of the simplest collaborative forms. It is used when parties need assistance focusing or moderating a discussion. The facilitator arranges meetings, guarantees that they are held in a fair and neutral environment, keeps notes and minutes, and enhances discussion through various communication and role playing activities (e.g., opinion surveys, brainstorming sessions, etc.) (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

Mediation is “the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute (Moore 1986:14).”

(Other terms presented in this paper will be operationally defined.)

Adopting Collaboration: the Forest Service alters its planning strategy

This section examines why and how the Forest Service adopted more collaborative approaches in the planning and management of national forests and grasslands. To aid the reader, the examination begins with a discussion of planning approaches and their definitions.

Planning Theory: so many choices

Planners and managers can utilize a number of planning traditions and techniques. Unfortunately, managers seldom experiment with unfamiliar forms, and instead cling steadfastly to the dominant planning paradigm of the time. Hudson (1979) illustrates the diversity of planning approaches by identifying and describing prominent traditions. Three traditional styles are used by the Forest Service: synoptic, incremental and transactive planning. **Synoptic planning** is the traditional and dominant quantitative form typified by the process of setting goals, identifying policy alternatives, evaluating means for specified ends, and implementing decisions (e.g., economic analysis of best land use). **Incremental planning**, also referred to as "muddling through (Lindblom 1959)," involves making decisions based on intuition, experience, rules of thumb, and endless consultations (e.g., determining inventory stock levels). (Incrementalism also shares characteristics with adaptive management.) **Transactive planning** (which is synonymous with collaboration) empowers stakeholders by creating and implementing policies through face-to-face contact with those affected by decisions (e.g., negotiating an environmental dispute). An understanding of planning theory provides the basis to look at Forest Service history and management trends.

Synoptic Planning Characterizes “Old Forestry”

Generally speaking, the adoption of mediation and facilitation was, in large part, a reaction to “old forestry,” a natural resource paradigm which stressed synoptic planning. At its inception, “old forestry” emphasized scientific management, timber primacy, and decentralization. Over time, the Forest Service

created an internal culture comprised of employees who shared common values and training in scientific forestry (Shepard 1992). This culture “sheltered” the Agency from outside political threats, and created the perception of a para-military organization. In the 1970s and early 80s, the forestry profession complemented biological and physical science with economic analysis, another method for the quantitative tool box (Shepard 1992). Under the scientific forestry culture, professional foresters, frequently trained in the natural sciences, found it discomfiting to deal with, or failed to see the need to incorporate political elements into their decision-making, even to the extent of public involvement.

“Many resource managers are academically and psychologically ill prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy of public demands to participate in natural resource planning. Even more managers fail to see how the public can actually provide innovative solutions to problems created by these demands. We resource professionals tend to believe that our views are already widely shared by other people or groups and that our services are responsive to public desires.... We attempt to resolve conflicting demands, in part, through public involvement or education. But often we would rather change the public’s mind about management practices than become more responsive to public interests. We seem keenly interested in convincing others that our knowledge is scientifically sound and that it serves their best interest (Magill 1988: page-facing 200).”

Unsurprisingly, this kind of mindset can and does lead to repeated conflicts between the forestry profession and publics (Hacker 1983, Magill 1988, Fairfax and Fortmann 1990, Knopp and Caldbeck 1990, Magill 1991, Manring 1993).

The Historical Progression: the demise of “old forestry”

A short history of the Forest Service illustrates how synoptic planning eventually failed to address the greater complexity of forest management in recent years. Gifford Pinchot, who later became the first Chief, espoused and popularized the idea of creating a conservation agency in the U.S. Department of Agriculture to manage federally-owned timber lands. A custodial function characterized the Agency from 1905, when it was given jurisdiction over forest reserves, until World War II. After the War, the Agency’s stewardship capacity was supplanted by a timber production emphasis to provide housing for an expanding economy. Soon, the timber-production priority conflicted with other uses and values. The Multiple-Use-Sustained-Yield (MUSY) Act was passed in 1960 to lessen management preference toward extractive resources; however, the synoptic planning style which previously characterized the Agency, remained the norm. Congress, viewing the MUSY Act as inadequate, passed the Resources Planning Act (RPA) in 1974, and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) in 1976 (Kessler and Salwasser 1995). These statutes questioned accepted planning and management methods within the Forest Service and eventually led to greater change.

Controversy emerged in the 1960s and 70s for a number of reasons. First, it was unrealistic for Congress and the Forest Service to assume that mandating harmony to managers of competing resources in the MUSY Act would effectively control conflict (Irland 1975, Hough 1988). Second, a larger number of Americans sought an increased number and greater diversity of goods, services, and values from their natural resources (Ewert 1993). Hough (1988) notes that growing populations demand more resources and space which creates a situation where conflict is more likely to occur. A related third factor was the increased public concern and awareness about environmental issues which existed since the early 1960s (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Hendee (1984) observed that public support for environmental programs broadened in recent years, while membership in environmental organizations (such as the National Wildlife Federation and Sierra Club) proceeded to grow, and political activism by individuals continued unabatedly. Fourth, the complexity of modern natural resource disputes prevented quick and easy resolution (Walker and Daniels 1994 work in progress). Fifth, Congress gave the Agency conflicting tasks. A final explanation of why the agency failed to resolve many past conflicts is ineffective public involvement (i.e., the Forest Service failed to effectively manage emerging conflicts by involving affected parties in planning and management functions).

Kathlene and Martin (1991) state that citizen participation techniques used by agencies generally have failed to effectively inform officials about people's desires. Daniels et al. (1993) note that participation procedures used by the Forest Service in the past have rarely provided citizens with enough control over management decisions to effectively resolve conflicts over competing uses. They supported this contention with several instances where parties accused the Forest Service of using public participation to minimally change or sugarcoat prefabricated decisions. Cited examples of the perceived undermining of public involvement occurred during the RARE II process in several states, and in planning endeavors in southern Oregon.

Despite laws "ensuring" public involvement,* top-down synoptic planning characterized most Forest Service decision-making in the 1980s. Also, production of timber was prioritized in both budgets and in decision-making models. The result was endless appeals and litigation from people who wanted diverse goods and services produced, as well as the condition of the land to be addressed. Eventually, agency leaders recognized that quick-fixes to the old management paradigm would not correct the crisis (Kessler and Salwasser 1995). The "new forestry" writings of forest ecologist Jerry Franklin further awakened the forestry profession to the realization that the German forestry model designed to maximize timber

* Statutes mandating public involvement include: the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and following regulations written by the Council on Environmental Quality, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972, the Forest and Rangeland Resources Planning Act (RPA) of 1974, which was amended by the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976.

production was not the only valid model; forests were more than trees and their products (McQuillan 1994). In response to the outcry, Forest Service Chief F. Dale Robertson initiated “New Perspectives for Managing the National Forest Service” in 1990. The New Perspectives program attempted to try “a different way of thinking about managing the national forests and national grasslands, emphasizing ecological principles, to sustain their many values and uses (USDA Forest Service 1991).” In essence, the program attempted to bring about institutional change in an entrenched organization (Kessler and Salwasser 1995).

Following two years of developing New Perspectives projects, on June 4, 1992, Chief F. Dale Robertson introduced a new agency policy entitled “Ecosystem Management of the National Forests and Grasslands”. Certain events led up to this incident: the American people continued to demand greater change from the Forest Service, especially in light of new forestry; the New Perspectives program showed that a change was possible; President Bush and the American contingent at the Rio Conference were under heavy criticism for lack of environmental leadership; and, some high ranking Forest Service officials (i.e., Chief F. Dale Robertson and New Perspectives Director Hal Salwasser) were at the same place at the right time (Salwasser 1994). The ecosystem management memo was at its core a political tool aimed at satisfying disgruntled political elements both at home and overseas.

A key aim of the ecosystem management policy is revising “old forestry” planning methods. In the memo, Robertson (1992) suggests, consistent with Hudson’s conclusion, that the Forest Service should supplement its current synoptic efforts with a combination of planning theories. He also urges for the adoption of several complimentary types of planning in an attachment to the ecosystem memo entitled “Working Guidelines for Ecosystem Management.” They are (as defined by Hudson) incremental, synoptic and transactive planning.

“Get people involved in planning and carrying out project work [transactive planning]. Involve interested and affected people in the full process of making decisions about common resources; plan as if you are in a fishbowl to make sure everyone who wants to has access and knows what is going on; make conservation partnerships the rule rather than the exception.... Involve scientists [synoptic planning] through adaptive management [incremental planning].... Integrate resource management for operational efficiency (Robertson 1992:6).”

Lessons learned by the Forest Service makes it evident, that emerging political realities required an expansion of synoptic planning. However, what improvements did the adoption of transactive methods (e.g., facilitation and mediation) promise?

Theoretical Advantages of Collaboration: why teach an old agency new tricks?

Like other agencies, conventional Forest Service planning procedures (i.e., administrative rulemaking and litigation) often excluded stakeholders and focused on procedural compliance instead of problem solving. Decision-makers usually determined the winner of disputes based on power, to a lesser extent rights, and rarely on interests (Ury et al. 1988). Even today, our present representative democracy entails: minority parties being forced to suppress their views until they comprise the majority or seek administrative or judicial relief; short-term commitments to problems and programs by officials until their terms-of-office expire (this usually results in ineffective and inefficient solutions); the overly simplistic "yes-no" context of voting; and, legislators' reliance on lobbyists for public input and information. In addition, technical and legal complexities, often purposely employed to exclude non-professionals (and characteristic of synoptic planning), prevent effective implementation even when all parties agree upon the problem. Finally, a "winner-takes-all" mentality results in inappropriate court rulings on technical questions and the widespread use of advocacy science (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

Simply put, facilitation and mediation are better suited to solve problems than conventional procedures because they involve relevant stakeholders to creatively find solutions for a shared problem. Ury et al. (1988) categorize four commonly assumed advantages of using collaborative methods over conventional ones. They are: lowered transaction costs, greater satisfaction with outcomes, improved relationships among stakeholders and decreased probability of disputes recurring (also see Slaikeu 1989, Yarbrough and Wilmot 1995). In addition, Daniels et al. (1993) identify three specific reasons for the Forest Service adoption of facilitation and mediation. First, agencies using traditional techniques cannot adequately address by themselves the complex issues which emerge with environmental conflict. Second, participants who involve themselves in collaborative processes bring additional resources to the decision-making arena which the agency needs to successfully manage conflict. Finally, the authors ascertained that resolution of disputes using collaborative processes is theoretically consistent with the holistic approach of ecosystem management.

"Since the focus of land management is changing from specific resources (stands of trees or herds of big game) to ecosystems, collaboration appears better suited to the planning and implementation tasks than does traditional public involvement. It arranges the relationships between the stakeholders in a manner that more closely matches the resources and responsibilities that each brings to the process (Daniels et al. 1993: 9-10)."

Theoretically, it seems to make sense for the Agency to embrace the collaborative methods of facilitation and mediation. But, institutional and cultural barriers of the "old forestry" in synoptic planning hinder full implementation of these forms.

The Success of Collaboration to-Date: anything to write home about?

The Forest Service, along with other federal agencies (including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Land Management), has utilized collaborative techniques for a number of years. Other federal agencies adopted these techniques after passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution and Negotiated Rulemaking Acts of 1990 (Manring 1993). (For a more thorough discussion of the purpose and intent of these statutes, see Susskind, Babbitt and Segal 1993.) To date, the Forest Service, like its sister agencies, has had limited success institutionalizing and utilizing facilitation and mediation. The next section examines the Forest Service's attempt to collaborate, including some noted successes and failures.

In addition to carrying out participation procedures specified in pertaining statutes, the Forest Service also has attempted to institutionalize collaborative efforts internally. This includes providing employees with alternative dispute resolution (ADR) training opportunities for a decade and formally codifying a regulation on dispute resolution procedures in 1988. This regulation explicitly authorized negotiations between agency officials and citizens who were administratively appealing decisions on forest plans, timber sales, oil and gas leases, and grazing permits (Manring 1993).

Despite attempts to implement more collaborative procedures, conventional decision-making processes with formally mandated citizen involvement remain the norm. Unsurprisingly, they often fail to resolve the increasing number of conflicts which emerge in natural resource management (Daniels et al. 1993). As stated above, failure of these processes is a result of frequent occlusion of affected parties, and a myopic focus on procedural compliance, instead of substantive citizen involvement and effective problem solving (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Manring (1993) notes, in regard to the Forest Service's attempt to incorporate collaborative practices, that there is a significant difference between authorizing negotiations and instituting an effective ADR system. For an agency to successfully implement such a system, it must forge a cultural change at the organizational and individual level. This includes a willingness to: use dispute resolution processes, implement resulting agreements; and, address employee motivation, resources, and the internal and external disincentives preventing effective ADR adoption.

A Positive Evaluation: the cup half full

Daniels et al. (1993) conducted case study research to: examine decision processes outside the traditional single agency/public participation model; determine whether these alternative processes developed a collaborative tone; and, discover whether collaborative processes achieved more positive effects than

traditional methods. After investigating 65 natural resource disputes, the researchers evaluated cases based on the following criteria and made the following conclusions:

(1) **Stakeholder Access** - Agencies (principally the Forest Service in this study) usually have included all parties involved in a dispute except in rare instances where exclusion of participants is purposeful. Agencies have kept out groups by not inviting them or by focusing on rules and issues which limit their involvement. Researchers also found that inclusion of new participants later on in the process rarely represented a problem. Finally, it was noted that to a large degree, parties self-regulated their involvement based on anticipated benefits of participating.

(2) **Joint Learning/Fact Finding** - Parties quite willingly shared information; they used the learning forum to debate factual information and to present their side of issues. They, however, rarely divulged information they thought might be used against them. This indicates a frequent lack of trust among participants of these forums.

(3) **Exploration of Value Differences** - Participants often explored underlying values through an exercise where they envisioned the ecological/setting desired and then translated that vision into value statements. Agency representatives, however, found it difficult to express organizational values. Instead, they substituted policies or mandates for these statements.

(4) **Discussion of Interests versus Positions** - Research revealed that interest-based dispute discussions achieved greater substantive progress toward settlement than position based-discussions. This indicates that integrative/collaborative strategies were used more successfully in dispute resolution than distributive/competitive strategies (also see Fisher and Ury 1981 for comparison of interest- and position-based settlements).

(5) **Shared Implementation Responsibility** - Jurisdiction responsibility remains a significant issue in public land disputes. A collaborative agreement does not automatically ensure that line officers will adopt arrived-at recommendations. There are instances (e.g., Willamette National Forest) where Forest Service officials rejected a collaborative outcome. In these cases, participants who developed a sense of ownership during the collaborative process, usually reacted negatively to officers' withdrawal of perceived promises.

Negative Evaluations: the cup half empty

Both Agency as well as non-agency disputants have encountered obstacles in effectively using facilitation and mediation. Manring (1993) and others examined the Forest Service's system of resolving disputes collaboratively and identified Agency impediments. As mentioned previously in this section, a strong statutory impetus now exists for the Agency to use collaboration. Despite this strong motivation and the decade-long training of Agency personnel in ADR techniques, obstacles remain which prevent complete and effective implementation of a dispute system.

The first obstacle to increased collaboration is a lack of Agency understanding or acceptance of current social and political realities outside the Agency. Manring (1993) notes that the risk of judicial or Congressional intervention is quite high if traditional administrative appeal procedures are used. The alternative, collaborative negotiations, reduces the likelihood that these external agents will decide dispute

outcomes, and educates agency personnel about these external social and political realities. However, personnel who are unaware of the above verities, perpetuate the use of traditional appeals processes. This obstacle, however, can be overcome through boundary spanning: the acquisition of knowledge about internal and external socio-political elements, and their inter-connected relationships.

A second concern was education. First, Manring (1993) notes that the Agency refuses to advertise its benefits from using negotiations (i.e., collaboration lowers the possibility that resource production will be altered). This hesitation is based on officials' realization that "successes" communicated within the Agency, must also be available to the public due to the Freedom of Information Act. Unfortunately, appellants who perceive from this publicly disseminated information, that the Forest Service "wins" through negotiations, might hesitate to collaborate, believing Agency success is due to process co-optation. Despite these "possible" disadvantages, advertising successes within the Agency would encourage Forest Service personnel to employ dispute resolution processes. Moreover, a second shortcoming of personnel's ADR education is the lack of on-the-job training in employing collaboration (Manring 1993).

A third concern is differing perspectives between the Organization and individuals within it. Although the upper echelon of the Agency eagerly endorses collaborative approaches, the lower level line officers and staff bear the brunt of time demanded for collaboration. While use of negotiations in lieu of conventional appeals processes saves the Organization total work hours, lower-level personnel, still expected to perform all past management tasks, must make the time for collaboration. The Agency, however, to effectively institutionalize ADR procedures, must reward officers and staff for using the purportedly longer process of collaboration, thus circumventing attractive "quick-fixes" to meet deadlines. Such suggestions are elements of the cultural change which must take place in the Forest Service for dispute resolution to be successful (Manring 1993).

Susskind et al. (1993) and Slaikeu (1989) identify additional cultural and institutional obstacles which could potentially hinder the Forest Service's ability to use and institutionalize facilitation and mediation. First, since ADR responsibilities are seldom included on job descriptions, officials hesitate to use ADR procedures because they involve risks beyond their specified employment duties. Furthermore, using collaborative approaches offers very few immediate rewards. Those employees who do use ADR processes risk receiving poor performance evaluations if deadlines or assigned duties are not met or completed. In addition, some agencies value "beating" their adversaries. In this cultural context, personnel engaging in adversarial forms of decision-making, such as litigation, are more likely to be rewarded than those using more cooperative procedures (Susskind, Babbitt and Segal 1993). Furthermore, institutionalized procedures often defer disputes to higher authorities for conventional resolution instead of employing

more collaborative approaches. Organizational by-laws often specifically describe the steps by which upper-level or external parties rule on disputes. Finally, most organizations know how to contact an attorney and start the litigation process, but are unfamiliar with the process of hiring a neutral third party and initiating ADR procedures (Slaikeu 1989).

In addition to the Forest Service, other parties involved in forest conflicts have also encountered barriers which prevent collaboration. Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990), in their case study analysis, identify seven potential obstacles to facilitation or mediation. First, the high front-end transaction costs of collaborative agreements may deter parties from participating. Second, citizens may fear co-optation by an agency, especially if they are unfamiliar with facilitation and mediation. Third, resources expended by disputants to participate may not be worth material or ideological rewards gained. Fourth, organizations may lack the necessary resources to participate as equal partners, especially against mammoth federal agencies such as the Forest Service. Fifth, participation might negatively affect the well-being of an organization (e.g., it might pull resources from more crucial projects.) Sixth, parties with certain environmental perspectives may view collaborative methods as inconsistent with their institutional philosophy. Finally, participants may benefit to a greater extent by using a conventional instead of a collaborative process (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or BATNA), especially if an organization is wedded to a conventional procedure (e.g., Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund).

Conclusion:

The Forest Service recognizes that it has entered a more difficult era; one characterized by a growing public which demands that it manage for a greater diversity of goods and services. Prophetic individuals within the Agency, who foresaw the limitations of stand-alone synoptic planning laid the framework for future collaboration. Their efforts involved personnel education in ADR practices, and statutes and regulations promoting facilitation and mediation. Although this constitutes a significant step forward, it is just a beginning. A more substantial conversion in the culture of Agency personnel must take place: expansion of synoptic planning to include incremental and transactive styles. In essence, the close-knit, quasi-military culture of the Forest Service must now expose itself to external views and adapt to meet new “political” demands imposed upon it by outside players. Collaborative decision-making will aid the Forest Service in managing in an increasingly complex, hostile environment, and will further allow the Agency to seek necessary input from a powerful potential ally, the American public.

The ability of the Forest Service to effectively use collaboration rests, however, on the relaxation of cultural and institutional barriers that hinder these efforts. This involves a departure from the way agency

planning was once done. Changes are demanded in three areas. First, planning regulations must call for collaborative processes. Second, structural barriers within the Agency should be removed. To begin with, the Forest Service should recognize personnel who successfully mediate disputes, both publicly and on performance evaluations. They should, additionally, compensate these individuals for the long hours required for negotiation. Third, the Forest Service should entice other stakeholders to collaborate. Possible strategies to motivate these disputants range, from empowering parties by providing them with monetary and research resources, to compensating representatives for time and expenses spent in meetings. Finally, there must be a concerted effort to educate parties involved in forest conflicts about the possibilities and limitations of collaborative processes. Widespread education will hopefully eliminate cultural taboos that discourage parties from engaging in facilitation and mediation, and will reveal that a better policy-making alternative exists for forest planning and management.


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**PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY MAKING:
THE BITTERROOT CASE**



**Bitterroot Ecosystem Management Research Project
Boone and Crockett Wildlife Conservation Program**

Working Paper 95-14

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BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST




Figure 1: the study area, is the 1.6 million acre Bitterroot National Forest and surrounding region, in west central Montana and east central Idaho.

A SAMPLER OF BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST EVENTS

| | |
|------|--|
| 1805 | Lewis and Clark explore forks of the Bitterroot River. |
| 1842 | Jesuits at Saint Mary's Mission appropriate the first water right on Burnt Fort Creek. |
| 1885 | The Anaconda Cooper Mining (A.C.M.) Company establishes a logging camp in the West Fork area. |
| 1892 | President Harrison sets aside by executive order, 25 sections of timber land in the Bitterroot Mountain Range. |
| 1899 | N.E. Wilkerson and H.C. Tuttle raise the national flag over the first recognized Forest Service building. |
| 1910 | Firest burning in Lost Horse and Fred Burr Canyons eventually encompass an area 125 miles long and 43 miles wide. |
| 1961 | The Sleeping Child Fire results in large-scale timber salvage sales. |
| 1982 | The Bitterroot National Forest (BNF) starts their forest planning process. |
| 1987 | The BNF completes their Forest Plan. |
| 1988 | Former members of the Timber Sale Review Committee form the Friends of the Bitterroot. |
| 1989 | The BNF initiates the Lick Creek Project. |
| 1990 | Resource production proponents create Grassroots for Multiple Use to counteract Friends of the Bitterroot and protest on-going negotiations. |
| 1992 | The BNF begins the Stevensville South-West Project. |
| 1994 | The BNF starts the Stevensville West-Central Project. |

ASSORTED FEDERAL POLICIES

| | |
|------|---|
| 1897 | Congress passes the Organic Act which mandated protective management of forest reserves. |
| 1960 | Congress further clarifies the Forest Service mission in the Multiple-Use |
| 1969 | Congress mandates procedures for dealing with significant federal activities in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). |
| 1972 | Congress provides guidelines for federal agencies using advisory committees with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). |
| 1973 | Forest planning begin when Congress passes the Resource Policy Act (RPA). |
| 1976 | Congress provides additional direction for managing national forests with the National Forest Management Act (NFMA). |
| 1992 | Forest Service Chief F. Dale Robertson issues the ecosystem directive. |

SUPERVISORS AND TENURES

| From | To | Supervisor |
|------|---------|--------------------|
| 1903 | 1906 | E. A. Sherman |
| 1906 | 1908 | Elers Koch |
| 1909 | 1921 | Wilfred W. White |
| 1922 | 1935 | John W. Lowell |
| 1935 | 1955 | Guy M. Brandborg |
| 1955 | 1959 | Thurman E. Trosper |
| 1960 | 1966 | Harold E. Anderson |
| 1966 | 1970 | Merrill E. Tesler |
| 1970 | 1974 | Orville L. Daniels |
| 1974 | 1988 | Robert Morgan |
| 1988 | 1991 | Bertha C. Gillam |
| 1992 | Present | Stephen K. Kelly |

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PREFACE

Collaborative methods are assumed to more effectively involve citizens in public natural resource decision-making than conventional ones. The ineffectiveness of conventional practices largely stems from a focus on fulfilling procedural requirements rather than solving problems. According to Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), this misplaced focus, unfortunately manifests itself with suppression of minority views until they comprise the majority or seek administrative or judicial relief; short-term commitments to problems and programs until terms-of-office expire which results in ineffective and inefficient solutions; and the overly simplistic "yes-no" context of voting which forces legislators to rely upon lobbyists for public input and information. In addition, technical and legal complexities, often purposely employed to exclude the non-professional, prevent effective implementation, even when all parties agree upon the problem. Finally a winner-takes-all mentality results in inappropriate court rulings on technical questions and the widespread use of advocacy science.

From the late 1950s to the early 70s, land officers on the Bitterroot National Forest (BNF), consistent with national forest policy, frequently opted to make forest decisions to increase timber production. Furthermore, they largely ignored protests from an emerging environmental community who objected to intrusions into wilderness areas, clear-cuts, extensive road-building, and in the early 1970s, terracing. These activities, especially in sensitive areas, such as the Magruder corridor, resulted in an escalation of the conflict. In addition, local activists, notably Guy Brandborg, used their connections in Washington DC, and on the University of Montana campus to, respectively, place the Bitterroot Controversy in the national spotlight, and produce the Bolle Report, in which University professors criticized practices on the Forest. National criticisms of Forest Service practices was not limited to the Bitterroot, however, but also included the Tongass, and Monongahela Forests. In 1976, as a response to a ruling on a case concerning the Monongahela, Congress passed the National Forest Management Act (NFMA).

On June 4, 1992, F. Dale Robertson, chief of the USDA Forest Service (USDA FS) issued a memo to all regional foresters and station directors entitled Ecosystem Management of the National Forests and Grasslands. Chief Robertson (1992) lists public involvement as one of "three very important points" for the success of ecosystem management. In addition, he suggests that the Agency should complement its current management with a combination of planning theories, equivalent to adaptive, collaborative, and synoptic planning. Although all three styles likely were used to varying degrees before release, the memo implies a departure from the flavor of Forest Service management in previous decades where synoptic planning dominated and often obscured collaborative and adaptive approaches. An increase in the effectiveness of public

involvement should, therefore, accompany an expansion in the use of collaboration for planning types in the National Forest System.

This study originally attempted to verify the above contention by comparing through case study methodology, the effectiveness of public involvement when synoptic-dominated versus more-collaborative planning was used on the BNF. The underlying assumption of this study was that formal policy changes (i.e., passage of forest management statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, and implementation of system-wide programs, such as ecosystem management) caused the changes in planning on the national forests. A corollary to this assumption is that more collaborative approaches emerged with the ecosystem management direction in 1992.

Consultation with other social researchers on the Bitterroot Ecosystem Management Research Project (BEMRP) confirmed an emerging truth: the unfamiliarity with, and lack of research on the social elements of the BNF precluded testing the hypothesis that: collaborative-dominated planning more effectively involved the public(s) than synoptic-dominated planning. Moreover, subsequent interviews with opinion leaders in the Bitterroot Valley confirmed that the previously planned methodology contained gaps in understanding. For example, the proposed research variables that influenced public involvement grew in number from one, formal policy changes, to also include personalities and styles of forest supervisors and staff, and historical events in the Valley. In addition, the research design lacked standardized definitions of public involvement and effectiveness. For instance, public involvement definitions by various people in reference to different points in time ranged from education and consultation, to greater interactions between the Agency and citizens. Research also found different definitions of effectiveness, whose meaning was often freely interchanged with the terms equity and efficiency.

This lack of information on interactions between the public and the Agency, however, demanded that other, inductive social research concerning public involvement, namely: what is the nature of effective public involvement; how should it be studied; and how should it be achieved - should be carried out. This ethnographic case study of public participation on the BNF follows a work entitled "Public Participation in Natural Resource Decision-making: A Review of the Literature", and attempts to answer these questions by presenting historical interpretations of Forest Service public involvement in the area, with an emphasis on recent decades.

QUALITATIVE METHODS

Interviews with various opinion leaders comprise the research data in a method previously described by Glaser and Strauss in The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. The authors prescribe development of a list of potential interviewees by employing a technique known as 'snowball sampling,' where initial and subsequent respondents suggest other qualified individuals. Moreover, names are selected based upon the number of references each name received, and differences in backgrounds and philosophical stances from other persons interviewed. The latter point is considered in order to cover as wide a cross-section of publics in the Valley as possible. Although extensive coverage and thorough understanding exist as ultimate goals, they are usually compromised due to methodological shortcomings, and/or the lack of research funds and time. Likewise, this research probably contains gaps when describing public involvement in the Bitterroot for the last several decades.

Nevertheless, upon meeting with selected individuals, open-ended interviews are taped and subsequently transcribed, ensuring that speaker anonymity is maintained. The researcher then reviews notes, extracting keyphrases and words from the transcribed texts, thus providing discussion topics for future interviews. Furthermore, common keyphrases and words are arranged in chronological order and grouped. When possible, conceptual or theoretical frameworks are devised to add greater understanding to the social environment under study. Moreover, appropriate quotations are linked to key statements to provide depth and validity to the text. To also contribute validity, ensure anonymity for interviewed respondents, and optimize usefulness to the target audience - outside readers, including interviewees, review and edit draft copies of the report.

Please note before proceeding that the sole basis for all text preceding the conclusion, both paraphrases and quotations, are interviews and notes of interviewees, and not the author's viewpoints. Thus, this report comprises a series of perceptions, sometimes contradictory; but such conflicting contentions are commonly found in life. In addition, the report might seem weighted unfairly, especially when portraying leadership personalities and styles. For instance, one supervisor received more coverage than others. Possibly, the greater coverage is partly due to her recent tenure (i.e., a greater number of people remember her and were on the Forest than other supervisors serving farther in the past), however, leadership personality and style it is believed also influenced how much and what people remembered about various supervisors; her tenure was reported in greater detail because people elaborated more extensively on it.

INTRODUCTION

This case study attempts to merge two different established methodologies: case study and ethnographic. Doing so presents an unusual end product, a history of selective variables obtained from individuals who represent different interests in the area. In other words, it attempts to present a valid picture, or in ethnographic terms, “a deep understanding” of public involvement in the Forest, by painting a picture with terms and quotes of those interviewed.

A valid study rests upon a valid research design. In the following sections of the introduction, quotes of respondents will demonstrate that a historical approach, and an examination of formal policy, personality and style of management and staff, and historical events in the Bitterroot Valley, are appropriate frameworks for this study. A second chapter describing public involvement in greater detail will follow the case study.

Historical Rationale

As was stated in the preface, this case study examines historic public involvement, focusing to a greater extent on recent decades. This methodology is consistent with statements of interviewed people.

According to one respondent in the Valley, the Forest Service has questioned what constitutes effective public participation for years. This party finds the agency officials’ difficulty in determining events in the last twenty years perplexing:

“I’m not sure why they haven’t seen the light. The Bitterroot is a pretty constrained, limited community. It can’t be too difficult for them to be here, mix with the people, read the paper, and know a little bit of the background for the last 20 years. There are very few in the Forest Service now who were here 20 years ago.... There are retired people. There are a number.... They would have some insight on public input.”

Furthermore, respondents list four reasons why interactions between the Forest Service and the public should be examined historically. First, different people who have resided in the region for varying number of years, relate to the Agency based on different periods in its past.

“When I came here I had to look back thirty years. I couldn’t start my public participation process when I got here because of the people I’m working for. They may have been here fifty years; they may have been here one hundred years; but they may have been here only

four years too. The history that's behind why people look at me and what I say and what the Forest says and does a lot of times is about what happened twenty-five years ago."

Second, the current Forest Service line and staff on the BNF are dealing with a public relations hump that predates the vast majority of them - taking place mostly in the 1960s and 70s when clear-cutting and terracing occurred.

"Well, if you are talking specifically about the Bitterroot here, I assume you are, they have a... this might be true in a bunch of other forests too, they have a huge hump that was built up for them before this particular group of people was on the Forest. In other words, not a soul was on the Forest, with the exception of John Ormiston. He honestly is the only one left of the old gang who has been here and knows how the antagonism was built up among the people against the Forest Service primarily dealing with the clear-cutting in the early 60s. That and the clear-cutting. And after the clear-cut, they built...[t]erracing. People did not like that."

Third, a handful of current Forest Service employees reside outside the Valley (i.e., "one out of fifteen line and staff; maybe fifteen out of two-hundred permanent employees"). A historical approach will therefore, not only familiarize Agency officials with the past, but will also paint a current portrait for those personnel who commute. One member of the line when asked to assess past public involvement, stated the following:

"Well, as far as techniques used in public involvement before I was here, I am not too familiar. I don't think you can look at public involvement as a technique or tool, as much as what social dynamics are happening in the Valley and what was going on. I can't really say that I am in tune with that either, because I haven't lived in the Valley and I don't live in the Valley now. So, I can't really tell you about the social dynamics."

Finally, the Bitterroot Valley serves as a "weathervane" for issues and trends that later arise in other places in the State or the Nation.

"What I found when I went down there was the Bitterroot Valley was considered...a kind of weathervane for Montana. Public issues that would raise in other places would raise early in the Bitterroot Valley: subdivision issues."

"That kind of policy shift [eliminating clear-cuts at the national level by the Chief] in a letter and no real assessment of what that meant to cut the volumes [of timber cut], and essentially reduce half the volume. So it was a significant thing. But here people demanded that in the 60s. We [the Forest Service] were here [i.e., instituted that policy] in 85. Is that effective public participation?"

Case Study Framework: Three Elements

To ascertain the effectiveness of public involvement, three variables are examined: management personalities and styles, historical events occurring in the Valley, and official policies of the Agency.

“So what I am getting at, if you really want to know what’s going on, look at the management style of the staff at any given period. That’s one variable. That’s why just looking at the policies is not going to work for you. You see there are at least three different variables that you have to look at. You have to look at what’s going on in that era, I mean each era for the Bitterroot Valley over these 25 years is different...[:] change in social setting, the changing values, as well as in-migration.... And finally the change in official policy, and that is probably the least important.”

To simplify the inter-connectedness of the three variables, one can envision the changes in each element by looking for trends and using a matrix approach.

“So the point which is important is that you can’t study the Bitterroot Valley without realizing that it isn’t something that is made out of whole cloth at one time. You just can’t go in and say this is the way things are and make any sense of it unless you look at the trends. If you don’t look at the trends of what has been going on, you can’t make sense of the existing because you’ve got a lot of what I would call legacy type of issues that are there, that have been there along time.”

“Well, I think as far as designating the different periods, you’re going to have to use some sort of a matrix approach and your going to have to look at events. What I am trying to say here is that your research problem is so big, it’s going to be very hard to draw sound conclusions, to test hypothesis. But you have to at least look at a continuum of errors too.”

The three variables should not, however, be weighted the same. According to most interviewees, management personalities and styles influence the effectiveness of public involvement more than official agency policies.

“I know seven forest supervisors and what they did in that Valley starting with Brandborg, etc. - you don’t need to know all the names. And here’s what my conclusion is after watching them after all this time: that it’s not the official policy of the Agency; its the personality of the forest supervisor generally, and his staff generally, that set the kinds of public participation and whether it works or doesn’t work. It is the personal values of the person leading the decision process that determines public participation and the success or failure of that.”

Respondents mentioned several reasons why this is the case. First, because communities and Forest Service officials are different, line officers must approach each public involvement situation in a unique way. This reality limits the use of public involvement models, when interacting with the public.

“In fact, if there is a conclusion that I would reach it is this: and that is, every community has a kind of different approach to decisions. Every community. And every decision-maker has a kind of different approach. And you can’t cookie-cut it. You can’t do a formal; you can’t do a model. You can’t say one works best and the other doesn’t work. It’s not the technique, its the social structure of the community and the personalities of the decision-makers that make it work or not work. I’m giving you the, well that’s a hypothesis you could test.”

Second, local line officers must observe that official policies work on the ground, in order for them to attempt implementing them. If they do not, land managers will pragmatically alter them to where they will, or will disregard them.

“Because what happens is in an agency that has a great deal of decentralization, you can change official policy, but if it doesn’t work on the ground, the people on the ground won’t follow it or they will shift it and change it so it will work. It is a very pragmatic organization. If it doesn’t work you don’t do it. See and I’m not discounting the change in policy as affecting these things.”

Examples of the over-riding influence of personalities on the implementation of official policies exist at both the local and the national levels.

“In that period of time, although we did policy changes like NEPA. I mentioned NEPA, as soon as we had tried some of the techniques in NEPA like more formal public participation, we backed off. We backed off because it was causing more trouble than it was solving. And we went to more of a consultive, one-on-one, small group kinds of work instead of the more formal participation.”

“See we were poised to make this paradigm shift in ‘78, almost fifteen years ago. We were poised to make the shift from optimizing timber on suitable land to some form. They didn’t call it ecosystem management. Hubert Humphrey who wrote NFMA, Hubert Humphrey wrote, “it is time to view forests as more than trees and trees as more than wood.” Now that is in the legislative history. Maybe it’s included in the Act. He failed to get elected and Reagan came in and said, “when you see one redwood tree, you’ve seen them all.” He brought in an administration that was politically at the national level; that stopped the Agency’s shift toward a different paradigm. Stopped it cold: twelve years, eight of his administration and four of Bush’s. Here you have a President whose policies and style, just like the supervisors, is affecting things.”

Third, supervisors set the tone for their rangers, who do a tremendous amount of public involvement work on the ground.

“[T]he supervisors set the tone for their rangers, and the rangers do a lot of PR work if you want to put it that way. People go into their offices and sit and talk. Or the staff in a ranger district gets their signals too from the ranger. Now, there is a difference in the rangers too.”

As mentioned previously, historical events also heavily affect public involvement, “[a]nd finally the change in official policy, and that is probably the least important.”

Despite much consistency among them, an interviewee fails to unanimously agree upon the relative importance of the three variables. For instance, one respondent differs markedly in his perception of the impact that supervisors and their staff have had on public involvement in relationship to public involvement.

“The [public participation] process is very similar; practically the same as the one started in ‘83 with forest plans. It’s...just different people involved. They probably think that they have a whole new process, but it’s just different people making the same mistake.... It’s all about the same. There isn’t any reward for them [Forest Service personnel] being more responsive. The reward system isn’t geared to that kind of thing. They try to be at the start by..., they try to establish communications, but as soon as it is apparent that their desires aren’t going to be met and they aren’t going to convince you that what they are doing is correct, they cut off communication basically - so that there is little communications with you....But, I think the real effect has been in the last, oh, from the 1970 on, with the Bitterroot Controversy, the Monongahela, and law suits, which led to the National Forest Management Act.”

Regardless of each variable’s weighting, the three elements provide strands by which to organize the following case study.

AN ETHNO-HISTORY OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT: THE BITTERROOT CASE

The Early Years

The Bitterroot Valley was one of the earliest settlement sites in the State. Moving to the area in the late 1800s, were groups of midwesterners who previously knew each other. Shortly after initial settlement in the region, Congress established the Bitterroot Forest Reserve. This action

unfortunately created hostility between the federal government and local residents. Proponents of the Forest Reserve and subsequent National Forest System attempted to impose a conservation management paradigm on forested federal lands - a view that few shared in the Bitterroot Valley. Homesteaders and commodity interests vociferously protested federal 'intrusion and interference', saying that it negatively affected their livelihood. A key party representing local commodities interests was Marcus Daly and his Anaconda Copper Mining Company, who, at a large scale, removed timber from the adjacent forests. In time, the forest reserves became the national forests, with early rangers acting as stewards by "fighting forest fires and maintaining trails and grazing, a lot more grazing."

This period marked the beginning of two trends noted by interviewees, which still are largely true today. First, since the inception of the Reserve, Bitterrooters have protested federal forest management.

"They seemed to be a particularly contentious society. And in 1898 when the people studying the establishment of national forests wrote their reports, they said they had amiable or friendly relationships with everyone except those in the Bitterroot Valley. And people in the Bitterroot Valley seemed particularly contentious."

Some respondents disagree with the conflictual notoriety granted only to Bitterrooters, both past and present. One states, "I think those conflicts show up anywhere. I think there's people who are as concerned about the Flathead, as there are people concerned about the Bitterroot."

Second, anti-government sentiment accompanied the expanding federal presence on the Reserve at the turn of the Century.

"When this Forest Service came to the Bitterroot Valley, we were hated. Many of the arguments which are made by Constitutionalists, anti-government [people] right now are saying the same arguments which were being made in the 1900s but for different reasons."

Shortly after, the area encountered its first boom-and bust event and in-migration with a massive campaign developing and marketing apple orchards. The subdivided plots attracted out-of-state citizens who possessed capital and different values. Most of the Valley residents at that time, depended economically on extracting resources and had developed accompanying utilitarian values, which , unsurprisingly, contrasted greatly with amenity values of the recent arrivals. Although residents of the Valley prospered from the influx of outside money, they resented the intruding newcomers.

“The Bitterroot Valley went through a lot of boom and bust kinds of things. In the 20s and 30s they decided that apple growing was a valuable option. They kind of built a business on the McIntosh Apple. They brought irrigation and subdivided the Valley at that time. They brought trains of settlers out from the East to buy into this process to buy into this land. So local folks, although they were capitalizing on the commercial values, were also resentful that people were moving in. So even in the 20s there were questions by the original settlers of what was going on.”

Revolving-door migrations, however, marked this period: outsiders moved to the area for its amenity values, and then quickly left, after being exposed to the physical and emotional hardships of the cold winters. Such trends of migrations to the Valley by people possessing different values recurred several decades later, and are occurring in the region today.

Interviewed respondents occasionally used the Forest Service of this era and its interactions with the public, to compare with the Agency and its practices at other points in time. As mentioned previously, its mission centered around protection of the forest resources, especially against the ‘deleterious effects’ of forest fires. Moreover, the close relationship agency personnel possessed with the public also characterized this period.

“But he [a past forest ranger] also had the sense and understanding of the community.... He was really ahead of his time, and at least in his district, he made a strong effort to be a member, but also have the relationship within a circle. Within a group which one is in you have a family, you have members of the family, they are connected by various types of relationships. Those are very special types of relationships. So, he was a member of the community. He was a member in the broad sense of the community. He was truly tied in, in the old sense of the word, to that community. And I think, most Forest Service people were at that time.”

Rangers gained acceptance into the Bitterroot community by engaging in activities. First, the ranger interacted with the area’s citizens through membership in various organizations.

“He was also a member in the narrower sense: all the little circles that were connected to one another, that were connected to the whole, that made up the community of Stevensville and Victor and whatever. He could also be quite controversial, but he could also be quite respected. He went out and did show-me trips, he was doing slide shows at the Grange and any other club he could possibly manage.”

Second, the ranger was more localized and resided within the community.

“Thirty years ago when [you had] your first public participation, the ranger always lived at the ranger station and so if you had a problem with the Forest Service, if the ranger wasn’t

working, he lived next door. And so the ranger was generally in many cases was one of the leaders of the community. Now, in many cases, just because dual careers, you know, two families and because it's easy to drive.... It used to be hard to drive from Missoula to Darby or Missoula to Hamilton. You know many, a lot of those things, we're not as connected as we used to be in the community."

Finally, a more decentralized Forest Service delegated greater responsibility to the ranger at the community level. In this environment, distinctions between the Agency and the community broke down.

"Rangers could pretty much do what they want. I used to ride Forest Service horses. I used to ride in Forest Service vehicles. It was part of the community. What...[he] had was the Forest Service's and what the Forest Service had was his, and there were no clear distinctions. And...[his wife] drove Forest Service trucks and so did Forest Service clerks. It was just a different era. They were part of the community."

One respondent attributes the greater cohesion between the Forest Service and the public as the result of the ranger's personality, political pressures within the community, and the lack of other Forest Service duties.

"Well, Brandy was kind of a unique character all by himself. First of all, that guy involved the public all during his tenure...[b]ecause he wanted to, because it was.... He thought it was politically astute for him to do that...But Brandy, that was his philosophy as long as he was in the Forest Service, involve the public. I guess you could when you weren't doing anything. I guess you could when you were basically putting fires out. You know, what the hell do you have to involve the public with."

Moreover, a smaller total and interested population in the Valley also helps explain the less contentious relationship between the Agency and the local people at that time.

"It probably was because Brandy could do more things on a one-to-one basis than you can even think about today, because there wasn't that many people who were interested in what was going on. Yeah. He probably had very, very few people who were interested in what was going on, because there wasn't impacts on the land that you get through resource production. I think it involved each one of my individual bases, whereas there's hundreds if not thousands of them today, right here in the Bitterroot. So, it makes a lot of difference when you are talking about the difference between the two periods. He retired in 1957, there was virtually nothing going on down here in the Bitterroot in the way of timber production."

Despite past success when involving the public, one interviewee notes that management practices of the time often protected resources less than ones today.

“Nothing happened when Brandy was here, practically nothing other than starting to get into the timber production. There was far worse practices that occurred when he was here, than occurred after he left. When they logged at that time, they went straight up the creek bottom and got the logs: came up it and came down it. That’s right. There’s a bundle of sales up there where the dozer went straight up the draw and right back out. Then there was quite a bit of watershed rehabilitation that went on because of that.”

The Controversy

Management of the national forests changed after World War II in response to a growing economy and a rising demand for wood. During this era the Forest Service changed its focus to the maximization of wood production. This new management paradigm, however, was not limited to the Agency, but was pervasive throughout the nation.

“For 30 or 40 years, the management of the land with suitable timber base, that’s about 50 to 60 million acres, of the National Forest System, was you were to manage it for maximum wood fiber production. It started in the 50s and it has been the paradigm. Now, it’s embodied in a whole series of policies, but nowhere is stated as clearly as I have just stated it. Everybody knew it, but it was never stated that way. It’s shown in appropriation language: the way Congress gave out money. It was public policy. It was not the Agency’s paradigm. It was the paradigm of the national interests having to do with the national forest[s]. In other words, Congress affirmed it through appropriation language: it’s embodied in all kinds of regulations; it’s embodied in the regulations of...; NFMA embodies it.”

For example, on the Bitterroot, harvest drastically increased from minuscule amounts to approximately seventy million board feet following the Sleeping Child Fire of 1961. Unsurprisingly, the loss of one-third of the roadless areas in the BNF due to salvage sales angered many local wilderness proponents. The amount harvested nevertheless, soon dropped to fifty-five million board feet, however, local residents still felt that too much stumpage was being removed. In a sense, this perception was correct. Timber specialists in the Agency, without public input, calculated the fifty-five million quantity based upon forested acreage on both the Montana (Bitterroot) and the Idaho (Selway) side. Unfortunately, all harvesting activity took place on the Montana side of the BNF. In time, timber analysts finally accepted that no logging activity would take place in Idaho and subsequently reformulated their calculations.

“And then, after the Sleeping Child fire, those people who cared, saw about a third of their roadless areas just evaporate on the Ravalli County side; just evaporate in just a matter of a few years. That’s when...[the Forest Service] really started to generate some controversy. And, those salvage loggings contributed to that seventy million, but the allowable harvest in the Bitterroot, that was both the Idaho side and the Montana side, was fifty-five million. And, we finally convinced somebody that [the Agency was]n’t going into that Idaho side.”

Shortly thereafter, an environmental movement rose up in the Valley. Group membership included two former Forest Service employees, Guy Brandborg and Charlie McDonald (who were reportedly forced out of the Agency in response to the new management paradigm); area residents associated with the Rocky Mountain Lab (an experimental medical lab located in Hamilton); and local citizens. This assembly gathered to protest national forest management which created the perception of a ‘tree farm’, instead of a ‘natural forest.’

“[A]nd after the clear-cut they built...[t]erracing. People did not like that. There were some places where indeed there was erosion and that sort of thing. But what it did was create a vision of a tree farm. And that, people didn’t like that either. We are used to the natural forest.”

The well organized group, under such leaders as Doris Milner and Guy Brandborg, effectively galvanized public opinion, and eventually gained a national reputation.

The Bitterroot Controversy started when people in this contingent reacted to two events: reclassification of the Bitterroot-Selway Primitive Area, especially lands contained within the Magruder Corridor, and the spraying of DDT to control spruce budworm.

“And the first battle which really took place if my time sequence is correct, was over the Bitterroot-Selway Wilderness and the designation of the lines. And there was a tremendous fight over that: where the lines were to be. A relatively small group of environmentalists fought that one, about half a dozen or so really active people, but were very effective at galvanizing public opinion. At the same time there was another controversy going on in the Bitterroot Valley. That was the spraying of DDT for spruce budworm control. Spruce budworm was pretty rampant at that time there. In fact, it was in parts of western Montana and Idaho and there was a massive spray program. And the scientists at the Lab organized to fight that because of the danger. They were ahead of their time a bit.”

These two clashes readied the environmental group for future engagements over larger national forest issues in a region still dominated by commodity interests.

“And this core of people who learned how to fight the bureaucracy, to fight the public policies which existed at that time, that learned how to do it on the battles of the Bitterroot-Selway and the spruce budworm - were well prepared to take on the battle for the overall

management of the National Forest which occurred in the 60s and the 70s. At that time you still had a strong ranching, farming, logging component, but you had a moving in of the scientists and a few others moving in from other parts of the country began to change; they had different values about using the national forests.”

An examination of the wilderness reclassification demonstrates how conflict over forest management in the Valley quickly escalated.

In 1963, the Forest Service redrew boundary lines for the Bitterroot-Selway Primitive Area. As part of this process, the Agency removed 270,000 acres out of primitive area designation in the Magruder Corridor (i.e., the Selway River drainage area). Furthermore, nine timber sales and the building of a road over Nez Perce Pass to access the timber from those sales accompanied the redesignation of this area. Moreover, these agency actions outraged the environmental community for several reasons. First, the Forest Service proposed building a road into a designated primitive area. Second and perhaps as important, these activities seemed based solely on direction from the Washington Office. In other words, the BNF continued to carry out these proposed activities despite the expressed displeasure of the public.

“But they were going to have timber sales. They had nine timber sales and that’s why that road over the Nez Perce Pass. I am not sure if you have been on the Nez Perce Pass. Well, we didn’t need a mechanical road to go into the wilderness. Believe me. Well it starts at the bottom and goes over the top five miles and stops. Well, we stopped it. But it wasn’t forest management just for the Forest itself. It came down from Washington to the Regional Office to here and they were not paying any attention to the public about what we wanted done in the Magruder area. That classification.”

A lack of public involvement also characterized timber plans in the 1960s.

“I think a lot of it was due to a lack of public involvement, there was no, probably was very little public involvement involved with the timber plan that the Bitterroot was operating with in the 1960s.”

Furthermore, in regards to timber production, the people in the Valley expected, and demanded that the Agency manage for all resources equally upon passage of the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield (MUSY) Act of 1960. Obviously, this was not the scenario in the Bitterroot during the 1960s and early 70s. One respondent remembers the minimal effect of the MUSY Act, and “the Multiple-Use plan at that time. Well, the first one was done during the 60s when.... It was a pretty minimal document. It didn’t try to guide detailed activities on the Bitterroot.”

Moreover, the knowledge of an absolute increase in timber harvested along with more visible signs of forest management (i.e., clear-cutting and terracing) implemented later, further angered residents in the Valley.

“So, when the Forest developed the new timber plan during the 60s, it involved, increased the amount of timber harvested, it actually regulated the amount harvested of other timber types with lodgepole pine and douglas fir. So, timber harvest increased because we were harvesting more of other species. It actually went down with the amount of ponderosa pine harvested. When we went into these other species, we went into quite a bit more clear-cutting: lodgepole and mistletoe-infected douglas fir and those kinds of things. Of course, the visual aspects of it were, I think, an immediate shock to a lot of the publics.”

Consistent with the above quote, interviewees attributed concern for and subsequent conflict on the BNF to their close proximity to, and full view of the adjacent forests by the residents of the Valley.

“I think the big difference is the fact, that you mentioned or I mentioned, that people are living in close proximity to a large part of the Forest. The significant amount of timber harvest that happened in the 60s on the face of the mountains was readily visible from the towns and houses and people in the Bitterroot. Whereas in the Flathead..., there was a tremendous amount of timber harvest with spruce, because they had a larch beetle epidemic with spruce. Probably as dramatic a change, if not more so, as the change here. Most of the changes were not visible to the public, they were on the North Fork or on the South Fork of the Flathead. They were not seen, on a large basis, by the public.”

Another respondent further explains why the close proximity makes Bitterrooters extra-sensitive to changes on the Forest, especially clear-cuts, additional roads, and terracing.

“We are used to the natural forest. Do you realize how closely we live to this Forest? I am going to digress here for a moment. We live right in the arms of the Forest on both sides. All of us. We wake up in the morning and smell the air off the mountains. We see the snow in the mountains. We get the chinook; we hear the chinook; we smell the thing. When the elk.... We live very close to this Forest. That isn't true in Lolo you see....I don't know of any forest in Region One that is that close to the people or the people are close to the forest.”

At the onset of the Controversy, the dissatisfied environmental contingent approached the Forest Service, but such efforts were fruitless because in the words of one person, “ I know you can't ask the fox to guard the henhouse.” Aware that agency officials would probably continue to quietly ignore their comments, the group turned to national actors and arenas to make their concerns known.

The Bitterroot Controversy was ripe to capture widespread attention for various local and national reasons. First, a substantive and personal connection existed between the local conflict and the national wilderness issue. At that time in Washington DC, wilderness proponents continued their six-year effort to push through legislation which would establish a wilderness system. Several staunch wilderness advocates including Guy Brandborg, resided in Montana at the time. "Brandy," armed with his ability to accomplish tasks politically and his connections with prominent people in the natural resource arena, decided to place the Magruder Corridor back into wilderness classification.

"I have to say that he [Guy Brandborg] was a tough old bird and there are some words worse than that for him but....he knew how to operate. He was a real operator. He felt very strongly that things were not going well on this Forest, and he, by that time, had retired. But he had decided that we were going to get the Magruder back into protection, and that we were going to stop the clear-cutting and the terracing, and get into some..., he didn't use the word ecosystem management - that wasn't quite in the vocabulary then, but Forest Service practices that were lighter on the land and more scientifically based. He had a good relationship with some very good researchers: Arnie Bolle, and a lot of others. And Brandy, he was not educated as a scientist, he still had the vision that the Forest was not being managed kindly and it was a single purpose."

Second, the environmental coalition, after the Forest Service refused to listen to them, approached Senator Lee Metcalf to force a change in management on the BNF.

"And we were working on Lee Metcalf. We needed help. We knew we weren't getting anywhere. But politicians no matter how good they are, are still politicians. And let me tell you it took years to get to their ears. And we had to show them that we were a constituency: a real one - not just eight mad people. That won't cut."

"In the Magruder case, the Secretary of Agriculture (Orville Freeman) was leaned on by Senator Metcalf to appoint a committee to look into the situation and come up with recommendations to end the standoff between the Agency and the angry public. In this case, you saw the public running the end on the Agency since it had turned a deaf ear to them."

Third, events in the Bitterroot caught the attention of conservation organizations, and the imagination of young people who were then joining their ranks. Finally, magazine and newspaper reporters, most notably Dale Burke of the Missoulian, actively covered the Controversy.

And, what was the Forest Service's stance on public involvement? Until 1960 with the passage of the MUSY Act, no legislation existed which mandated public involvement specifically for forest planning or management. The extent to which the Forest Service incorporated citizen desires rested largely with the supervisor and local rangers. As mentioned beforehand, several

agency employees such as Guy Brandborg, chose to interact with the public on a regular basis. The emerging timber emphasis in the 1950s, however, moved the Agency from a protection to a timber production focus. As a result, rangers now had less time to communicate with locals in the Valley, and less discretion in how to manage. The replacement of Guy Brandborg with Thurman Trosper accompanied this change. Moreover, a couple years later, Andy Anderson, Trosper's successor, fully promoted timber production on national forest lands. In addition, one-way communication, instead of more-participatory two-way communication, characterized this era. In short, the Forest Service simply informed the public about their current projects or activities.

"Then there was Harold Anderson - a very tough cookie with whom I had to deal during the Magruder Corridor fracas so I know first hand his ideas about what was the proper role of the public in forest management, and they weren't exactly a partnership approach!"

"[The] office was originally known as information and education, so that tells you a whole hell of a lot about what public involvement consisted of: inform and educate....It was pretty late in the game, when division of information and education was changed to inform, involve."

Indirectly through inference, the transformation toward more public involvement began with the MUSY Act of 1960.

"It [public involvement] started out as just kind of informing people. Big brother saying, 'we know what's right for you.' And then informing the people what we are going to do. I guess, that's the way it is, was for a long time...[, then] the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act. It didn't require it, but it inferred it. That Act was a very short act. It was a quarter of a page. Now you have an act, and you can't believe it [the length and complexity of recent acts]. It kind of evolved."

Passage of a law mandating that the Forest Service incorporate other utilized resources in their planning did not necessarily result in a weaker emphasis on timber production. At the time, commodity producers remained the most vocal public of both the Agency and Congress.

"If the price of logs went too high, about the only people who were talking to Congress at the time were the National Home Builders Association and wood products industries. They would tell our representatives that the price of stumpage was too high, and they wanted us to put more stumpage on the market to drive those prices down. And that was the way it was. And, you look at range management, and it was the same way. The people who were knocking on Congressional doors were the ranchers. The rancher might be saying, 'those sons-of-bitches, they're driving me out of my range.' I'm sure you know that background, but that was the way it was."

Business-as-usual commodity production continued. This situation allowed some high-ranking officials to remain unaware of the law several years after its passage. The following anecdote reveals how little attention some officials gave to the law and its ramifications.

“One of those, was to define high-area zone under the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act. That particular zone was like a roadless area, an area that would be perpetuated as long as it was in that high area zone. So, it seemed like a logical place to start, for me....I think it was about 62 when I tried to figure out what a high area zone was....And, one day I had, it was in the winter so there was no field activity, so I had a floor full of maps and in walked three assistant regional foresters. They asked me what I was doing. And, when you say, ‘I’m trying to define a high area zone,’ and they say, ‘what’s that,’ and you start talking about the Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act and that drew a blank. And so it was a totally different period than we have right now. Totally different: different philosophy. The whole damn works. The whole outfit was driven by commodity production.”

Perhaps surprisingly, public involvement did occasionally occur due to the MUSY Act, however, like the era prior to its passage, the discretion of forest officials largely determined the magnitude by which the Agency practiced public participation.

“I can remember one of the earliest issues that I ever got involved with, what did they call it, scenic roads. That was way back in the 60s, ‘62 or ‘63....We talked to quite a few groups....And these were roads that were planned within roadless areas for scenic purposes. We sure got an earful, and we didn’t build a one of them. I suppose it was the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield that got me going on it.”

Little public involvement, however, took place on the BNF at this time, in large part, because Merrill Tester, supervisor at the time, failed to engender confidence, and communicate with local citizens.

“The guy [Supervisor Merrill Tester]...was very isolated from the people. He was not a very confident manager. He was afraid to talk to the people. He would talk only in controlled settings. He was the type of guy who would never look you in the eye. He didn’t engender confidence. And the thing was just falling apart; it was just flat coming apart under him.”

Moreover, antagonistic public meetings of this era were far from ideal. One interviewee describes his attendance at a Resource Conservation and Development (RC&D) meeting in 1968.

"I went into that meeting, and I didn't know there was anything going on. I went into that meeting, and there were two fist-fights right in the meeting. And I was thinking, 'what did I get myself into.' And, that was the so-called Bitterroot Controversy which was going on at that time period. It was going on then. It kind of started, I suppose it had been building, but it really got in kind of full-swing in 1968."

One respondent attributes past Agency deafness of what the public wanted, namely, fewer roads and clear-cuts, and the elimination of terracing - to it's personnel's' scientific belief that they knew what was best for the Forest and how to achieve it. Many Forest Service employees felt that the public simply did not understand.

"And we [the Forest Service] haven't always made the right decision sometimes. We get clouded by our own science and our own opinions. And I think if you look at the public participation in the Valley,...is the Bitterroot controversy came along and we thought we were doing good science. If you read the reports of these people who were terracing and that kind of stuff - I don't have any ill will against them at all. I mean they...thought they were doing what they were trained to do. They were making the land better. I mean, they thought, 'I'm improving on nature.' And in that era that was the general scientific thinking was, 'man can do better than nature did.' And to this day, many of those people that are still in the Valley that did that work still feel that way. They still feel very strongly about it. They want to take you out on tours and show you all the trees. And even if you say, 'what about the water? What do you think this has done to the watershed? Cutting the road sides' They don't think that's a problem. So I believe that the Bolle Report and some of those things were saying that 'even though you think you're doing good science, the body of people over here are saying, "you're getting outside of where we want. Even if you think it's good science,...you're getting outside of how we want our national forest to be managed like.'" And so we responded to that."

In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires full disclosure of existing conditions and a full range of alternatives. Failure to meet these mandated stipulations, opens an agency to appeals or litigation. "The National Environmental Policy Act requires, and that probably has been the biggest role, requires full disclosure of the existing conditions. It requires a diligent search of alternatives."

Despite the importance one interviewee attributes to it, others find that the Statute minimally affected forest management on the BNF, or was an impedance to the planning process. In the words of one respondent, "NEPA kind of started some things but I'm not saying that it did not do some things, but it didn't do much with public participation in the Bitterroot Valley."

The Act, however, did result in: a reformulating of planning positions on the Forest, the initiation of inventories for unit planning, and the filing of environmental assessments and impact

statements. Moreover, many publics initially deemed successful the unit planning process which characterized the post-NEPA era. People in the Bitterroot approved of the unit planning process, in large part, because the Agency's apparently managed for criteria other than reaching commodity production targets; this was later proved inaccurate.

"The Bitterroot Forest went to the unit planning process in the 70s, and most of those unit plans did not have any timber targets whatsoever. Most of the planning that was done, the involvement that was done, did not have targets tied to it. So in the 70s, the public was involved in a process that a lot of the public was very satisfied with. They thought it was a wonderful process. I think the reason they thought it was a wonderful process, was because they thought the management guidelines were pretty good. The management guidelines and allocations were pretty good, and they didn't know what the timber was, so they thought it was okay. Later on when the timber targets were tied to that by..., at least the Forest Service knew what the targets were, the public was not satisfied with that volume."

Nevertheless, personnel on the Forest soon discovered shortcomings with the process. For instance, agency officials shortly discovered that several parties attending public meetings often manipulated them, thereby undermining the processes advocated in the NEPA. Moreover, competition against more organized and vocal elements at public meetings often intimidated others in attendance at these meetings.

"NEPA...started some public meetings. Actually some of the early work where we would call a public meeting and talk about things, the thought was that was the best way for public involvement - they didn't work. There were public meetings that others used for their own personal agendas and the organization's agenda. I sat in one meeting where in one particular case the environmental community had had a pre-meeting and decided which particular question each was going to ask. And then they spread themselves throughout the room and acted as though they didn't know each other. And one person would get up and ask a question and another member of the same organization would get up and say, 'I like what that guy in the red shirt said. I think he's right.' In other words, it was a manipulation of the meetings that you couldn't control. So it was hard to get good, clean data out of those meetings because many people were intimidated to speak at meetings. And it wasn't intimidating. That was a little ploy, while those people knew that was a ploy."

In addition, the NEPA formal participation created forums for scuffles, and allowed national and local interests to further antagonize existing conflict.

"The problem was, I'm getting ahead of myself, what I found after I had been there awhile, is that as soon as you started doing what we called formal participation you automatically dropped out of the realm of signing a compromise. Because what you did was create a forum which people could fight. So the public meetings were not very useful, and even public workshops is where people fight among themselves. It gave them a chance to fight. Because there were so much contention, you had to avoid that. However, if you could do a more reasoned kind of sensing of what was going on you could get to some of the basic feelings

and take on the responsibility of making the decision instead of sending it to a vote.....Let me give you an example of what I am talking about because I am just giving you some rhetoric. When I went down there in 1970 and it was a national controversy - it was a major, major fight. Outside influences coming from outside the Valley were trying to make it grow due to national agendas and local people were fighting each other.”

During the early 1970s, despite the emergence of a local environmental movement, commodity interests refused to willingly share forest resources with other interests and users.

“The timber interests told us when we came out of the unit plans, that we couldn’t manage in accordance with the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act. That we had to go right back to the Organic Act and manage for timber, timber protection. To them, timber protection meant fire control. I don’t know where water fit in with them. And, we didn’t have any legal representation at that time. The Office of General Counsel, we had that, but there might have been one attorney for the whole damn region. Through our reading the law, through our reading of the legislative history behind an act, we would consistently be able to respond to that kind of a threat. They were a threat. In fact, as a matter of fact, we even published letters....That must of been a little bit embarrassing to read what they said.”

In response, the Forest Service decided to alter their approach upon realization that the tactics of several groups precluded effective participation by other parties.

“What happened after trying for two or three years formal meetings under NEPA, we dropped back to less formalized and kind of changed their approach. Stopped having public meetings when they didn’t have to. Use more formal groups, etc.. So, NEPA didn’t make that much change.”

Later, Congress passed two other statutes pertaining to national forest management. However, passage of neither the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) or 1972, nor the Forest and Rangeland Resource Policy Act (RPA) in 1974 affected local policies greatly, although the RPA did mark the beginning of the forest planning process. One respondent did, however, note that “quotas with RPA was a disaster because they [the upper echelons of management] decided what the quotas were, did the analysis -and that didn’t work; set down targets and it wasn’t here”

During the mid-1960s and 70s, outsiders rediscovered the Bitterroot Valley. This time, many of them hailed from ‘notorious’ southern California. Like in-migration periods in the past, changes in the social structure and values followed this demographic transition. Nevertheless, unlike the apple orchard migrations, most arriving during this period decided to brave the winters and stay longer than two or three years.

“The problem was it had been discovered by people from California and people from the southern part. It was a forerunner of what we’re getting now, this massive immigration, but it hit the Bitterroot Valley first. By 1970 when you drove Bitterroot Valley, it was essentially a farming a ranching community and now it’s almost a strip city. Now you have all those businesses....So what you had was a social system built up of the original settlers who looked at the land as an agricultural and commodity base. Still feeling strongly about their quality of life but from a ranching, farming, logging concept. Into the apple bloom days which petered out and then you had this influx about the mid 60s.”

The increase in the region's population placed more demands on the Forest Service. One interviewee states that there is “the realization that [as] the population continues to grow[, it] put[s] demands. It's not just trees.” In addition to the problem of more people requiring more resources, these demographic trends forced the Forest Service to cater to a changing public. Furthermore, “Congress’ public changed went from the time...the only people that were knocking on Congressional doors were timber interests, range interests, and mineral interests. That was it. Now, my God, there are hundreds of interests knocking on Congressional doors.”

In 1970, Orville Daniels replaced Merrill Tester as Bitterroot Forest Supervisor. The Forest under Daniels initially attempted to use the extension service model of public involvement. This model uses public leaders and legitimizers to gauge public opinion of current and proposed practices. Unfortunately, the Valley lacked these information contacts.

“You go into a community, find out who the leaders [are] and find out who are the legitimizers. They are a good barometer of how the people feel and so instead of having to do public meetings, you can sit down and talk to people who have a good feeling or seem to represent the values of the community. What I found...was essentially [that] those people did not exist. There were no acknowledged local leaders who had long tenure.”

A respondent explains why this is the case in the area.

“It was common for them to have a leader who would emerge and fight an issue. As soon as that fight was over and the next fight came along, they would not allow that prior leader to lead that next fight. They would choose somebody else....It’s a pretty sophisticated concept actually in that they do not like authority, any authority. They would not create a powerful leader. They would use a leader until that battle was over and then discard that leader and choose another one. There was nobody who took on a disproportionate amount of power.”

Faced with this extension model barrier, the Forest Service then managed according to common issues and concerns found in the Bitterroot community. One interviewee notes that, “what...[the

Agency] found...was that there were basic underlying values that all the people held. And that if you worked with those, you would find that there were compromises that could be made."

Two changes quickly incorporated after the adoption of this participation scenario were: termination of road-building from Blodgett to Canyon Creek, and terracing. The majority of the community supported both policies, even the more conservative elements.

"One of them, there was a road planned to go...up Blodgett across to Canyon Creek then dead-ends....It was to log that hillside. I was sitting in my house one month when one of the bankers came in. He was one of the most conservative bankers you could ever find which means pro-business. And he sat down and said 'I gotta tell you something....[The Forest Service has] to stop building the road up there.' He said, 'my wife won't stand for it.' Well, his wife was involved in the garden club. The view of the mountain was precious to the people and it didn't make any difference if you were: a logger, a banker, a preservationist, an environmentalist - that was important. And in order to keep timber flowing from...suitable timber land; to get timber off that - you needed a road. The technology at that time, they had to. The road would contribute to the economic well-being of the town which you would think the banker would be in favor of. But the value of the scenic view was more important to him."

The Forest Service also ceased terracing to satisfy the public, despite the technique's ability to effectively establish ponderosa pine seedlings at a low cost. The Agency eventually realized that the area's citizens disliked viewing trenches on hillslopes which clashed with their perception of a natural forest.

Daniels hand-picked Bob Morgan, for his successor. Morgan had formerly served on the Helena National Forest, where battles with the Regional Office concerning the allowable harvest had worn him down. Nevertheless, with his humor, involvement, approachable management style, and his willingness to bend rules and regulations to benefit local people - he quickly gained acceptance in the community, where he would continue to serve as supervisor for approximately fifteen years. "Bob Morgan was a great forester. He had a solid land ethic. I counted on him as a friend."

"Within two years, Bob had calmed it down totally....Bob, he came in; he knows the people; he's a Montanan; he's real relaxed. He can get along with loggers; he can get along with environmentalists. He went in and it calmed down. It got fairly peaceful.... And the early Morgan years were kind of [the Daniels years]....They were very similar. And in fact, more personal involvement on the part of the Supervisor: he joined everything; he was involved in everything."

“He was universally liked, public and in the Forest Service, mainly because he had guts. And he had a sense of humor. Oh, he played tricks down there on the rangers. He really pulled some funny ones when he was young.”

Later on, personal troubles limited Morgan’s ability to supervise the running of the Forest. Nonetheless, his staff, to a large extent, aided him throughout the remainder of his term.

Despite largely successful policies to address road-building and terracing during the Daniel’s years, the Agency’s response to the public’s clear-cut concern resulted in as much, if not more deleterious high-grade harvesting during the 1970s.

“It took us a while to respond. And on the Bitterroot, clear-cutting issues and that kind of thing, they start leaving trees and the clear-cuts. They weren’t clear-cutting and they were leaving a lot of green trees. There was some concern that they were leaving diseased trees and that kind of thing. And in many cases they were. But they were trying. What they at that point were thinking, ‘these people just don’t understand. We’re going to have to appease them so we’ll do this or....’ There was problems with what they were doing because they were leaving diseased trees and not leaving a representative sample, or not leaving trees that were going to make good trees for tomorrow. So that stood around for five, ten years and the public went on to other things. And then we started clear-cutting again, started building roads.”

The BNF’s replacement of clear-cuts with high-grade selective cut demonstrates its continued emphasis on timber production. Despite attempts to compromise between both commodity and amenity interests, the Agency leaned more toward commodity production. One interviewee notes, “in the 70s what happened was the Forest Service said, ‘group A is over here and group B is over there and we’re in the middle.’ I think that we were too close to group A with cutting. We weren’t in the middle.”

Driving this trend was Congress setting timber targets. Accompanying this paradigm was the assumption that spending additional capital could offset or mitigate any degrading effect of management. In addition, interviewees note that employees within the Agency placed too much faith in, and improperly used FORPLAN, by using this computer model as a decision tool to justify maximization despite contrary conditions on the ground.

“We were responding in those days to targets. Targets were being generated on the hypothesis that you could maximize. You could maximize all the resources. If you look at our forest plans, there weren’t many tradeoffs or levels were they said, ‘you go above this level and you’re going to have problems over here.... Pretty soon the...[fish] are going to start doing a nose-dive.’ The Forest Plan said we are going to put so much money into fish habitat improvements; we are going to have so many cows, the ranchers will be happy; we’ll get the ASQ [allowable sales quantity]. It will be sustainable because the FORPLAN

computer model said that. People in the Agency would say, 'you said that with that computer run but I'm out here and I know if we cut this many over this many years, it's not going to look very good.' You can go on and on with the resources. FORPLAN was maximizing and everything was going to come out in the end. I think you do have to factor in all these other things.

Two trends during this period did improve the quality of the forest planning process. First, the inventory process allowed officials to make more informed decisions. Second, the BNF started hiring disciplines other than foresters and engineers. Due to the visibility of clear-cuts, the Forest started this process by hiring a landscape architect. Ironically, the architect salary originated from timber money, and timber targets continued to be met. In time, the Forest also hired soils scientists and wildlife biologists.

"I think the public involvement evolved as our information base got better, too. We began to get a little information on soils; we began to get a little information on wildlife habitat, and winter range, and that kind of thing; we began to get a little information on fish habitat; we began to get disciplines on board besides engineers and foresters."

According to one respondent, the use of inter-disciplinary teams drastically improved the quality of products put out by the Agency.

"I don't think there is any doubt about that. We started having specialists, and we no doubt started putting out better products. No doubt, we started having better products that we had before hand. We looked at more things more intensely. And, when we started having other disciplines involved in inter-disciplinary teams, we still had to meet targets, too. Now you've involved hydrologists, wildlife biologists, fisheries biologists, whatever, but, you still had to meet targets."

As mentioned in the preceding anecdote, timber targets still factored into decisions regardless of the presence of inter-disciplinary teams. This reality existed until the late 1980s when a final, approved timber sale resulted in several clear-cuts on the mountain face. "These were timber sales that were okayed by an inter-disciplinary team....And this one came out, and there were six or seven clear-cuts which blossomed on the Bitterroot Range front as the result of that timber sale."

A Reordering of Forest Management

In 1976, Congress passed the National Forest Management Act (NFMA). According to an interviewee, passage of this Statute was largely a Congressional response to the Forest

Service's refusal to acknowledge public concerns on forests, such as the BNF. As a result of this action, the Agency's control over management practices was significantly lessened.

"The two major frays in the Bitter Root have been the Magruder Corridor and Forest Management Practices. In both cases, after exhausting every avenue of relief through the Agency, citizens finally in desperation, had to petition their Congressional Delegation for help. The intransigency of an agency, certainly in this case, led to the loss of total control over their operations in the forms of laws passed by Congress directing the Agency to do such and such, or from high officials such as the Secretary of Agriculture."

However, this Act, according to one interviewee, was the most important policy change for public involvement because it created the expectation that people would be actively involved, not just consulted.

"The fact that we invited people into the major process of land-use planning, land-use decisions and that by doing that we opened up a whole level of expectation of what they though was legitimately their role. In other words, prior to that time the major decisions were not..., the public was consulted but they were not involved. NEPA really didn't do it. But the National Forest Management Act did do it."

In addition, the Statute institutionalized the timber maximization paradigm for forest management where other resources were considered 'timber liabilities'.

"So you can see what's going on in each alternative. I'm trading off this much wildlife for this much timber. Well I went for more wildlife and less timber. So here you have this paradigm and NFMA. Now NFMA pulled people into this process and at the same time institutionalized this paradigm. Because you look at the regulations and it optimizes fiber from the suitable timber lands. And the fascinating thing about the paradigm is that you always take the big wood pile; all the wood you could supply. But then you say, 'we have to take care of wildlife.' So then you get involved in a subtractive process. Well that always meant that you have the big pile and you didn't want to take anything from it instead of making everything equal. And say if we produce this much wildlife, look what we do to timber. Instead, it was always subtractive."

After passage of the NFMA, the Agency started transitioning to a new management paradigm. Twelve years of a Republican Presidency and an entrenched timber-production culture, however, renewed the emphasis on commodity maximization.

"And then we started clear-cutting again, started building roads....Early 70's, mid 70's to early 80's. And in my mind there was a certain amount of arrogance....I mean we weren't terracing and we weren't doing some of the more Earth moving type. But we were building a lot of roads and responding, of course, to some political targets and that kind of stuff."

Still, people that were doing it, they thought they were doing the right thing. They still thought they knew what was good for the National Forest; what was good for the people. And here we are in mid 80's and early 90's, people are back again saying, 'wait a minute, we thought we had your attention.'"

Nevertheless, at times, an active public and institutional memory of the past controversies reminded and curbed the BNF's clear-cutting policy.

"Then, we did have some projects, like this Canyon Creek which is on the face up here, that I was talking about. In the past, I think it was around 1979, there was a tremendous amount of public involvement: field trips, and the public was right there almost every meeting. In fact, I don't think there was any preconceived notion of how much they were going to cut on the face of the Bitterroot, because we knew that was very sensitive."

Eventually, the BNF initiated its forest planning process in accordance with the NFMA. One respondent describes the chronology of Forest Service interactions with the public during the process.

"Well, we started the Forest Plan, some of the inventory around 1980. Then, we started the public involvement in 82 and, at that time...[an] inter-disciplinary team...worked on the Forest Plan....[W]ell we actually issued the final Forest Plan in late 1987."

The Forest initiated scoping meetings to inform and receive comments from the public. "And, I think the forest plans were where you would have got into involving the public, scoping. I can't remember how many times; it was continuous in forest plans." The initial meetings, held in different areas throughout the Valley, informed citizens about NFMA requirements for public involvement, and attempted to identify issues and concerns. The Agency utilized the nominal group process during this introductory phase to extend participation to members of the community less apt to stand up and speak in public meetings.

"So, we went to the public in several locations, here and in Stevensville, and explained to them what we were required to do by the National Forest Management Act, and utilized the process to obtain the public's issues and concerns, and try through that nominal group process, small groups, to get everybody involved. Not just those who are inclined to stand up in a public meeting and yell the loudest, but to actually break it down, so that somebody that had concerns but was not inclined to stand up in front of large groups, could get up and give us their concerns, issues, whatever. That's what the nominal group process does. Also through this discussion, we might lead you a little bit to some ideas or alternatives to respond to some of those issues. But, the nominal group process was the process that was used to develop the issues on the Forest Plan."

Moreover, the Forest Service supplemented the nominal group process with other involvement techniques: periodic publications, public meetings, presentation of issues and alternatives, and meetings with interest groups. Furthermore, the Forest Service invited commenting during each process.

“We had a publication that we put out periodically to let the public know where we were in the process, what we were doing, what we were up to, what was available for comment if anybody wished to. We also had public meetings at various steps in the process....If I remember correctly, after we developed the issues, we went to the public to show them what the issues were so we could make adjustments or corrections. We had alternatives developed in response to those issues. We went to the public for various reasons to show them the alternatives we had, so we could correct those alternatives. The environmental community presented us with an alternative, and, to the best of our abilities, we actually developed an alternative that responded exactly, not exactly, but as close as possible to their alternative. In other words, at other strategic, important steps in the process, we went back with the public. We had meetings with interest groups throughout the process. If there were questions, we met, at request, with county commissioners, the Governor’s task force and various points in the process to explain where we were, what we were doing. Those are the things that come to mind now after this many years.”

Despite vigorous efforts to keep people informed, the Agency’s efforts often seemed in vain. Problems stemmed from: the long period of time required to complete a forest plan, the Agency’s fumbling due to inexperience with forest planning, and the publics changing throughout the process.

“We tried to keep the public up to speed all the way through the process, particularly with major steps in the process. The difficult part of that is, of course, the length of time it took everybody to do a forest plan. What seemed to us working on it, was keeping the public informed at each step, but it sure seemed liked the public didn’t know what was going on because it was such a long period of time. There were so many slips, starts, and reverses with Forest Planning the first time around, that when we were going backwards, the public was probably wondering what was going on. We had people comment that, they weren’t involved. They weren’t involved because at any point we had to provide them with significant information, and in many cases we were going backwards. But, when you start in 1982 and put out a draft in 1985, that’s a three year period. Plus, when we put out the final in 1987, that’s a five year period. It’s pretty hard to keep the public involved and informed of what is going on, especially when the public changes every day.”

Factors attributed to publics changing included people recently arriving in the area, vacationing, or being unaware of the process.

The planning staff largely attempted to incorporate changes in response to public comments, however, pressures from the regional level often limited the magnitude of changes. For instance,

although the Forest could freely introduce additional alternatives, the Regional Office occasionally requested re-analyses of alternatives. A specific example occurred in the stage between issuance of the draft and final environmental impact statements. After reviewing public comments from the draft environmental impact statement, the Forest proposed cutting timber production to twenty-five million board feet. Regional Forester James Overbay, nonetheless, determined that these harvest levels on the Forest were too low. After bringing more acreage into the suitable base and performing subsequent analyses, the planning staff and Overbay set harvest levels at around thirty-three million board feet.

“So, we had just published the draft environmental statement for the forest plan, we had accepted comments, we had gotten together with the public, we reviewed what they had told us, and we figured we had better cut back timber production, allowable harvest or whatever it was...to 25 million. And so, that was the way we were writing environmental statement and during that period of time, between the draft and final, you get together with the Regional Forester. The Regional Forester at that time was Jim Overbay. And, our draft environmental statement had proposed that an annual allowable harvest of, I think, 33.7 million. When we went in there to discuss dropping down to 25 million...He said, “that isn’t good enough.” So, we had to come right back. It was the same thing we had with the draft environmental statement. Of course, you know from there on it was appeals, appeals, appeals. It finally ground to a halt. That was kind of interesting.”

“The Forest Plan was appealed by two individuals and two groups: timber industry and environmental groups, and the two individuals.” Environmental appellant groups consisted of “the National Wildlife Federation, the Montana Wildlife Federation...was involved. Sierra Club was involved through local people. Trout Unlimited. You name it. The Forest Plan appeal was from that spectrum, nine groups.” Their issues of concern included, “economics was a big concern: how we did the economics in the Plan. The wildlife was a concern.”

In 1987, Bertha Gillam replaced the now deceased Bob Morgan as Supervisor of the BNF. By this time, the Forest Service had resolved some appealed issues through negotiations or decisions by the Chief (although others remained unresolved until 1993).

“A lot of the negotiations, in fact, I think all the negotiations, were done prior to Bertha being here. I think when Bertha came, we had a couple issues which were open with the environmental community, that we had been negotiating for quite awhile. All the rest of the issues that had been appealed, the Washington Office had already made a decision by the Chief. So when Bertha came, we were implementing the Forest Plan. We were already involved with projects, and appeals of projects, negotiations of the appeals of projects, those kinds of things.”

Gillam represented a drastic change for the Valley; a change that interviewed people clearly remember. Very noticeable in this transition was the reduction in trust and rapport between Gillam, and her staff and the public. Trust and accompanying public involvement on the Forest decreased during the Gillam years for several reasons. First, "was that she was a woman in the Bitterroot Valley in one of the highest profile positions. This is a pretty conservative place." Second, others downplayed her qualifications due to her lack of experience. One person notes, "she had only been working for the Forest Service for ten years," where she previously served under a popular supervisor of the Wasatch-Cache Forest in Ogden, Utah. Third, her presence represented a change from the previous fifteen years under Morgan. "After a supervisor has been there for a long period of time, I think you are going to see some changes." Fourth, people in the Valley sensed that the Regional Office sent her here with a mission "to slow things down."

Fifth, her management style differed markedly from Morgan. Whereas Morgan fully interacted with the public, portrayed himself as easygoing, and extensively relied upon his staff when he began his tenure, Gillam seemed less approachable from the outside, portrayed a "combative, confrontive, controlling approach[.]" and failed to delegate as much responsibility (as Bob Morgan) to her staff. Two decisions characterize her contentious term: the turnover in her staff, and her attempt to control communication between the Agency and the public.

One respondent describes the breakdown in trust between the Supervisor and her staff.

"She started making decisions and the press started taking her on. So, she decided that people were being resistive to her change: internal people in the Forest Service. And the pattern of open communication was so strong on the Bitterroot that a newspaper reporter would walk into the office, walk back to somebody's desk sit down and ask them what was going on. A good, natural way to do things. Well, she got paranoid about the fact that some of her employees didn't agree with her direction, and they were using the media against her. So she set a policy that a reporter could not get an interview with an employee without going through the public affairs officer, telling the public affairs officer what the interview was about, and setting a time for the next day so the employee could be prepared to give the company line."

Once distrust and a noticeable schism developed between the Supervisor and staff, the public jumped into the melee, further aggravating the situation.

"She began to suppress the openness of communication. As soon as she did that, everything started to crumble because you get into a control, into a whole arena of bureaucratic control that destroys all trust between the people and the Forest Service employees. You get trust by giving trust. You trust your employees to talk to the newspaper media. You're not afraid of that. Well she was. And what happened in that was people in the Forest began to build up a resistance movement to her and actually began to undermine her management. As soon as

there is a schism in the organization, it is reflected out into the public very, very.... That's happened every time I've seen it occur. When there's fighting within the Agency, the public jumps into the fight and everything gets messy.... You can for a short period of time. Bertha was effectively trying to split it. See she wanted her forest and the public out here. Well it didn't work and it wouldn't work in any small western town."

While most attribute these events to either her mission to change the Forest, or her personal style, respondents find her turnover in staff and controlling nature understandable since many forest personnel had reached retirement eligibility or were remiss in their duties, and she lacked experience as a supervisor.

"Yes, there were some people who retired, and some people who moved, both. But the people who retired were eligible to retire. I guess a lot of the discussion was they retired because Bertha was here. But since we don't know if they would have retired otherwise, it is kind of hard to tell. One guy did quit because of Bertha, or the fact that she was a woman. You'd have to ask him, I guess, to know for sure why he did it. But, the entire staff on the Bitterroot did change."

"From my view point, there were people in the Agency who needed to go. There were rangers who had taken advantage of the 'good old boy' regime, and as I saw it, were remiss in their duties.... You see Bob had been ill. There was no question, he had been ill for the last two years. Things that went on that people just took advantage of."

"Well, some people like to know what's going on, and generally, that's not always the case, but the newer they are to the job, or that kind of job, the more they think they need to know what's going on. In the case of Bob Morgan, he had been a forest supervisor on the Helena and the Bitterroot for a long period of time. And, his staff had been here for a long period of time. And, so he could pretty much take care of things that he wanted to take care of, and let his staff take care of the other things. He knew what was going on. He didn't need to check with his staff all the time, whereas when somebody new comes in, I don't know if it makes a hell of a lot of difference if it's Bertha or somebody else, they obviously want to have more knowledge of the day-to-day activities."

Perhaps the personnel shake-up then still affects employees sense of security within the Agency. "Fear of employees. Some of these disgruntled employees fear losing their jobs. They fear taking a stand. They're afraid that they are going to get axed."

Contrasting perceived flaws in her management style, interviewees allude to positive managerial and personal qualities. For instance, "I thought highly of her resource ethic.... And the people who ended-up building a good relationship with her thought highly of her."

It is quite plausible, however, that many antagonisms which emerged during Supervisor Gillam's tenure predated her. Most significant, was the resistance to the Forest Plan by both commodity and environmental interests, which promised appeals during implementation at the project level.

"But there was quite a bit of reason for public involvement at the project level, implementing the Forest Plan....The environmental community didn't like the Forest Plan, and industry didn't like the Forest Plan either, so...[the Forest Service] knew that there was going to be a lot of public involvement, a lot of concern by publics, industry, and environmental groups on the projects."

Unsurprisingly based upon the Valley's past, a variety of interests quickly protested the Plan's implementation. For example, five individuals, including: Les Pengelli, Wes Woodgeward, Doris Milner, Jerry Nichols and John Grove - formed the Timber Sale Review Committee to appeal the Little Butte Timber Sale in 1987, the same year that Gillam assumed her position as Forest Supervisor. A year later, several members of the Committee assembled to form the Friends of the Bitterroot (Friends or FOB), with the former groups dissolving shortly thereafter. Toward the end of 1989, Supervisor Gillam notified the public of four timber sales and released accompanying environmental assessments. In response, Friends "appealed them for violating NEPA: lack of full disclosure, lack of reasonable range of alternatives, and so forth." The Forest Service then approached the Organization with the option of negotiating a settlement. Negotiations ensued for two and a half months starting in December.

Three primary groups attended the negotiations: the Forest Service, Friends, and local people representing commodity interests. Pro-management representatives such as Rem Korht and Shirley Maydall attended only as intervenors, and were unable, therefore, to partake in decision-making (an agreed upon provision established in the groundrules). The negotiations were strenuous, involving "in December, every day for one day a week; and then in January of 90, three days a week, eight hours a day for two and a half months." One interviewee notes, "when you are in negotiations, you are in an adversarial position and it's tough....We weren't getting paid anything. It was taking it out of our hide." Moreover, "[t]here was a lot of compromise. Actually, the Forest Supervisor got more timber out of that than they ever have since."

Another respondent describes the time-consuming and expensive nature of the timber sales caused by the Agency negotiating after site-preparation for harvesting, instead of before it.

"That was a very time-consuming operation, very expensive. In my opinion, we came to some reasonable solutions, some give-and-take and some solutions, on those timber sales. But, it should be done beforehand: before they are laid out on the ground, and marked, and

roads are put in, surveying, and all those kinds of things. There's nothing wrong with negotiating, but it needs to be done beforehand, not afterwards."

Another anecdote explains the negotiation process and demonstrates the importance of parties viewing the planning area.

"One thing I am sure about, is that the projects, something that is actually happening on the ground, you've got to go out on the ground....And, I think the field trips we had on the Forest Plan, or the negotiated timber sales kind of shows that, because you actually got out there on the ground and looked at some stands, and we all pretty much agreed that some places needed treatment and some other places did not need treatment...With the timber sale, we came to some resolution with what we were going to do in the office, indoors, then we went out to the field and looked at the stand exam information, looked at the maps, looked at the photos inside. Then we came to the field and looked on the ground. All the information that we saw was correct."

At the conclusion of the settlements in March, Mike Nichols and others formed Grassroots for Multiple Use (Grassroots) and staged a protest demonstration outside the place of negotiation. Two reasons underlie the formation of Grassroots: to serve as an opposition to Friends, and to protest the Forest Service's negotiation of the appeals. An interviewee defines the constituency and purpose of the Group.

"Grassroots, theoretically, represents the variety of groups that use the Forest; that actually have an active use of the Forest. I am not talking about people who go out on hikes on the weekends. I am talking about loggers, miners, ranchers, people who are involved in having access: recreationists such as horsemen, off-road vehicle users, and off-road vehicle operators. People who like to go snowmobiling. People who like to go biking, motorbiking on various trails and what-not. Grassroots, theoretically was intended to act as a voice for the various groups that are active, and very often economically involved in using the forests in this area."

Active participation by Grassroots continued for several years with the Group, along with members of Friends, participating in timber sale reviews. In time, Grassroots filed an appeal based upon opposition to a newspaper article, which the Supervisor quickly dismissed in a matter of weeks.

Although Bertha Gillam's tenure drastically altered the direction of the Forest, perhaps her legacy, in the form of personnel replacements with a different natural resource management ethic still surpasses her effect.

“Unfortunately, I’ve seen a lot of the older folks who believed in managing, believed in management, believed in actually doing something, I’ve seen a lot of them essentially get booted. Bertha Gillam was terrible for that. She basically got rid of anybody who was pro-management, and replaced them with anybody who was anti-management, which was a real blow to this Forest. Bertha Gillam’s tenure here on the Bitterroot basically destroyed the timber harvesting program; destroyed the road-building. She basically lied through her teeth to the public, to those publics who wanted management. It was really sad to see it, but she basically got rid of people: people who had a lot of very good knowledge; people who knew how to manage this Forest and get it into healthier condition.”

Conceivably, the Agency replacing past employees with ones less inclined to manage commodities was intentional: a clear sign that pro-management advocates needed to represent themselves.

“I think one is the message to industry that the Forest Service wasn’t going to carry timber’s waters anymore....You know, they needed to represent themselves. One of the results was the Grassroots for Multiple Use Group. People needed to stand up and represent their views. And, I think they were comfortable with the Forest Service doing it. But, we were on the bridge to a lot of changes in the Valley as far as what people wanted, what the newcomers wanted to see.”

Moreover, other respondents suspect that anti-commodity Forest Service officials exist in the upper echelons of the Agency.

“They’re not worried about the cattle rancher or the logger here anymore. They’re gearing up for their potential and future development here. I think there is some places, where if you go high enough up or at some place in time, somebody is saying, ‘let us find a convenient way to weed out the ranchers and the loggers. We’ve got to make this thing come together just gradually.’ But, I even think they try to make it, in some instances, in some of the management practices that we are trying to do right now, they will just throw it on us until we say, ‘I can’t do it anymore.’ I’ve had a real lot of positive things that have taken place, but there are some things above the local ranger and the range con that they have to address. It...[makes] my job just about impossible.”

Nevertheless, according to one respondent, values found with Forest Service personnel mirror overlap, or mirror those found in society. “But they also mirror one another, too. The attitudes of the district rangers and your supervisors also tend to reflect what you are seeing in society.”

Another interviewee reaffirms that the changing values brought in recently from outside the region, and which some interviewees associate with Agency personnel, now characterize the Valley.

"I described what it was like in 1970 when it was still pretty rural, and logging- and agricultural- and farming-oriented. With people moving in, now that feeling is very suppressed. And the dominant force down there is the outside people. So you went from the local dominance, long term settler dominance to this in twenty-five, thirty years. Who runs the Bitterroot Valley now? Well it still is being fought over, but within a short time there is going to be over 100,000 people in the Bitterroot Valley and they are not going to be local settlers. And the outside influence is going to run the Valley."

To the chagrin of commodity advocates, environmental values which translate into more restrained management options, not only depict the local area, but to a large extent typify the Nation. Adding to their dilemma, environmental groups in the eastern United States continuously promote limiting the uses on the land.

"It's fashionable to save the planet; it's fashionable to try to save the tree; and it's a joke. Because, reality is, those trees have to die; those trees don't belong there; those trees need to be removed. And you have all those millions of people running around in those big cities back east, and are fed this environmentalist crap from the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation, and even now, I hate to admit it, but National Geography, the National Geographic....Don't cut timber; Don't mine. Miners are bad; loggers are bad; farmers are bad: these people are ruining the earth. My God people, we provide everything you use. We're not bad people; we are providing everything that you want. And we do it by cutting timber; we do it by cutting holes in the ground; we do it by grazing our cattle, grazing our cattle on the ground....If what we have been doing is such a horrible, terrible, destructive thing, then why is this Country so damn beautiful? Why is it so wonderful? If we are as bad as these people make us out to be, why is it that everybody wants to be here?"

To add insult to injury, pro-management respondents perceive that local and national urbanites, biased by environmental organizations, lack the experience and understanding to make a knowledgeable decision.

"There are a lot more people out there that don't have a vested interest, but they want to make [it] their interest now. There's a lot more of them, than there are actually out there on the ground utilizing the natural resources. Take this area for instance. There is a lot more retired people that have come here from southern California, and now they think they are experts on managing mountain properties. It really doesn't make a lot of sense. It seems like their attitude is no management is the best way to manage it."

"Well, take for instance in a democracy, you do what the majority of what people wants. According to that, this land belongs to everybody in the United States. And, if you lived up here and saw how things worked, you would have a better understanding of livestock grazing and logging, and so on and so forth. You take somebody back in New York who has the same amount of say as I do, and a tree is probably something. He would give his right arm to have a tree in his backyard. He doesn't even have a back yard. When he hears..., he gets propaganda that they are cutting all the trees out West, it gets him upset....So, what I hate is that there are a lot of untruths which are being told to the American public. And

somebody like me has to suffer the consequences. If I could get every American in the United States to come [here] and see what I am doing, I think the problem would be solved. But you can't."

One interviewee comments on the perceived hypocrisy of affluent environmentalists, who create the demand for products by using them, yet limit production of the resources to make those products.

"When you look at the environmental people who are scapegoating the commodities people. 'They're cutting down the trees. They're doing bad things to the habitat.' This sort of thing. They don't happen to look that their homes are full of wood....It's not particle board. It's cedar shake; it's the ultimate in wood. These are the 4000 foot square homes, with voracious consumption of paper products, and of all things that come out of natural resources. And there should be a guilt with that, and there is internally, but they have a scapegoat that they send out with all their sins. The scapegoat goes off, and they can forget about all their sins. Because we have the commodity people who we can scapegoat and still live in our beautiful mansions. But what he is saying, is that those people too have to realize that they are part of the problems. It's not just the loggers who are cutting the trees down or the timber industry."

According to respondents, other factors, besides environmental fads and misinformation, prevent commodity groups from organizing and disseminating their message. A comparison of the environmental group, Friends of the Bitterroot, and the commodity group, Grassroots for Multiple-Use, reveals the disparity in influence between the two organizations; this is due to a number of factors. First, "[Friends] have been around a lot longer." Second, members of Grassroots with their limited resources, find themselves ill-prepared to counteract Friends. For instance, personal time limitations hinder Grassroots' effectiveness, whereas Friends' members, many of whom are retired, possess more time to forward their cause and are free during business hours, granting them greater access to Agency employees.

"But, you have to understand, that the guys in Grassroots work all day long and at night it's time to go to a meeting - so they go to a meeting. If you look at most the people in Friends of the Bitterroot, they are retired people who don't have another thing to do."

Other individuals interviewed, however, fail to empathize with the plight of Grassroots' members.

"My time is just as valuable as anyone else's. I might be retired..., but I still...paid my dues, I guess. Just because I save my money and I can do some of these things. I still have to work some for myself. It doesn't mean that my time is any less valuable than anyone else's. That's always thrown out. 'Pensioners sitting around. His time isn't valuable but my time is, because I have to work every day. I have to make a living.' Well, I have to make a living

too. I've paid my dues and maybe he or she will pay their dues, or maybe they will be working all their life until they drop dead. You don't know. That's up to each individual. Any way, I can't think of how it can be any more available to people. You just have to make that commitment. It's what people view as valuable. It's a tough deal to have to go to all these things, and try to make your livelihood."

Despite the former interviewee's downplaying of the time advantage, one respondent illustrates how members of Friends exploit their time advantage.

"The noisy wheel gets the grease. That is they way they operate. And you know, Grassroots, we do have some hotheads who really get irate. But most of us, we go in there and we are real mannerly, and we try to take that approach. Maybe that is part of our downfall. You should do some of the things that the Friends of the Bitterroot do to the Forest Service. They decide to wait right until quitting time, and then they come in and have a two hour chat with the ranger. Now he wants to go on home to his family, and go do this and that. He is already at a disadvantage because he wants to go home. Whenever there is an appeal,... there is a forty-five day period or whatever. They wait until two hours before the final deadline, and then they put in their appeal. You know they get everyone excited that it won't be appealed, that it was worthwhile, that we will be able to get a timber sale or this - and then two hours before the deadline, they get the rug pulled out from under them. It's just a wrong way to operate; it is."

Moreover, members of Grassroots discover that they compromise other concerns when they become deeply involved in meetings and other time-demanding activities. "You just get to the point where you see that you are letting things go that you shouldn't be letting go, because you have a meeting you should go to."

In addition, Friends, supported by wealthier patrons, is monetarily better off than Grassroots.

"They have a lot of money to work with, too. They have rich people like movie stars, and this and that. They are feeding in money like this and that. Grassroots, the yearly dues is \$18. We hardly have any money to work with. I think that is another reason I got discouraged."

Third, in-fighting lessens Grassroots' effectiveness. One respondent notes, "[w]hen I tried to get that done, I got stabbed in the back repeatedly by others within the Organization. My efforts were sabotaged. It was pretty sad, because I know we could have made a difference." Creating division within the movement is different ideas on how to achieve the Organization's political objectives.

“The individual who is the Director of Grassroots, he may have assumed the Presidency, I am not sure, he has been quite active at that angle at the national level. Dealing with things at the national level is kind of his baby. He puts a lot of effort into it, and to his credit, he does a good job of it. But, he also has blinders on. That is what really suffers. That is what hurts the Organization. Grassroots was never permitted by the leaders who had long-term control of it to be as active, and as forceful dealing with local issues as they should have been.”

Fourth and adding to members' frustration, is a realization that they are more ineffective than Friends at relaying their message and influencing management on the BNF. One affiliated interviewee put it bluntly, “I don't want to sound like a quitter and I hate to say it, but we were losing the battle. It gets pretty depressing.” Fifth and related to the preceding point, long term members, who comprised the founders of Grassroots, exhausted their involvement in the effort. “Myself, I kind of got burned out because you can only ride the same horse so long... No, I still pay my dues, but I haven't attended a meeting for, God knows how long.”

Finally, the administrative and judicial appeals process is structured to prevent management, inherently placing commodities people at a disadvantage.

“These people are so pathetically scared of an appeal or a lawsuit, that they don't have enough hair on their balls to go out there and do their damn jobs. They know I am not going to sue them to stop them from putting up a timber sale. I want that timber sale. I am not going to do anything to stop the timber sale because I want that timber sale. Friends of the Bitterroot will do anything to stop a timber sale. The Bitterroot National Forest is scared of an appeal; they are scared of a lawsuit. They haven't got the guts to do their jobs.”

Faced with these formidable obstacles to commodity production, it is unsurprising that proponents of this view want officials to bypass public involvement, and leave decisions up to professional forest managers.

“Basically, I think they should just tell the public to go to hell, and do their damn jobs. Do what's right, and to hell with the publics. Because the only public they are going to listen to, is the people who are telling them to not touch it.”

Perhaps the restraints on management activities on the BNF have worked too well. In fact, most interviewees support less planning and more management if activities are carried out with a land ethic.

“You have all those various specialists. They have to justify their jobs. And they do so by doing all this crap on paper. And, that's all it is. It's basically, a bunch of paper shuffling; a

bunch of nonsense running around in circles. When it comes right down to it, these people who are so-called specialists don't even use proper documentation off of the ground. The Forest Service goes out there and does their stand exams and writes very detailed paperwork on their very stands related to all the different species, the plants, what is out there. When these people put a timber sale together, they don't even check their own records to see what it is they are putting on the ground. In their own time, they are creating this massive documentation, going to all these meetings, going through all this nonsense."

"And from then until now, it seems that the only thing they do is plan. A big organization, the only thing that is occurring is planning. There isn't any production. And, I'll be the first to admit that production was way too high, because that's where all my emphasis was. Now, I think it is, way too much the other direction. You go from one peak of the pendulum to the other peak of the pendulum. I imagine it is going to start shifting back to where there is some damn production targets."

Steve Kelly, current BNF Supervisor, with his conservative, low profile approach and his willingness to delegate responsibility for management on-the-ground to his rangers, seemingly epitomizes the lack of a strong management direction on the BNF. "The Forest Supervisor in the Bitterroot is of the old guard. He doesn't like the kind of changes which are happening. He is very threatened by controversy."

"Steve Kelly brings a new management style. He is more conservative, tends to want to work within the community, doesn't want to take a high profile, tends to take a low profile.... I don't know how the public perceives him. Most of the people deal directly with...[rangers] and don't deal with the issues he deals with."

An interviewee, however notes that Kelly, with his "conciliatory, collaborative approach[,]... hasn't resolved the problem, but he has brought peace to the Valley."

To a large extent, ambiguity also appears to characterize the most recent official policy change for the Forest Service. Remarks one respondent, "[a]n ecosystem is a conceptual entity that is up here. It's an empty diffused concept. It's kind of an empty sack. You can see trees, and rocks, and whatever." Contributing to its nebulous nature, are the jargonistic terms and abstractions used by the Agency (see the document in appendix II which the quote contained below refers).

"Let me get you something that I got a hold of that is a perfect example. Oh, wonderful. Ecosystem planning. Multi-phased. Multi-reasoned. With all these different colors. And this is a real slick, pretty document. You give this to one of these folks and it's meaningless. You give it to me and I've already seen it. These terms, the level of abstraction is so high, that it's a nightmare. I don't have time to study that. These people are going to look at it

and throw it in the trash. It's beautiful. It looks great. Someone put a lot of effort into that. But it's preaching to the faithful. It's to people who understand all those terminologies."

Unsurprisingly, the nebulous nature of the concept and accompanying policy creates confusion, and occasionally fear.

"Everyone has heard ecosystem management in this thing. One of the quotes says, one person says, 'I can look in the eyes of a friend in the Forest Service when I ask him what ecosystem management is, I can tell he isn't sure what it is.' One of things we need to do is it needs to be in simpler terms. Not simplified but in terms that we all can relate to."

"Some people are scared of it. I had one guy say that...the people in his group are terrified of ecosystem management. They think it is something that will be done to them, and they have no idea of what it is. The problem as we become more specialized, right, we can just talk about the forest as these guys do. We have to talk about habitats, we have to talk about ecosystems. And, we have to try to get a handle upon it, because things are so much more complex. People, they have more ideas. It's a nightmare in that book."

Several feel confident in their understanding of ecosystem management, but those who do envision different end results of the policy.

"This ecosystem management, ironically, that could be if they would actually do it the way it should be done, if they would actually manage an ecosystem the way an ecosystem was meant to be - ecosystem management could justify cutting 100 million board feet on this Forest. They are going to use that as an excuse to cut 2 million board feet out of this Forest. It's an abortion. It's more excuse."

"But we were building a lot of roads and responding, of course, to some political targets and that kind of stuff. Still, people that were doing it, they thought they were doing the right thing. They still thought they knew what was good for the National Forest; what was good for the people. And here we are in mid 80's and early 90's, people are back again saying, 'wait a minute, we thought we had your attention.'" And now we're back to the same issue and now we're.... I think, you know, ecosystem management is a paradigm shift and we made it more institutionalized, what we said the first time we responded to clear-cutting. The first time we said, 'well, they don't really understand and I'm going to make this clear-cut look prettier and everybody will be happy.' Now I think we, the bulk of the Agency anyway, has heard what the people are saying. Saying, 'we want to do it different now...different.' Still, not everybody's going to agree on what different is, and of course not everybody. But I don't hear many people saying, 'we'll have to clear-cut,' on either side of the issue of cutting trees."

So what is ecosystem management? Several respondents articulated definitions of the term. First, it is an evolutionary development of the NFMA of 1976 and the political landscape since

that time. "It [ecosystem management] was a natural evolution it seems to me from the National Forest Management Act. Not completely because politics was part of that to a great deal." Second, ecosystem management is a philosophy of management which examines variables affecting management more broadly. Third, it incorporates the precepts of sustainability. Fourth, to ensure sustainability when faced with incomplete information, managers opt to conservatively alter the landscape. Fifth, ecosystem management recognizes and attempts to minimize people's impacts on the land.

"Ecosystem management is a philosophy of management and it isn't any one thing, but it's a philosophy of management which says we are going to look at a broader time period. That what we do today is going to be sustainable tomorrow. That when we don't know, we are going to error on the side of being conservative. It also has the realization that people are a part of this thing. That if it weren't for people, you don't need ecosystem management and you don't need the Forest Service. That's my whole approach to my job. What I am here for is because of the people and the demands they put on the system and the impacts they have on it."

Sixth, it emphasizes utilizing a variety of resources sustainably, rather than optimizing production of any one product.

"We're now managing ecosystems and under ecosystem management, we talk about the paradigm being we are going to manage the ecosystem for the stability and health and sustainability of the ecosystem. Getting out of it what values we can. Different from optimizing. Different from planting a cornfield. It's a native range that we are going to graze a little bit and use some of the surpluses in the ecosystem to fatten up some cows to eat versus we are going to plant some corn, feed the corn to pigs and maximize meat production."

Seventh and a corollary to the above points, "the land has to drive what's done in a sense if your going to have ecosystem management." This reality sets management at a scale by which people can examine and identify with an area, and then voice their management concerns.

"So, I think at this point, that it'll continue to be public participation and public policy driven at the national and regional level, but the place that you can be most effective is at the local level; whether that be the district or forest level. It may even be the regional level, not the whole region but maybe the western Montana or an ecosystem..., because people need to connect to a piece of ground. That's where, I believe, we see the most issues."

Finally, one respondent believes a fundamental change in the nature of public involvement is consistent with ecosystem management. Instead of following the NEPA model where the Agency

presents extreme alternatives to arrive at a reasonable one, it is suggested that the Forest Service functions as an organism where it is sensitive to responses from the environment about its management. Once aware of problem indicators, the Agency can make the necessary adjustments without completely reorienting the Forest Service's direction.

“The way I would characterize it [initial forest planning] is, some of the theories behind decision-making, and how NFMA came about, it was really more of an analytic approach to decision-making. And therefore, its whole premise was that you had to consider extreme alternatives so that you stretched your thinking and came up with something that was reasonable. The requirements were that we had to have a benchmark for maximum timber; we had to have a benchmark for maximum amenities. And, by forcing us to look at that kind of analysis, it also forced the public to choose extreme sides. And so, I think it facilitated polarization. I think where we wanted to evolve to is more of a systems theory, or more of a cybernetic theory about human directions. That is more looking at human decisions as an organism. And, you get feedback from the environment or from other people about how things are going. And from that, you determine that there is a need to change your direction....By getting to more specific proposed actions, rather than these themes types of things, like out there on the land we are going to do a commodity alternative, and a maximum amenity alternative.”

One cited example of a new planning approach is with the on-going forest plan revision.

“Our plan was done in 1987. And, we are getting close to the point where we are going to have to revise the plan. Do we want to say, “Bitterroot Valley, do we want to have a commodity approach to the national forests, or do we want to have an amenity focus for the national forests. We will present those two themes, and then you can select the one that you like.” That would be one approach. And, if we end up with the same regulations that we have now, it could be the approach. But, an alternative approach would be to say, “these are the things that we have seen that are problems with the Forest Plan. Our elk habitat standard isn’t as effective as we thought it would be in measuring elk habitat and we think this other standard would be better. What do you think of that? We found that some of you expected for us to produce 33.4 million board feet of timber per year, and that hasn’t happened. Here’s what we think we can produce, probably around 10 million board feet per year.”

An alternative suggestion to avoid polarization is to start with commonalities to avoid the development of adversarial roles.

“I would think it would be more productive to start with things that we could agree with, than to start with an appeal....Yeah, it was a very adversarial thing. You were pitted against one another. Why set the stage that way? Why not start from scratch, so you’re not adversaries from the very beginning?”

One respondent contends that the Agency already transitioned to a new management paradigm based upon ecosystems. Unfortunately, the public hesitates to trust the Forest Service yet, and so the process of trust-building is slow. In addition, many environmentalist groups operate as strict legalists, hindering a break from procedures stipulated in the NEPA and NFMA.

“Some of the environmentalists say, ‘they don’t obey the law. We are going to make them obey the law.’ They are strict legalists, if you will. And there are so many laws....But, now there are so many laws, that it is difficult for the Forest Service to cover all the bases.”

Nevertheless, a future establishment of trust between the Agency and its constituents constitutes the next era in effective public participation.

“Part of the problem today is that the Forest Service has already in effect made that change and the public doesn’t trust them....So I think we’re in a very strong era of transition in the public trust until we have proven that we changed our paradigm deep down inside the Agency. Until they can look at the Agency and not see remnants of the old paradigm, they will not trust us. So, I would submit to you, that in the era of public involvement, I would say that you are going to see another change in the effectiveness of public involvement after there is another trust level. And if you were to look at you public involvement process, when ninety percent or ninety-five percent of people believed in the old paradigm, the public, that producing wood was the thing to do with optimizing, etc., that kind of public participation worked. Now you have eighty percent of the people who do not believe that paradigm, or ninety percent. So you see a changing value set. So how you do your public participation is different.”

An example of this outside of the Valley existed with the North Grant Creek Sale near Missoula, where residents told the Agency that they would trust them with harvesting only if it occurred under the auspices of improving the ecosystem, and not the amount of stumpage harvested.

“If you follow..the North Granite Creek sale north of town, the Grant Creek I mean, when...[the Agency framed] that sale in terms of logs produced for the mill, people didn’t like it. When...[they] framed it in going back to a natural ecosystem and how much Douglas Fir you had to take out to do it, they said okay. It was the management objective that determined the acceptability or non-acceptability of the sale. The terms were the same; could have been the same. You still could flow the same number of logs down to the mill, but if you were doing it to supply the mill, the current value set is that [it] is not a good enough reason to cut in my back yard. If you are doing it to reestablish the ecosystem. ‘Well, we will trust you enough to try it. We still don’t trust you yet.’”

Collaborative planning, including those found on Lick Creek, Stevensville South-West and West-Central, are hopefully persuading the public to trust the Agency. The diversity of interests represented highlight the Lick Creek experience.

“See this is the third of these IRAs [Integrated Resources Analysis]....There has been, Lick Creek, that’s the first one they had on the Bitterroot. And it really went fairly well. I was really interested in it because they brought in excellent resource people. Some were even from the University of Idaho. That was the first time I had heard Jack Losensky make his presentation....There were about 22 who started out in that and like this one, some of them shook out. But it hung in there pretty well and it was very interesting because this is the first time they had young loggers, there was Deniston....There were ranchers. Snowmobilers were represented. And at first it was funny because there was a standoff[.]”

Nevertheless, in retrospect, one party present felt that the Forest Service betrayed several interests, and unfortunately their trust, by harvesting less timber than they implied and limiting public access by closing a road (although only during the hunting season, and winter - during which it is open to snowmobiles), despite alleged agency promises to keep it open.

“What they took out of Lick Creek was a joke. It really was. It made me sick. I felt pretty good about them actually putting in a timber sale. I thought it was pretty great that they actually did something; they actually harvested some timber. They did it under the guise of research. And it made me pretty sick to my stomach when I went in after seeing that....They cut a bunch of pathetic stuff that wouldn’t make a decent two by four, and then the middle age stuff, they went through and girdled. They intentionally killed it, after they wouldn’t let the loggers harvest it. That wasn’t what we had been talking about in Lick Creek Scoping Group. We had been talking about utilizing it. We had been talking about making the most of it. We had been saying, ‘do it right.’ They didn’t do it right. They left the big stuff which should have been cut, the stuff that was dying and needed to be cut and which could have been utilized while it still had real value, they let that stuff stand.”

“The Scoping Group hashed and rehashed, and we went over and over and over one point: keep the road up to drop point six open to the public year round, and that is a part of the document. And those sons of bitches closed the road any ways. A complete denial of what this highly touted public group was supposed to do, was to give them guidance. ‘We’ll do what you tell us to do.’ We got it in black and white that they were supposed to keep that road open. They closed it any ways.”

In addition, several participants found the process too lengthy. “[B]ut by the time we finished, it was a year and a half or two.... That’s another thing, it can go on too long. They go on too long.”

Another beneficial aspect of Lick Creek is its use as a demonstration site. Unfortunately, the lack of similar sites fails to counterbalance clear-cut scars left from past forest management.

“Now there is a legitimate one and it’s coming. But there’s not a lot of those around here. And people will still say.... I can still look out from my porch and see the same clear-cut that I saw in 1964 and when the snow falls they are just as big and blatant as they ever were.”

Several interviewees also spoke positively of the open planning meetings on Stevensville South-West and West-Central.

“I guess we tried to involve the public at a broader scale before decisions had been made at all. Like some of the areas in Stevensville, supposedly there was not any decision made to have any timber harvest activity before the public was first involved, which was a little different from what we had done in the past.”

Unfortunately, in addition to the long length of time demanded of collaborative meetings, the diversity which characterized Lick Creek is absent in Stevensville West Central. “It [Lick Creek] was quite a diverse group like this one [Stevensville West Central] was at first. This one isn’t anymore.” A respondent, when asked why, notes that Lick Creek lacked an “organized, anti-group. In any words we didn’t have Friends of the Bitterroot.”

Furthermore, there is the danger that people tire or lack the time to continue participating.

“You know the Stevensville West Central and the Stevensville South. That’s really where we started in this intensive and many meetings over a long period of time. What we heard from some people in that thing was that, ‘we were tired. That we have lives besides the National Forest and we certainly have interest here but we can’t rise up next month to start the new project.’ The same people that really gave us good input weren’t willing to go on the next project because they had something else in their lives. That’s always the concern of mine is how do we get effective public participation without completely burning people out because there’s not just a National Forest...There has to be a more efficient way of getting information and getting more than just information; getting them to participate and helping make a good decision or in helping implementing properly.”

A final setback to using collaboration, is environmental groups will accuse the Agency of manipulating the parties, if they reach consensus.

“You are stacked with retired, environmental, well-off people. You can’t do consensus in a Forest Service according to a ranger. You can’t do consensus, because then you will be accused of manipulating all these folks into where they all agree.”

The three projects, however, will hopefully give participants a sense of ownership in and understanding about management on the Forest.

“This Lick Creek Project: the group that did that had an extreme amount of ownership in that process. When somebody had a question those people were there to talk to the people. ‘Yeah, I was involved with the project and this is why it went like that.’ I think that’s the same thing that will come out of the West Central Project when you get to the end.”

In spite of these efforts, one respondent finds little improvement in the effectiveness of more recent public involvement.

“I think it [public involvement] was about the same. In other words, involving the public in discussing. I can’t say involving the public in decision-making, because that has never been done. Involving the public in discussions about the administration of the national forests or projects hasn’t really changed in twenty-five years. It stayed the same. There hasn’t been any improvement in it. There is probably more of it. Obviously, there is more of it than in 1970. So obviously, they are spending a lot more time and a lot more money - they being the rangers and the forest supervisors and the regional forester. But as far as making any improvements in the process - no, there hasn’t been any improvement in the process.”

Another interviewee, nonetheless, affirms that new policies and personnel are transforming public involvement on the BNF. In addition, the respondent downplays the naysayers, identifying them as ornery and unwilling to forget past events.

“Now you have a new breed of cat on your forest management and they still had to deal with some of these problems that weren’t built in for them. They had nothing to do with it. You can still see the roads and the stuff that is already up there on the hill. Well they have to figure that into the picture and that makes management, ecosystem management, difficult. This is not a territory where nothing has been touched....I do all I can but somethings don’t come quietly. People don’t fall into your lap. People like to be ornery. They do! It gives them sort of.... So they don’t look like pushovers. It gives them the look of strength or something like that.”

Moreover, other recent events concerning forest management optimistically suggest improved relationships between the Agency and the publics.

“The prognosis is not completely negative. Up in Sula Basin there is a rancher who is cooperating with the ranger in some experimental grazing. There are loggers involved in Representative Pat William’s Bill, HR 1682 - The Forest Ecosystem Stewardship Demonstration Act of 1995. A lot depends on agency vision of the rightful place of the public in land management decisions, and I think that the process that we have been going through with the Stevensville Ranger District will have some positive results.”

The most positive sign of increasing participation, and cooperation between the various parties currently in the Valley (yes, even members of Grassroots and Friends), is a Darby land

acquisition. "This [land exchange] is the first thing we have ever done here where there is absolute support, even the county commissioners."

One interviewee hopes the forests' ability to renew and replace itself, thus removing the mountainside scars of past management, will allow people to forgive and forget past events. "But the trees are coming in there little by little. After all that is thirty-five years ago."

PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT CONCEPTS

What Is Public Involvement?

Addressing this question is difficult since a number of definitions exist for the term. One interviewee provides an overarching explication of the term. "Public participation can be any type of input from the public or other government agencies."

A more meaningful question, perhaps, is what is meaningful public involvement. This question, nevertheless, also eludes absolute answers, however critical issues to focus on are identified.

"It's a nightmare. Meaningful public involvement to me would be, this is pie in the sky, that ideally the formal and informal ways of involving circles, would be informed enough about the Forest Service, about its mission, about ecosystem management, about what all this jargon means first of all.... A lot of people agreed, jargon was a big problem for a lot of people. It's so hard. That these leaders, formal and informal, would be informed enough about the mission of the Forest Service today, not about what they think it was some time ago, what all these programs and processes that they are doing are. And then be able to decide, does any of it impact me or should I not be concerned about it. Am I going to designate a representative for an interest to go, and would that person be willing to be a member of the public involvement process at the Forest Service? Then I have to decide what they stakes are in for me. Then I have to feel that my group will be heard, that I won't be ridiculed....So, you must deal with their time, which is a real factor. Whereas the higher up the socio-economic scale you go, the more time you have. That is also true with retirees. They can afford to retire."

Nevertheless, examining what comprises effective involvement is a fruitful venture, since disenfranchised parties (such as loggers) who feel excluded from formal public involvement processes currently exist in the Bitterroot Valley.

"There's a real sense in which the timber industry people themselves make....They might be able to jaw with Friends of the Bitterroot members, but, Joe Blow logger can't. He's afraid. He's afraid to get up and speak his mind. He's afraid to participate. He's afraid he's not

articulate enough. He's afraid he doesn't understand some of the fifty-four dollar words that are being used. He's really quite intimidated and afraid to come, even though his ox is being gored. Then the question becomes, for me to be effective, you have to span that gamut, not only of interests groups, people who are stakeholders, but within those groups for their ability to participate - and make them not feel threatened. It's almost like the Forest Service trying to deal with diversity. Some people have been cut out of the goodies of society because they are not so well educated, because of their color, because of their race, because of whatever else. It might be gender. So, that to me is something that hasn't been addressed. How do you take these folk and bring them there so they can feel that they are comfortable. That they have the time. These are the folks out in the woods cutting the trees down. And they care deeply, but they are not off until ten o'clock at night."

Nonetheless, the lack of a fully equitable public involvement process should not be attributed wholly to a lack of effort by the Forest Service, who, according to one respondent, tried every conceivable method to better Agency-citizen interactions.

"As far as how it has changed, a period of time, in the last fifteen to twenty years, we've tried a multitude of different ways to involve the public from public meetings where any of the public could come and say anything they wanted about anything, nominal group types of public involvement where we broke the public into groups and tried to name our issues out of all the comments and get some possible resolution, or alternative resolution to this particular issues, to one-on-one types of involvement, involvement with certain groups, whether they be environmentally-oriented, timber industry-oriented, or mining-oriented, or whatever the case might be. I can't think of any type of public involvement we haven't tried. We've also tried, whenever the issues involved something in the field, we've actually gone to the field with the publics that were concerned, with academic people who were concerned. We've gone to the field and have actually looked at the project to see what was the best solution with the project. So really, during the forest planning, and projects since the forest plan was done, it seems to me that we have tried a multitude of different types of public involvement, from individual, to in the field. Just about anything. I can't think of what we didn't try, that we could have."

Despite the apparent absence of clear categories when analyzing the types or effectiveness of public involvement, one distinction interviewees alluded to concerning the subject is formal and informal methods.

Informal versus Formal Methods

Two types of public involvement exist: formal ones largely based upon the requirements of the NEPA, and more informal ones. One interviewee respondent describes both categories and when the Agency utilizes each.

"I guess I would look at public involvement in two aspects. One, is really looking at it as part of a process. In that, you start out with a change you want to make in a forest plan, and

you initiate some announcement to the public that you want to make a change, and you get comments. The second aspect of public involvement to me is just the day-to-day keeping people informed on how you are implementing the forest plan, discussing possible changes you are making to it, and implementing it. I think the latter is more true of forest planning since I have been involved. It is more informal, and more of a day-to-day relationship with the people when talking about the forest plan instead of implementing some change to it.”

Of the two, most respondents expressly favor informal procedures over more formal ones. One interviewee states,

“[W]ell, I don’t view public participation as a stop and go process where you’ve got a project and you say, ‘okay, I’m going to go out and do public participation.’ Rather, I think you build public participation by having a relationship with people to begin with.”

This acclaimed bias, nevertheless, is unsurprising. First, informal participation demonstrated its effectiveness in eras predating passage of the NEPA (e.g., the effectiveness of Supervisor Brandborg’s interaction with local people). Second, as previously noted, respondents describe how public participation suffered when the Agency, upon passage of the NEPA, adopted formal procedures in 1970: certain attending parties manipulated and controlled these forums, thereby excluding effective involvement by others; and conflicts escalated, especially when philosophically-based groups jumped into the fray. Faced with more controversial and monopolistic meetings, the Forest Service turned to more informal methods, such as the extension service model, or identifying common values through conversations.

Although the NEPA and NFMA statutes, respectively, provide an opportunity for people to comment on decisions, and an expectation for their involvement, the Agency still relies on informal sources to direct decision-making, both at the individual- and neighborhood-level.

“He is not that active in National Forest Management, but is a conservationist...When I don’t know whether we’re shifting too far on an issue, I will go out and talk to him and say, ‘what do you think about this?’ Or if I get beat up real bad and I’ll say, ‘do you think they are saying anything relevant here,’ and he’ll say something. He’s a conservationist in the true sense of the word, long term.”

“You know I can break my area of influence up into all those neighborhoods. I’m not just talking small areas, I’m talking maybe twenty-mile neighborhoods where the people live in the same general area. They don’t all think the same but I could go to a number of places in that area and talk to a many of the opinion leaders or influencers of that area. I think if we had time to spend more in that arena we would be better off. Some of the most effective work we’ve done getting influences back or input to projects has been when we go out in the homes, sit around with fifteen people and have supper and then after supper sit down like you would with your family and talk about issues. We’re not going to agree on everything.”

Moreover, effective informal networking gives agency officials awareness of problems and discontent through indirect channels.

“I have been working very closely with...[the ranger]. There are a bunch of people who are very worried about the salvage cutting up there. People have known for a long time, but have not, for one reason or another, seen fit to go to the Forest Service and sit down one-on-one. So they send this kid to do the calling. Then I say to...[the ranger], ‘they won’t be able to call you for one reason or another, but you call them.’ And he does. And he goes and sees them....But he’s also firm. He’s honest about things. If this is the reason he doesn’t think we can do it, he says it.”

Third, the Agency continues its use of informal methods of gathering public opinion, since problems with equity among participants participating in formal procedures continue to exist. Moreover, the diversity of groups involved in the recent collaborative efforts has declined since Lick Creek.

“We haven’t done the most effective work here involved with West Central. Then there’s a large input of time into a group of people that may or may not have influence. They certainly have influences in their spheres but how are those people representing other people? That to me would be something that the study has to look at. If you get too narrow or you get into a group of people, are you still hearing from everybody in the sphere of influence.”

Unfortunately, the Agency can not expect to drastically increase the number attending public meetings.

“[I]f you get five percent or even two percent of a community, you can’t expect more than that. You can when there is a protest. I remember one night when we had a meeting down at the RC&D, I was part of the committee that was asking the Forest Service to look at the practices around here. There were about 200 people who showed up: all the loggers and the Forest Service had encouraged them to be there, and of course they all did. But there was even fights....So, if they try to set their sights too high, they’re going to be disappointed because this world as you know has become more complicated. There’s a meeting every night or two and people have the TV and its easier to watch that then go to meetings. It’s gotta be something you really care about. So I don’t anticipate that there is ever going to be a great deal of easy participation. If they think so, they’re due for disappointment.”

Another interviewed respondent also notes lack of participation and believes that active interest by conservation organizations is needed to place natural resource issues on political agendas.

“I think the public could do something about it, but most of them don’t understand what’s happening or the need for action. Very few of the public are really involved with what goes on in the national forests. If you ask most citizens of the national forests, what are the national forests, they wouldn’t be able to tell you. Most people just don’t participate in government that much. So it involves a small percentage of the public that are involved, that are participating in government. I think the conservation organizations need to do a better job of making the administration of the public lands as issue in the political process. I don’t think conservation organizations have done a good job with that. The environmental concerns didn’t even enter into this last election. It was a continual propaganda barrage by hate-radio, and a few others, about feeding people’s discontent with government, and their frustrations. And that played right into the hands of unscrupulous people, I believe. I call them ‘the wacko group’ that doesn’t read their history books in regard to the Civil War or whatever. They’re still screaming about states’ rights like the Civil War was never fought.”

On the other hand, a respondent notes that “environmental concerns were hot items in the 1995 Session [of Congress].”

Another interviewee also observes that non-government led forums for discussing natural resource management currently exist in the Valley (i.e. Bitterroot Water Forum). These efforts demonstrate an active interest in addressing natural resource issues.

“[T]he Bitterroot Water Forum is an example of a group that has basically decided that water is the most important issue in this Valley. They have decided to do a whole lot more about it. And, rather than trying to just adhere to a forest planning schedule or a county schedule, they are just taking on this particular question and developing it themselves....But, they are the ones who are leading the effort. And, I would say for those meetings, there are more people who attend them every time. There is a broad section of the Valley. There are irrigators and conservationists. And it seems to me a wide range of views. It is facilitated well.”

Fourth, instead of limiting discussions to differences of philosophy (a characteristic of many national groups), informal involvement educates agency officials about individuals’ specific reasons for or against supporting a decision.

“I think more one-on-one public involvement is more effective, because you have the chance to really understand why people are proposing what they are proposing. And, you have a chance to get beyond just the philosophical issues. But even one-on-one is getting pretty difficult because a lot of your environmental or conservation concerns may come from outside the Valley.”

Finally, informal procedures differ from formal ones which create and analyze extreme alternatives to ensure legal compliance. Unfortunately, this scenario forces groups within the community to pick opposite sides; the end result, unhappily, is greater polarization and conflict.

“I am aware that NEPA set[s]...those standards and helps create those extremes by ensuring that a full range of alternatives was laid out for the public to choose from....[In addition], NFMA regs are the guiding rules for forest planning. And, they guide us into this very benchmark-type of analysis, this analytic approach. And yet, some of us really don’t buy into it and agree with this. So, our approach isn’t in this way. It is more, what is wrong with the environment.”

Factors, however, often preclude using informal over formal methods of participation. Statutes, for example, mandate certain formal procedures, regardless of their effectiveness. In addition, large population sizes prevent officials from establishing a working rapport with all necessary groups. “It’s difficult if you’re talking about having public participation in San Francisco and you have to have a relationship with too many people.” Furthermore, physical distances obviously limit the usefulness or feasibility of informal involvement (i.e., a line officer can not feasibly interact informally with his national constituents located throughout the country). Finally, time restraints imposed legally and by agency agendas often limit the use of informal participation.

“You always have to look at how much time you have. Putting people on the stand to say, ‘this is the correct way....’ You know. I do think the Forest Service has to be very deliberate in their position. ‘I think this is the method that will work,’ or ‘I think this is the guidelines they should use.’ But a lot of time, that could be done in a document. ‘This is our written position.’ Then, groups can react to that.”

One respondent observes, however, that when presenting a position in writing, the Agency must “be very sure that the reasoning for the position is clear with support information with it.”

Unfortunately, a respondent notes that limiting participation to formal NEPA procedures when time pressures exist, seriously lessens the quality of the involvement process.

“Sometimes it is the formal NEPA procedures that lead you into the quandary, because you are trying to get through something in a designated period of time. And a lot of times, issues can’t be resolved in an eighteen-month period, or a six-month period. They are resolved over several years.”

A better approach, however, entails using a combination of formal and informal methods since there are “different types of public involvement for the different audiences you need to reach.”

“I mean, you have a general announcement. You have to tap into the general public, at least make them aware. A lot of times it’s going out to them, such as civic clubs or people who aren’t necessarily tied to the Forest Service, such as some organized group that can at least tie in with some outreach. And then bring it in from there. I think you have to have a one-on-one relationship with the governments that you work with: the tribe, the county commissioners, with state agencies, and that type of thing.”

An interviewee describes the different interests of the Friends of the Bitterroot and Grassroots for Multiple Use groups which make it necessary to use different public involvement approaches.

“Like, one of the main principles of the Friends of the Bitterroot, is that they don’t want any more road building in designated wilderness lands. Sometimes, you are able to work through those differences on the particulars of a projects, if they understand those particulars....[W]orking with them [Grassroots for Multiple Use] one-on-one [also] helps them understand. I think they have concern about ecosystem management, not understanding what that is. At face value, you propose a project that is ecologically sound or something like that, it doesn’t sound that great to them until you start getting on the ground and looking at the situation.”

(Examining the situation on the ground also improves understanding, and thus the planning process for other groups as well).

Another anecdote reveals how the Agency currently is applying different involvement techniques to revise the Forest Plan.

“Then, we primarily met with two groups. We met with conservation groups, and that included Trout Unlimited, Friends of the Bitterroot, Montana Wilderness Association, Audabon Society, Valley Fish and Wildlife Association. And so, it was quite a group of different individuals from those different conservation groups. And then we met with Grassroots for Multiple Use, and that includes: livestock people, loggers, millworkers, people who are just concerned with the traditional way we use the forest. We didn’t meet with them together, and that was perhaps a different approach. We didn’t try to seek consensus in the Review, because we just sort of matched what the objective of the Review was, with what public involvement seemed most appropriate. We also asked them all the way through, whether this was an effective way of doing this. Should we get together with the other groups? Should we try to put a group together? And the response from them, was that they liked this type of meeting. It allowed them to speak their minds more fully. And so, it seemed like an effective way.”

Principles for Effective Public Involvement

Interviewees pointed out general and specific principles, the latter applying to formal or informal situations, to improve the effectiveness of participation.

General Involvement Principles:

Even generally speaking, respondents provide a number of suggestions. First, the Agency needs to provide the public with updated and clearly articulated goal statements (i.e., something beyond the nebulous adage of ecosystem management).

“Changing goals of the Forest Service fail to get communicated and understood by people. Many of these people who I interviewed are still operating on the basis of a 19 whatever-it-is, 1898, or 1908 Organic Act. And you don’t communicate those goals through things like this (see Appendix II). You can communicate them maybe over coffee. I don’t know.”

Constant updates of agency goals and management objectives is especially needed today when they frequently fluctuate with political and administrative changes. This leads to perceived “[i]nconsistency in management....As administration changes, policy changes. It used to be consistent despite administrative changes.” Another remarks on how national policy changes result in inappropriate placement of blame on local officials.

“I have found this [changes in policy at the national level] to be true and very frustrating. The local agency people have to bear the brunt of public dissatisfaction on this point. People at the Washington Office don’t get beat on.”

Moreover, the Agency must avoid planning according to resource production quotas, and instead explicitly demonstrate that conditions on the ground and citizens’ desires are factors that largely drive management decisions. Despite continuous arguments that they are no longer basing decisions on quotas, agency officials still fail to convince several members of Friends of the Bitterroot of this. “There are people in the Friends who, still to this day, think the West Central is a way to get the cut out.”

Furthermore, the Forest Service needs to address and correct accumulated, widespread myths about the Agency.

“There is just a tremendous amount of myth about: what the Agency is supposed to do, what the Agency can do, what the Agency is doing. The meaning of all those computers. I have a friend who is so down on the Forest Service that she is convinced that they use those computer models to try to justify below-cost timber sales. What she doesn’t understand, is that they have to take into consideration things besides commodities to justify what they do. And, even under multiple-use they were supposed to do that, and especially under ecosystem management. There are just so many myths about the whole operation that need to be diffused. The only way those can be diffused is by being a member; by being a trusted

member. I come out from the University, or come out from the S.O. and I give a talk - nobody knows me. They just know that I am a Forest Service representative....But if I sit across the table from you, if I talk to you, if I ride horses with you, if I ski with you, if I take your child, if I keep your child while your doing something, going to the doctor - I trust what you will tell me as a friend. That is asking a lot of these people."

One critical way the Forest Service can better educate the public and dispel myths while gaining their trust is by reducing jargon and euphemisms.

"Level with people, and call a clear-cut, a clear-cut. Avoid euphemisms like group selection. People come up with all these wonderful terms. People are like, 'guys, your just trying to put a clear-cut through.' Jargon - deal with your jargon. It's almost like you have to have technical talk in house, but you have to have real talk in the life."

(One person pointed out, however, that explanations by forest staff effectively overcome most difficulties with jargon and euphemisms, provided that the public is willing to approach them.)

Second, Forest Service officials should utilize assorted participation methods, and "can't just rely on that one participation strategy." This is largely due to the differences among communities and agency employees which prevent the Forest Service from effectively using a single modeled approach.

Third, line officers must show their constituents that they are sincere, and interested in the resource and their concerns. Furthermore, they must allay suspicions that the motivation for public meetings stems mostly from legal requirements, individual political interests, or fashion.

"I think up front, the...[important element] of developing a participation process is that the people that are trying to participate have had to feel like you're there to listen, you're sincere, and why you're doing it. You're not just doing it to meet some law or because it's a neat thing that the people are talking about nowadays. So they have to feel like this person number one has some real feelings for the natural resources."

Third, officials should localize participation to enable agency employees and citizens to connect with a piece of ground.

"[There will] continue to be public participation and public policy driven at the national and regional level, but the place that you can be most effective is at the local level, whether that be the forest level. It may even be the regional level; not the whole region but maybe the western Montana or an ecosystem...because people need to connect to a piece of ground."

“There should be more decentralization; more and more should be given to the rangers and the forest supervisors, even though that might not lead to having things done similarly on various forests. There is some problems, obviously, with that, but the problems are greater not to decentralize.”

Nevertheless, an interviewee notes that the Forest Service is becoming increasingly centralized. One cited example of top down management, is the requirement to complete the Upper Columbia River Basin Project before culmination of forest plan revisions.

“The process is geared toward more centralization. I can give you examples of that. The forest supervisors can’t do any revision of the [Forest] Plan until after the Upper Columbia River Basin Project is finished. It is out of Boise. And, instead of being started at the grassroots, it’s not.”

Contrasting this point, one respondent notes that the Columbia River Basin Project provides information helpful and necessary for the forest planning process. This interviewee, therefore, fails to assess the situation as an effort for greater agency centralization. In addition, a respondent questions what is meant by decentralization and remarks, “I am not sure how the Forest Service would be decentralized unless more decision-making is given to the individual forests: decisions would be based more on what’s on the ground, rather than quotas.”

Another sign of that centralization is “[c]ostly buildings like the supervisor’s office, instead of little things out on the ground.... you have to put more money into on the ground management where it’s visible. How is it going to be visible?”

Moreover, a respondent perceives that communication technology, allowing instantaneous communication with the Washington and Regional offices, serves to increase centralization. According to this interviewee, the Forest Service should instead seek greater decentralization.

“The communication age, the instant communication with computers and so forth, has only served to centralize it more, so that the power structure can basically control right out of Washington. And that is getting tighter as it is getting more and more centralized, instead of less and less. And in my opinion, that is exactly the opposite of what it should be.”

One interviewee attributes the continued trend toward greater centralization to two additional things. Foremost, it enhances commodity interests’ ability to influence policy-making at the national level.

“But unfortunately, I don’t see that [decentralization]. I see it going in the opposite way, because basically the timber industry, and the mining industry, and the off-road vehicle people, manufacturers, and that kind of thing - that’s the way they want it. They can control that type of thing out of Washington. That is where they have their powerful lobbies. I can’t. Who can go back to Washington DC every week and work lobbying and that kind of thing. But certainly, people who have powerful lobbies, have their lobbyist right there, so they can affect change at the national level. Centralized control works well for them, as opposed to having the general citizenry more involved. So, I don’t see that trend changing. I haven’t seen the change, yet.”

(On the other hand, another respondent observes that “computer communication works for conservationists, also.”)

Moreover, an interviewee notes that greater centralization gives politicians at the national level the ability to preserve their power base. Therefore, the public must demand decentralization for it to occur.

“The chief has to make those kinds of decisions, the chief and those he shares power with. In order for him to do that, he has to have direction from the Undersecretary of Agriculture. Unfortunately, the politicians want to see that happen. So, I don’t foresee that happening. Without that kind of direction, I don’t know if it can happen. The only way that it can happen is for the public to demand that it happen.”

A critical reason for decentralization is that it becomes increasingly more difficult to ascertain effective participation and land management at a larger scale.

“The President tries to deal with the Spotted Owl issue and everything on that larger level but the tradeoffs and everything are made at that level. It takes a long time to know if you’re doing the right thing or not. This work you’re doing on West Central, I think you can tell pretty quickly whether or not you’ve had successful public participation process. You can tell whether you’ve done anything right by the land.”

Localizing management, however, seemingly requires that upper-echelon management grant a large-degree of autonomy to district rangers and their staff.

“What do I mean by problems of scales in management? There was a lot of talk about on the ground people. Locals, not management, not being able to do what they need, to or don’t desire to, or should do because of national, regional, and forest policy.”

Fourth, Forest Service employees should acknowledge that they are best positioned to provide physical and biological information.

“So, we have to give, rely on information the resource people are now gathering. I have to. I have to take them at their word. I have to believe when John Ormiston tells me about a certain habitat, a certain wildlife situation. When Kathy Stewart spells out problems with white bark pine, I have no recourse. I have to take what she says. I think most of the people, I think most not all, especially those who are disgruntled Forest Service people, buy this altogether.”

An important element of information gathering is monitoring. “Monitor on the ground; hands-on management. Demonstrate that you are monitoring.”

Nevertheless, the realization that the Agency is in a good position as a information-provider should be accompanied by the awareness that ‘experts’ are not found solely within the Agency: the public also contains a highly-educated element.

“Now I think we realize that there is many people that are better educated than me and they’re common in the projects that I do....I still have a number of specialists, researchers and all that kind of stuff that are giving me advice before I make a decision. But the people that will appeal my decisions, many of them have got Ph.D.s and different...[qualifications] that I don’t. I’m not the expert. I’ve got lots of experience but there’s all kinds of different opinions. And so I don’t believe anymore that I know better than you about how to manage this forest. I am, however, paid to make decisions once all the necessary information has been gathered. I need to be able to display to you what the tradeoffs are, whether we do exactly what your way is or what their way is.”

In addition, the Agency should present their information in a simple, straight-forward manner, without either jargon, or condescension. Moreover, a respondent notes another downfall of agency research: that Forest Service information, such as the present literature on disease and forest health, is slanted. This research, according to the interviewee, starts with a conclusion, whereby supporting evidence is built around it.

“I think the Forest Service probably provides information that is slanted. Now it is about disease and forest health. There are all kinds of pamphlets. Mainly, I would classify them as propaganda. So, I am not advocating that the Forest Service people make any more of that available....Well, I think they start with the conclusion that, for example.... That’s basically what propaganda is, you start with a conclusion and then build all the evidence to point to the conclusion. Fires is a perfect example of that. People are talking about the fact that fire suppression has been effective for eighty years, when in fact, it hasn’t been effective for eighty years. It’s been effective since the jumpers, basically. Prior to that, if you start looking at the facts, it wasn’t effective. Yeah. And the Forest Service didn’t get any appropriations, special funds for fire fighting, until 1928. There weren’t hardly any roads in the forests, only trails, and you get a lot of starts out here in the Rocky Mountains when it’s dry, windy and hot. The fires took off.”

A related fifth point is that citizens often view processes as more legitimate if they involve researchers, because of their expertise on subjects and the understanding that they are influenced by different political pressures than line officers.

“When I try to do public participation, it still doesn’t ring as true as if you’ve got one of the researchers, Arno or someone, researching right here within the project that you’re trying to work with the public on....They’ve just got more credibility. They’re not being looked at as being pressured by the same political issues that I may be influenced by or I can be perceived as being influenced by. And of course they’ve got their opinions, they’ve just spent a lot more time studying, most of their life. So I really think they’ve got some credibility too with public participation.”

Finally and most importantly, personnel should not attempt to separate the Agency from the community, because “you can’t.” This includes interaction with parties regularly opposed to the Agency.

“But at least it’s a start. I mean, you can’t solve any problems unless you communicate. How can you solve any problems unless you communicate with each other. If you are going to communicate with each other, you have to do it on even terms....[Y]ou have to talk to the people who are challenging you. You know, you try to ally these other groups over here. ‘The Friends of the Bitterroot over here, they are a bunch of wackos.’ But it doesn’t work. They’ve tried it for ten years, and it hasn’t worked. It’s not going to work. It’s not going to work for them. They get a new ranger in, and he or she keeps trying it. And then a new ranger comes in, and they think they have a whole new idea, so they try the same thing. ‘We will isolate these people over here. We will ally Trout Unlimited.’ And it doesn’t work. You’ve got to talk to the people who are challenging you, and you have to talk to them on an equal basis. Even though it might not happen on the first meeting, you have to keep on doing it.”

Furthermore, Forest Service employees should continually seek to enhance relationships between the Agency and community; specifically, through informal interactions with community members.

Informal Involvement Principles:

Informal involvement is the cornerstone of public participation in the Forest Service. This involvement occurs at many levels in the Agency. For instance, one interviewee related how Regional Forester Tom Coston visited the homes of people involved in the Magruder Corridor Controversy. The Magruder Corridor incident characterized his term throughout which he habitually listened attentively and sincerely to reported problems, and dealt with them promptly

(e.g., after receiving complaints from constituents, he readily wrote a memorandum dealing with caches of outfitters and guides in the River of No Return Wilderness in 1981).

This on-going process of relationship building, which Arnold Bolle simply referred to as “natural public involvement,” begins from the moment agency personnel arrive. The critical importance of developing a rapport early on is based on the observation that the most effective public involvement occurs when a relationship is established prior to discussing an issue which emerges later.

“I’m most effective in my public participation when I have some kind of a relationship with people prior to ever discussing a single issue. They’ve met me or I’ve been in their homes, or they’ve heard about me from somebody else or something along those lines. I tend to want to spend lots of time in that arena as opposed to designing an elaborate public participation plan for a timber sale or trails. Many of those things are required by law and so you need to do them based on: “I want to find information on this specific project; I want to make a better decision.” Many of the things that I do or the people that work with me do, is to make sure that we have some kind of relationship built before we ever get to that stage.”

Building relationships in an unfamiliar community shortly after arriving demands self-confidence, an attribute necessary for all forms of public involvement. Because without public involvement, officials will hesitate to seek necessary answers by asking uncomfortable questions. “Be visible. Shun defensiveness. Explain why and stick with your decisions. Assert your professionalism.”

“One thing I’ve noticed about public participation is that you have to have confidence in yourself. People who are good at public participation have high self-esteem. If you don’t have high self-esteem, you can’t be good with other people. You have to have confidence in yourself before you can feel good about other people.... You need to trust others and feel good about others. And the only way to do that is to feel good about yourself. If you feel that you can be vulnerable enough to ask questions that you might not want to hear the answers to, if you know what I am saying.”

For instance, one interviewee largely attributes the lack of interaction with the community and the Agency during various years to the low self-esteem of supervisors and their staff at the time. For instance, although many interviewees credit Supervisor Gillam’s unpopularity to the personnel and policy changes she made on the Forest, another notes that some another official previously have made similar changes without the same repercussions.

“I knew a forest supervisor....He was a very strong individual. Came and did the exact thing that Bertha had to do: overturned personnel and made major shifts in environmental program direction....Bertha was singled out personally by many people. This person was

able to dodge many of those. Number one, he was more outgoing. He was somewhat more of a master of talking to people."

Another respondent notes, "more and more...I'm beginning to see the importance of the agency's training (or picking) in individuals as Rangers (and Supervisors) who 'like' people."

Other factors within the Agency contribute to the schism separating it from the public. They include the authoritative mode of operation and bunker mentality (evidenced by more time at computer terminals and in vehicles, than on the ground talking to people), fewer districts, greater centralization, and abstract, impersonal models.

"Authoritative mode of operation, that started...[during the 1950s and 60s]. The bunker mentality. We've kind of talked about that. A unit unto itself. Increased diversity has provided more educated specialists with the agenda to move frequently, so that they are not motivated to become part of the community.... More centralization and consolidation of districts, which created the view of nobody being on the ground. They take away the face. We are going to centralize. Now we are going to take the Regional Office to Denver. We had a lot of ranger districts, and it was those ranger districts that had people out on the ground, that people saw, and could put a face on; that they could talk to in the Forest Service truck. Now there is no one out there to talk to. They just drive by the Forest Service office and see everybody sitting at their little computer terminal, which gives the impression that it is all being managed by computers. Another variable. Inability to get things done....Models. All these wonderful models. When I came to a meeting, all I heard was models it seems like. Does that mimic reality? Can we model what people do? Maybe we can. People don't like being modeled."

In addition, dissension seemingly exists in the agency ranks. It is difficult for people to trust the Forest Service, if agency employees visibly disagree with each other.

"New mandates are being carried out by those who don't agree with them. You touched on that a little earlier with the old guard. Some of the old guard is abrasive to change. So, you've got the two. How are you going to meld into one again. It's a transition. You just keep seeing it. You have one-one-one, then you have two. It's a multiple....And one guy said to me, 'I have a friend who works for the Forest Service, and this is how it is. They are counting the days until they get out. They don't agree. They don't buy in.' But to me, why wasn't something like this given to the employees. Why won't they buy into it?"

Another respondent notes that "dissension [also exists] in society on these issues - would be more concerned if there wasn't some healthy discussion on the issues."

Despite these apparent setbacks, one positive attribute, civility, is consistently associated with the Forest Service. This obviously betters interactions between the Agency and its public.

“[B]ut at least civility is a good thing to practice. Some of our conservationists are not very civil. I have never had a Forest Service employee be rude to me. Now in early years I could be lightly ignored; or if not ignored, I could exit out the door and nothing happens....I have found Forest Service personnel almost universally civil. Some are shy - but respond in a friendly manner when addressed.”

Moreover, both community members and line and staff members require frequent interactions to determine to what extent both share common values and views of acceptable management activities. “The point is, is the management you are putting on the ground acceptable to society?”

“And if you were to look at you public involvement process, when ninety or ninety-five percent of people believed in the old paradigm; the public [felt] that producing wood was the thing to do with optimizing, etc. - that kind of public participation worked.”

Fortunately, one interviewee notes that most people in the Valley share a shared goal of bettering the land which provides common ground for management decisions.

“Well, if this wasn’t my job, I feel like I’d probably feel the same way about the national forest. You would probably...[voice] feelings to me on what should be correct management: what we should be doing on a national forest....But people by and large, most people want the land to be in better shape than the way they found it.”

Another anecdote additionally reveals that the majority of the Valley’s residents expect line officers to manage sustainably. “Everybody’s paying my salary, not just the people I’m meeting with every day. And what they pay me the salary for in most cases is to look at the issues and make a fair and consistent decision what’s going to be a long term sustainability of the ground.”

Perhaps surprisingly, a respondent notes that the public’s judgments of a Forest Service employee are largely based upon personal observations of, and interactions with the individual and his or her family in the community. Moreover, these judgments instrumentally influence the amount of trust extended to that person.

“In this Valley people know who I am and my family. And little things that I do in my own personal life will influence how they think about me, what I do in my professional life - that all factors in. I mean, rightly or wrongly, it all eventually comes into the public participation process. If I get in a meeting and they’re thinking, ‘I don’t like that guy,’ then I’m not going to get very far and we’re not going to be listening to each other very well.”

“One of the things that was said to me was, ‘he must be an okay guy because he comes to the high school basketball games.’ Now I didn’t think anything of that but that’s the little

things that build perceptions in people's minds. I didn't sit at home tonight and go, 'oh I should go to the basketball game because people will think that's neat.' I don't function like that. But to me, I like to go to basketball games because I like to watch basketball. But it's also being part of that community, root for the home team. I'm involved in things like civic clubs and not because I give the Forest Service a good name, but because I get a personal enjoyment out of being part of that community. And...[this is] sometimes a strange community because we have our share of controversy and that kind of thing but like any place, like any town I've ever lived in, there's ninety-five percent that are good people that want to do the right thing for everybody. So that's how I've established trust."

As noted beforehand, the overlapping of agency personnel's personal and professional lives occurred frequently in the past when they lived and gained membership in the community. Several decades ago, people within the locale could readily discover Forest Service activities by talking to friends or family who worked for the Agency. Today, there are fewer ranger stations, and a small number of employees reside outside the Valley, commuting to and from work.

On the other hand, a line or staff member can become too intertwined in the community to the point where he or she no longer distinguishes separates personal and professional spheres.

"Now, on the flip side of that you can also start losing some of your objectivity when you become too involved. You know, you're so involved in the community that you're afraid you're going to lose some of your best friends when you say, 'no, I don't want to put that timber sale over there,' or 'no, we're not going to mess this road up.' So it's a fine line but I still think, no matter what job you do,...whatever you do in the community, it's my personal belief that you've got to be part of that community in some shape or form."

Naturally, an employee's length of tenure influences his or her rapport with community members. It is interesting to note that, terms of fifteen to twenty years characterized the tenure of rangers predating the 1970s. During the 1970s and early 80s, the Agency drastically shortened the period employees spent in their positions to two to three years. Understandably, people in the community soon tired of seeing and meeting these new faces.

"I came at the tail end of a big shake-up as far as district rangers go. Rangers were here for fifteen or twenty years. Part of the problem of maintaining good public participation process, you transfer people out every two to three years, the people who are working in the town get tired of meeting new people, get tired of building new relationships. Have that person move away and have to explain to the new person."

Today, agency personnel select from available positions. Of course, there are advantages and disadvantages, largely due to particular circumstances of long tenure on a forest or a district.

The first advantage is “you need some people to provide...continuity,” or a consistent agency presence in the community. Second, it possibly improves public relations. “You can have some professionals that the public likes, they like what they’re doing, and they’re doing a good job; it’s nice having them around.” Third, it forces line officers to recognize and endure their past mistakes. “[T]enure on a forest or a ranger district is good..., because you have to live with your own damn decisions.” Finally, it gives employees and their families a chance to become part of a community (i.e., it provides a better family environment).

Generally speaking, moving frequently provides: promotion opportunities, skill development, and a new environment to avoid job apathy. One interviewee notes, “moving is good, because you get a flavor of what other people are doing.” In contrast, personnel who are “just biding time” with long-term tenure harm the Forest Service, the public, and their professional development by rendering fewer services than they are capable of.

Obviously, professional behavior influences the level of trust accorded to a line officer, as much as personal behavior. Several respondents suggest activities for Forest Service officials to better informal involvement. For instance, line officers should realize that their best “success with getting participation and getting trust in most things is when people have problems.” Moreover, there should be the recognition that “[p]eople want to talk to who’s in charge[.]” They should therefore respond to criticisms accordingly by personally dealing with the complainant(s). The suggested response to a protest is for officials to “either call...[the party] back directly or...go out and see...[the party] directly.”

Although such personal interaction lessens time spent elsewhere, it diffuses a potential time bomb if ill-feelings associated with the problem are allowed to fester.

“So that takes a prioritization in my time. That means I’m not somewhere else....I may not be out on the land on a given date because I’m doing that. But you could say some of those things could blow up and become a week long problem if you don’t take care of them right away, when they are a half hour problem.”

This balancing act by line officers is not limited to periods where objectors identify problems with agency management. Rather, line officers must constantly equalize this precarious symmetry of time spent on the land and with the public.

“It is a big part of my job right now and someday this idea, ‘not knowing if you get so far away from the ground when you’re into public participation so much that you can’t...’ I meet with you and you say, ‘I’ve got a concern about...[this],’ and I have to say, well, ‘I’ve

never been there.' Then it's an ineffective public participation. And you laugh but you know, it takes time to cover districts and so I have to balance....'Now, last summer I spent my whole summer doing no public participation because I've been chasing fires all summer.' And I know we let some of our public relations slide. The district was hurt by that. People are mad, or we didn't get as much done now because of the tradeoffs we had to make."

In addition to resource and community concerns, line members must additionally address personnel and other, similar managerial matters.

"Now I believe your land ethic, how well you do with the public, and those kind of things are some of the things that they look at when they want to put someone in a ranger or supervisor job. Your ability to lead and those type of things I believe are in our job descriptions. We can do one hell of a lot more in that arena, but you have to balance it with some of the other things. We also have to spend time with the employees that work for us. If you don't know the land, I don't think you can do either one of those."

Formal Involvement Principles:

Despite the bias toward a higher investment in informal involvement, land managers can also better their formal participation procedures. It should be noted, however, that success or degree of involvement is "always going to depend on what the issue is." Furthermore, participation specialists should acknowledge that a perfect process does not exist. Therefore, the success of the effort is largely based upon intuition and abilities of the meeting leader. "An agency person has to use his/her common sense and intuition, when listening to a person to ferret out just what agenda the person has in mind."

"But in my view, I think one misjudgment about public involvement is that people always tend to look at it, the process, after it is done and say, 'well, if they only would have done this, and this, and this, things would have worked out differently.' That we can't create a perfect process that is going to work. And I don't think that there ever is a perfect process. So, you can always start through something again, and see where that will lead you....In fact, I don't think there is any mechanical answer with public involvement. I think it is a lot more intuitive than people really recognize. Good public involvement is going to come with the people who are working with it and their abilities. It's hard to fit the dynamics that are going on with the changes that are going on in this Valley, and then try to conduct something on the side which is effective by a lot of different factors."

Nevertheless, officials can take steps to prevent public meetings from being "almost an adverse experience for some general people." First, the Agency should involve other parties when setting the agenda.

“Instead of the rangers and the supervisors setting the agenda all the time, it would make a hell of a lot more sense to me for them to say, ‘hey, we want to meet. There is no agenda. We will make the ground rules together. We will set the agenda together.’ That is revolutionary. It has never been tried. Something as simple as that, you think somebody would think of that. You know, you would think that a forest officer would think of that. But they haven’t.”

Second, meeting leaders should “follow the time frame[.]” Third, “they [should] meet the objectives” established for the meeting. Fourth, “they [should] allow people to express their opinions without domination of a view[.]” Fifth, facilitators should ensure that, “there are fair rules that people follow when they are working with each other. In addition, they should guarantee that “there’s respect.”

“So, I think good facilitation in meetings, they follow the time frame, they meet the objectives, they allow people to express their opinions without domination of a view, and there are fair rules that people follow when they are working with each other, there’s respect.”

Sixth, parties should focus on, and organize around agreements instead of differences. A final concern for both formal and informal involvement, but especially the formal, is promoting a relaxed environment for people to work through issues.”

“I think the thing I worry about the most, is trying to have a fairly unstructured environment by which to work through a particular issue. I think if you are truly going to be open in a community setting when working with the public, you have to be somewhat open to new ideas, new things that can come up. So when you are trying to organize and run a process, you really want to have some control over it. So, it’s trying to relax with not having some control over it. So, there are a lot of unknowns.”

Additional Tools for Mitigating Inequitable Involvement:

Despite attempts to avoid inequity, participation efforts frequently fail to include most of the affected public.

“But, from my standpoint, I just don’t know any tremendous way to do public involvement that involves all the people, or at least a representative sample of all the people, all the time. I just don’t know how to do it. If you have public meetings, some of the publics [are] going because they are the ones who are very vocal and can stand up and dominate the meeting. You get one or two sides of an issue, and that’s all. The so-called silent majority or general public, you don’t hear from them at all: whether that’s the Forest Service’s or

whatever group's responsibility to talk for the silent majority or general public, or whether you should try to find some way to do it. I just don't know any good way."

Fortunately, social research tools exist to uncover the opinions of the 'silent majority'.

"I do recognize that people who are affected are not necessarily the ones who are heard, or are not the ones who can articulate their concerns as well. So in some cases, you need to take a look at ethnographic or those kinds of social assessments to understand the full range, the full implications of some actions. And then, you have your interested public who participates. I don't think that you can expect to get a good read where you just get your interested publics. I think there are so many busy people that they don't have time to go to public meetings, or be an active participant. So, many times now, you need to go out and just talk to different people. 'What do you think about this type of change. How do you use the forest.' These kinds of things. I think social assessments are good. I think phone surveys can be good at some times. Opinion polls give you a different read on what public opinions are."

Haplessly, respondents note that products of social assessments often remain unutilized.

"Those supervisors and the regional foresters have all kinds of surveys, but they don't pay any attention to us. They just keep on going. They will do another one, and it will show the same thing. They won't do anything about it. They will just keep on doing the same thing."

"The Forest has done a number of these, phone surveys....Then we took those and developed a strategy on how we were going to develop our public involvement. But most of them never came and got them. They do them and sit on a shelf somewhere. It's a waste of money. This one [Janie Canton-Thompson's Social Assessment] started a little controversy because it offended some people."

Evaluating Public Involvement

Different interviewees suggested assorted evaluation tools to determine the success of a public involvement processes both formal and informal. Despite these different options of judging involvement, several interviewees found evaluation to be mostly subjective.

"It is those subjective evaluations that are probably the most valid for you in success or failure of public participation. Getting subjective evaluations from knowledgeable people who kind of track it."

For instance, one evaluating public involvement should obtain feedback from the various parties about their feelings, and determine to what extent the Agency incorporated suggestions into the final outcome.

“Well, I think you have to evaluate how the Forest Service feels about the public involvement that was conducted, and how the public has felt. Do they feel like they have been hurt? I think effective public involvement is also when their suggestions become part of the product.”

In addition, an evaluator can measure success by “whether it seemed like anybody who wanted to be involved - could be involved.”

One respondent describes a three-tiered approach to evaluating public involvement, comprising: substantive, procedural, and psychological elements.

“[T]here are three types of satisfaction that you look at. There is substantive satisfaction, that is are the resource issues addressed fully, and have you discussed that to the extent that the public is satisfied in terms of providing products from the national forest or protection measures that they might have wanted to have in place. The second type of satisfaction is procedural satisfaction. That is, is the process satisfactory; is it fair. The third type is psychological satisfaction. And, that is more their feeling that it was a good relationship, and that they feel good about the outcome.”

Despite these differences, most respondents clearly indicated that the number of appeals per se fails to accurately measure the success of a participation effort. First, as previously noted, administrative and legal appeals structurally discriminate against those seeking additional resource production on the Forest. Second, line officers may avoid appeals merely by ceasing activity on the forest. Furthermore, a lack of management does not necessarily imply greater public satisfaction with agency activities or better forest health.

“At one time Forest Supervisors were marked by the number of appeals. The lower number of appeals you have, the better you were at public participation. I worked for a forest supervisor somewhere else. His words were ‘bullshit. I can sit around and do nothing and not get any appeals. And if I don’t do anything to make people mad or I don’t do anything that is stepping out and looking at the issues, it’s pretty easy not getting any appeals.’ I come from that school of thought. In the complexity of natural resource management today, to measure the number of appeals is old.”

Moreover, forest officials, if faced with a possible appeal, may back-off and instead choose to spend funds on other management activities. “They spend several thousand dollars on appeals, and better this money be spent on forest management.”

Third, different numbers of appeals often accompany different management events. An official needs to look at the number of appeals relative to the amount normally received for that activity.

“No, I don’t think it [number of appeals] is a very good measure. I think numbers of appeals can be an indicator if you view them in the context of a broader picture. For instance on the Bitterroot, they had nearly one hundred or two hundred appeals on that mine down there, on the vermiculite mine. Right there your data is way off because you’ve got a couple hundred on that one mine which is quite different from ten on a timber sale. Ten on a timber sale might be as important to what you’re trying to evaluate as two hundred on that mine. You see what I am saying.....You’ve got to look at the whole context. Numbers work in context.”

An additional fourth flaw of measuring success based upon the number of appeals, is that some groups are more representative in the appeals process than others.

“Sources of appeals vary. Who appeals is as important as numbers. In fact, maybe more important. A few groups appeal everything, regardless: so them appealing something doesn’t mean something changed. It’s not a variable, it’s a constant.....[W]e were going along with a timber sale project and we were getting nervous that we were cutting too much.....He’s about seventy and is an old-time resident and is known as the most reputable private land manager in the Valley. Very knowledgeable person. He has cut his own lands many times, grazes cattle, so he’s not a preservationist....Just the fact that this person is discontent about what is going on is a strong indicator that we’re really off the track....One person who changed from here to there, the nature of that one person was an indicator that socially we were off the mark. Whereas we could get an appeal from one of the environmental information groups and it wouldn’t matter because they probably took the appeal from some other timber sale and didn’t even change the names on it.”

So, even though appeals, per se, fail to determine the effectiveness of participatory efforts, the identity of the appellants, the number of appeals relative to similar activities provide context. As one interviewee notes “[y]ou...look at the number of appeals and the substantiveness of those appeals.”

Substantive Issues in the Valley

Several commonly named substantive issues exist in the Valley, which interviewees identify as sensitive. These issues are mutually rooted in two realities. First, is a community-wide love for the mountains, which many wish to remain unchanged.

“But the way you do it is getting down to the basic values which are involved with the people and the loggers and the ranchers and the agriculturists, they love the mountains too. So when you change the nature of the mountainside, you have nobody supporting you.”

This steadfast devotion is largely due to the residents of the Valley close proximity to, and expansive view of the mountainsides.

In addition, most resident disdain unsightly management practices on adjacent forests. Moreover, a number of interviewees speak about this condemnation of the ugly. "So it [terracing] was effective [at growing trees], but it was ugly. Everyone knew it was ugly."

"[N]inety-nine out of every one hundred who saw a terrace would have to agree that, that was lousy. You just shook people up. Aldo Leopold probably put it better than anyone I have heard in the Sand County Almanac when he said, 'if it looks pretty good, than it probably is.' When you look at a terrace, man, when you look at a clear-cut, when you look at a pile of roads on the side of a hill - you know, it doesn't look good to anybody."

Respondents reiterate five proscribed activities or items of concern, although citizens would likely protest any activity negatively affecting the visible appeal or health of the Forest. First, as mentioned above is terracing. Despite this technique's effectiveness at growing trees on grassland at a minimal cost, its visual impacts prevented its widespread implementation in the Valley. Second, is clear-cutting on the mountain face. The long-term evidence of this management practice and its visibility to a large portion of the Valley residents, limited or eliminated clear-cutting as a harvest procedure at different periods in the Forest's past.

"By and large, they're [clear-cuts] not particularly nice looking and they last a long time. We can accomplish the same objective. Why would we try to accomplish it a different way? Even when we started to go to heavy clear-cut from selective harvest for a number of reasons, many of the logging community were questioning us. 'Why are we cutting these trees? Why are we cutting all these little trees and putting them in slash piles?' We were talking about 'getting rid of all these diseased trees. By God it's going to be an industrial forest.' Well that wasn't what people wanted."

Road-building is a third contentious issue.

"And the other thing is just the miles of road that this industrial forestry took to pull off. And this to me that was one of the things when I came here that really jumped out. This road, this road is everywhere."

Their visibility on mountainsides, potential access of wilderness areas, and association with harvesting activities made road-building a sensitive issue throughout the region's recent past. The three aforementioned practices, however, remain entirely or mostly restricted due to the

uproar against them in the past, and other ecosystem sustainability factors. Nevertheless, other issues still continue to concern citizens.

Fourth, people preoccupy themselves with water quantity and quality: a concern associated with land management. "Water quality in the Valley has always been very important. That's one of the common things. You don't hurt the water, you don't hurt the water." Another interviewee notes that the BNF "also provides the water: the quality of water and the type of water. And they felt that clear-cutting was detrimental to the quality and quantity of water. And water is very important."

"There's certainly a water issue, and there's got to be a water issue because when it all comes down to the end product. That's why we are in the Valley today, because there's water. Because there's good water. That's why agriculture exists. And, you know, when you are talking about screwing up one drainage, it's different than having timber sales in every damn drainage you've got. You suffer some slow attrition on some drainages, but that slow attrition becomes a major factor. You know, you have activities on every drainage you've got."

Tied to water quality, a fifth concern is preservation of wildlife habitats and watersheds. One respondent decried clear-cutting, because of the deleterious effect on habitat. Another notes, "[t]hat's [water protection] one of those common approaches, wildlife's another one."

"Your best water quality is if you don't do anything. That produces the most fish. Anything that you do out there that disturbs land is going to be pushing that water quality down, because there is no way you are going to put a road in without some sediment going to some damn creek. And sediment in the creek ain't good for fish."

A final large issue "is the status of roadless land and future wilderness designation."

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, two main points emerged from this research. First, research demonstrated that the identified three variables, respectively, influence the effectiveness of public involvement. They are: style and personality of forest supervisors and their staff, local events, and national policy. In addition, this study confirmed that throughout the Forest's past, informal public involvement has overshadowed formal participation procedures.

These two conclusions help direct how public involvement should proceed in the BNF and similar forests. First, the Agency should refine its involvement through personnel/citizen relationships. More specifically, personnel should strive to attain full membership in the community. Some steps to enhance communication and interaction at the national or regional level include: granting autonomy to supervisors and rangers to increase their ability to deal with local problems; retaining energetic line and staff employees in a locale for a sizable time period to provide continuity; and, select line officers who interact well with people, and know or are willing to learn the history of the area. At the personnel level, the agency should urge: employees and their families to relate with the community soon after their arrival, both personally and professionally; line officials to respond immediately to criticism by contacting the complainant either in person or through a telephone conversation; and, line officials to exert their professionalism, or in other words, standing firm on a decision after demonstrating that he or she considered a number of variables and other options.

Second, the Forest Service should understand historical events shaping citizens perception of the Agency and the Forest. For instance, procedurally speaking, several supervisors (e.g., Guy Brandborg), interacted frequently with residents in the Valley. This knowledge has led certain individuals to expect current officials to connect personally with individuals in the region. On the other hand, the bunker mentality exhibited by different supervisors has caused others to pessimistically view relationships with the Agency, and instead, opt to limit communication to formal, legal channels, or cease to communicate with the Agency altogether. Nevertheless, officials must, however, also realize and incorporate into the equation past controversies, and demographic changes that have resulted in greater demands placed on the BNF in the form of more forest users, changing publics, and an influx of new values.

Moreover, another valuable procedural lesson learned from the past concerns framing forest management and plans; to avoid confrontation and distrust, plan according to site conditions and social desires, not production quotas. Furthermore, line officers, by surveying opinion leaders, can identify issues or position to aid them in management decisions. A related substantive matter revolves around historically sensitive issues: avoid practices which mar the publicly viewed and cherished mountainsides (e.g., terracing, extensive road-building, and clear-cuts). In addition, explicitly monitor and protect the quality and quantity of water, and the condition of watersheds and wildlife habitats.

Third, employees at different levels throughout the Agency, should understand that personnel styles and historical events alter formal policy on the ground; that lower-echelon line officials pragmatically alter a rule or regulation to where it will work in a particular context. Moreover, this

enterprising spirit is necessary for the agency to function. Furthermore, the different personalities and situations found at various forests and districts throughout the country prevent universally applying one, formal involvement strategy. In fact, formal procedures, although they create mandated opportunities for citizen participation, usually restrict a line officer's ability to customize his or her involvement process. To prevent this, it seems that agency heads and Congressional members must regularly query local agency officials about the effectiveness and limitations of statutorily-defined procedures. Instead of formal processes, the Forest Service must continue to depend upon the intuition and interactive skills of its rangers, supervisors, and staff to conduct and evaluate informal and formal participation.

Nevertheless, knowledge of different participation strategies remains a useful resource when creating a formal participation forum. In addition, principles such as following time frames, meeting stated objectives, allowing parties to express opinions without domination of a view, ensuring that there are fair rules and respect, and focusing on commonalities instead of differences - also better the effectiveness of a formal involvement effort. Finally, both employees and personnel should realize that effective involvement is based on trust, an element which requires frequent communication and perseverance.

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APPENDIX I

This section contains a speech by Orville Daniels, then Supervisor of the Bitterroot National Forest, to the Society of American Foresters at a Section Meeting in Burley, Idaho, on February 20, 1971. Remarkably, this speech contains many observations which confirm or clarify ones found fourteen years later in this research project.

The classification of public groups was intended to provide a generalized portrayal of the Bitterroot Valley population. A number of groups & interests were not included.

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN. IT'S A PLEASURE FOR ME TO RETURN TO THE INTERMOUNTAIN SECTION OF THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS AND TO SHARE IN YOUR MEETING WITH YOU. I WAS A MEMBER OF THE INTERMOUNTAIN SECTION FOR ALMOST 7 YEARS WHILE I WORKED ON BOTH THE DIXIE AND CHALLIS NATIONAL FORESTS, SO YOUR COUNTRY AND YOUR PROBLEMS ARE FAMILIAR TO ME.

AFTER I LEFT THE CHALLIS NATIONAL FOREST, I SPENT SOME TIME IN THE JOB CORPS PROGRAM. WHILE IN THE JOB CORPS, I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASSOCIATE WITH BOTH PSYCHOLOGISTS AND SOCIOLOGISTS. ONE OF THE THINGS THAT THEY IMPRESSED UPON US IS THAT PEOPLE NEED A SENSE OF IDENTITY. THEY SAY THAT ALL OF US NEED TO IDENTIFY WITH SOMETHING, WE NEED SOMETHING THAT SETS US ASIDE FROM OUR PEERS. AS ARNOLD BOLLE SO ABLY DISCUSSED, WE ON THE BITTERROOT FEEL THAT WE HAVE IDENTITY. IN FACT, WE FIND OURSELVES IN THE PUBLIC LIMELIGHT MUCH MORE THAN IS COMFORTABLE. OF COURSE, THE PSYCHOLOGISTS ALSO TELL US THAT IDENTITY HAS VALUE ONLY IF IT IS IN PERSPECTIVE WITH YOUR SURROUNDINGS.

SO WE ON THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST HAVE ATTEMPTED TO PUT OUR SITUATION INTO PERSPECTIVE WITH EVENTS ON OTHER NATIONAL FORESTS. WE HAVE FOUND THAT THIS IS SOME TIMES DIFFICULT TO DO. AS AN EXAMPLE, BOTH THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST AND THE MONONGAHELA NATIONAL FOREST IN WEST VIRGINIA ARE OFTEN SPOKEN OF CONCURRENTLY WHEN DISCUSSING THE CLEARCUTTING CONTROVERSY IN THE NATION. WE TRIED TO CORRELATE THE HAPPENINGS ON THE MONONGAHELA WITH WHAT WAS OCCURRING ON THE BITTERROOT. WE FOUND IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO DO. WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION TO DRAW COMPARISONS, SO WE BEGAN TO ESTABLISH SOME CONTACTS WITH THE MONONGAHELA. BECAUSE OF THE KNOWLEDGE WE HAVE GAINED THROUGH OUR LETTERS AND TELEPHONE CALLS, WE HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE TWO FORESTS COMPARE AND CAN DRAW BETTER CONCLUSIONS FROM THE THINGS WE SEE OCCURRING.

MY GOAL TODAY IS TO HELP YOU BECOME A BIT MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE SITUATION ON THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST SO THAT YOU MAY INTERPRET WHAT YOU HEAR AND APPLY IT TO YOUR OWN SITUATION. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THIS BACKGROUND INFORMATION, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WHAT IS OCCURRING IN THE WAY OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT ON THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST AND TO PROPHECIZE A BIT ON WHAT WE THINK IS AHEAD IN THE PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT FIELD.

THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST IS A RATHER TYPICAL, MODERATE WORKLOAD NATIONAL FOREST. CONSIDERING THE AMOUNT OF ATTENTION THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED, SAYING THAT WE ARE TYPICAL MIGHT SEEM INCONGRUENT. BUT WE HAVE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE MANAGEMENT SITUATION AND PRACTICES ARE RATHER TYPICAL OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ON NATIONAL FORESTS THROUGHOUT THE NATION. THIS WAS SUBSTANTIATED BY THE BOLLE REPORT AND THE FOREST SERVICE TASK FORCE REPORT. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECEIVED LETTERS FROM SUPERVISORS FROM COAST TO COAST, ALL OF THEM SAYING THAT THE MANAGEMENT SITUATION AS DESCRIBED IN THE TASK FORCE REPORT COULD APPLY EQUALLY WELL TO THEIR NATIONAL FORESTS.

SINCE THE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE ELSEWHERE, WE CAN GAIN PERSPECTIVE INTO THE CURRENT SITUATION ON THE BITTERROOT BY CONCENTRATING ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOREST THAT VARY FROM THE NORM.

ONE OF OUR PRINCIPLE CHARACTERISTICS IS THAT THE FOREST IS MADE UP OF HIGHLY VISIBLE TIMBERED SLOPES THAT CAN BE SEEN FROM U.S. HIGHWAY 93 AND NUMEROUS RESIDENTIAL AREAS. THE BITTERROOT VALLEY IS ABOUT 60 MILES LONG, COMPLETELY SURROUNDED BY NATIONAL FOREST LANDS AND WITH MOST OF THE RESIDENTIAL POPULATION

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LIVING IN CONSTANT VIEW OF THESE FOREST LANDS. THE VALLEY IS PARTICULARLY SCENIC. THIS HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE PUBLIC CONCERN SINCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TEND TO CREATE FOCAL POINTS DETRACTING FROM THE SCENIC BACKDROP.

ANOTHER AREA OF VARIANCE FROM THE NORM IS THAT THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST IS GENERALLY NOT SUBJECT TO HIGH INTENSITY RAINSTORMS, NOR HEAVY SOIL EROSION. THIS IS A BLESSING, BUT IT HAS MADE IT EASIER FOR OUR PEOPLE TO BE CARELESS WITH SOIL PROTECTION. AS A RESULT, LAYMEN AND PROFESSIONALS ALIKE HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF THE SOIL PROTECTION MEASURES USED ON THE FOREST. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT HAD SERIOUS SOIL EROSION, WE HAVE USED PRACTICES THAT HAVE CREATED A HAZARD.

ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONTROVERSY IS THE PRACTICE OF TERRACING, STRIPPING, AND OTHER MACHINE SITE PREPARATION METHODS. RELATIVELY LARGE AREAS OF STEEP MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN SUPPORT HABITAT TYPES WHICH OFFER SEVERE VEGETATIVE COMPETITION FOR YOUNG TREE SEEDLINGS. THIS HAS LEAD THE FOREST INTO THESE SITE PREPARATION METHODS.

A FIFTH CONDITION THAT HAS INFLUENCED MANAGEMENT PRACTICES ON THE BITTERROOT AND HENCE LEAD TO PART OF THE CONTROVERSY IS THAT THE FOREST HAS HAD NONE OF THE NON-FORESTER LAND MANAGEMENT SPECIALISTS NEEDED FOR THE BEST POSSIBLE PLANNING AND EXECUTION. AS AN EXAMPLE, WE HAVE NOT HAD A LANDSCAPE ARCHITECT, SOILS MAN, WILDLIFE BIOLOGIST, NOR HYDROLOGIST.

ALL OF THESE FACTORS THAT I HAVE LISTED HAVE INFLUENCED AND BEEN A PARTIAL CAUSE OF THE BITTERROOT CONTROVERSY, BUT NONE OF THEM ARE REALLY DISTINCTIVE ONLY TO THE BITTERROOT. THEY CAN BE FOUND IN VARYING DEGREES IN NATIONAL

FORESTS ALL AROUND US. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE THAT I HAVE FOUND IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PEOPLE IN THE VALLEY TO THE NATIONAL FOREST. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MAGRUDER DISTRICT WHICH IS IN IDAHO, THE ENTIRE FOREST IS IN RAVALLI COUNTY. RAVALLI COUNTY HAS LONG BEEN CONSIDERED A WEATHERVANE COUNTY FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA. POLITICIANS, SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, AND GENERAL OBSERVERS HAVE FOUND THAT TRADITIONALLY, RAVALLI COUNTY HAS SET THE PACE FOR MUCH OF THE STATE. THIS HAS BEEN TRUE IN ELECTIONS, CONSERVATION MEASURES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND SO FORTH. THIS PHENOMENA HAS BEEN STUDIED BUT NEVER FULLY UNDERSTOOD. THERE ARE GOOD INDICATIONS THAT THIS PHENOMENA WAS A MAJOR INGREDIENT IN DEVELOPING THE NATIONAL FOCUS ON THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST. LET ME DWELL FOR A FEW MOMENTS ON THE PEOPLE OF THE VALLEY. THERE ARE 14,400 PEOPLE IN THE COUNTY. THIS IS AN INCREASE OF 16 PERCENT IN 10 YEARS.

GEOGRAPHICALLY, THE COUNTY IS BROKEN INTO FOUR PARTS. IN THE SOUTH ARE THE EAST AND WEST FORKS OF THE BITTERROOT RIVER. THIS AREA IS POPULATED BY LAND-USE ORIENTED RANCHERS AND FARMERS. GENERALLY THESE PEOPLE ARE OLD-TIME RESIDENTS AND HAVE A GOOD CONCEPT OF LAND HUSBANDRY. OUR MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN WELL ACCEPTED BY THESE PEOPLE. OUR RELATIONSHIPS AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IS GOOD.

FURTHER NORTH, AROUND DARBY, WE HAVE A POPULATION ALMOST COMPLETELY DEPENDENT UPON LOGGING, LUMBER MANUFACTURE, AND TO SOME DEGREE, AGRICULTURE. WE HAVE GOOD RELATIONS IN THE DARBY AREA. MANY OF THE PEOPLE ARE OF LOCAL ORIGIN AND ARE CONDITIONED TO THE USE OF THE NATIONAL FOREST FOR COMMODITY PURPOSES.

PROGRESSING ON DOWN THE VALLEY TO THE HAMILTON AREA BRINGS A COMPLETE SHIFT OF POPULATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS SITUATIONS. IN HAMILTON, THE POPULATION

IS ALMOST ENTIRELY SUPPORTED BY COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS SUCH AS GROCERY STORES, BANKS, AND A LARGE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY. THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN LABORATORY IS SITUATED IN HAMILTON. THIS PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE LAB IS STAFFED WITH ABOUT 150 PEOPLE, MANY OF WHOM ARE OUTSTANDING SCIENTISTS FROM THROUGHOUT THE NATION. REPRESENTED AMONG THESE SCIENTISTS ARE MICROBIOLOGISTS, BIOCHEMISTS, CHEMISTS, ENTOMOLOGISTS, ECOLOGISTS, MEDICAL DOCTORS, AND OTHERS. MANY OF THEM HAVE TRAINING IN BIOLOGICAL FIELDS, INCLUDING ECOLOGY. MOST OF THEM HAVE SPECIFICALLY SELECTED THE BITTERROOT VALLEY AS A PLACE TO LIVE AND IN SOME CASES, HAVE WORKED HARD TO ACHIEVE EMPLOYMENT AT THE LABORATORY IN ORDER TO LIVE IN THE VALLEY. OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THIS SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IS NOT NEARLY AS STRONG AS IT IS WITH THE MORE TRADITIONAL PUBLIC THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED.

THE NORTH END OF THE BITTERROOT VALLEY IS MADE UP OF SMALL FARMS, ORCHARDS, RANCHES, AND RESIDENTIAL AREAS. IT IS A BEDROOM COMMUNITY FOR THE TOWN OF MISSOULA. SOME OF THE POPULATION IS DEPENDENT ON NATIONAL FORESTS FOR IRRIGATION WATER, BUT MOST OF THE PEOPLE HAVE LITTLE DEPENDENCE ON COMMODITY USE OF THE FOREST.

SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE VALLEY ARE VARIOUS CLASSES OF PEOPLE WHO DON'T FIT INTO ANY OF THE SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS. ONE BIG SECTOR IS THE DESCENDANTS OF THE ORIGINAL SETTLERS. THEY ARE KNOWN LOCALLY AS "BITTERROOTERS". THEY ARE BASICALLY CONSERVATIVE, LAND-BASED, COMMODITY-ORIENTED INDIVIDUALS. THEY ARE ACCUSTOMED TO UTILIZING LAND TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING, BUT HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF APPRECIATION FOR THE VALLEY AND WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO.

SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE VALLEY ARE RETIREES FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THE VALLEY IS BECOMING A RETIREMENT CENTER. THE RETIREES ARE GENERALLY FROM SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, THE PUGET SOUND AREA, AND THE MIDWEST. THEY HAVE MOVED TO THE VALLEY, BASICALLY BECAUSE OF ITS GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING AND NATURAL BEAUTY. THERE IS A LARGE NUMBER OF FORESTERS AMONG THE RETIREES.

SIMILAR TO THE RETIREES BUT WITH A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ORIENTATION ARE THE RECENT IMMIGRANTS. THE PEOPLE AT THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN LABORATORY ARE TYPICAL BUT ONLY MAKE UP A SMALL PROPORTION OF THE RECENT IMMIGRANTS. THERE ARE PROFESSIONAL MEN, BLUE-COLLAR AND WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS, AND BUSINESS MEN WHO HAVE IMMIGRATED TO THE BITTERROOT VALLEY TO ESCAPE THE PACE OF LIFE IN OTHER AREAS. IT HAS BEEN TRULY AMAZING TO ME TO DISCOVER THE BROAD VARIETY OF EXPERIENCES, SKILLS, AND PROFESSIONS THAT ABOUND IN THE VALLEY.

ANOTHER GROUP OF PEOPLE, WHO ARE SMALL IN NUMBER BUT WHO HAVE A TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE IN THE VALLEY, IS THE REALTORS AND SUBDIVISION DEVELOPERS. WE HAVE 1 REALTOR FOR EVERY 760 PEOPLE. THIS SURELY MUST BE MORE REALTORS PER CAPITA THAN ANY OTHER SIMILARLY-POPULATED AREA IN THE COUNTRY. MOST OF THE REAL ESTATE EFFORTS DEPEND ON THE CHARM AND NATURAL BEAUTY OF THE VALLEY. THE DEVELOPERS HAVE A TREMENDOUS ECONOMIC STAKE IN THE ESTHETIC CONDITION OF THE NATIONAL FOREST. AND, OF COURSE, WE ARE HAVING A LAND BOOM.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION THAT IN THE VALLEY THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE NATIONAL REPUTATIONS AS ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERS. MRS. DORIS MILNER OF HAMILTON AND G. M. BRANDBORG, FORMER FOREST SUPERVISOR AND INCIDENTALLY, FATHER OF STUART BRANDBORG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE WILDERNESS

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SOCIETY, ARE TWO GOOD EXAMPLES. DALE BURK OF THE MISSOULIAN, ALTHOUGH NOT A RESIDENT OF THE VALLEY, IS A LANDOWNER AND PLANS TO BUILD A HOME IN THE VALLEY.

SO WHAT WE HAVE IS A SITUATION WHERE THE VALLEY RESIDENTS WERE HISTORICALLY, ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE LAND, BUT THE POPULATION IS RAPIDLY SHIFTING TO A NON-DEPENDENT, SOPHISTICATED, COLLEGE-TRAINED GROUP. THIS GROUP IS INTERESTED IN A DIFFERENT LIFE STYLE AND SET OF VALUES THAN THE ORIGINAL POPULATION. THEY HAVE, IN MANY CASES, IMMIGRATED TO THE VALLEY BECAUSE OF ITS AMENITY VALUES, ITS REMOTENESS, THE WILD LAND CHARACTER OF THE NATIONAL FOREST, AND THE NEARNESS OF THE WILDERNESSES. IN MANY WAYS, WE HAVE A MICROCOSM OR REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS THROUGHOUT THE NATION. WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE OPINION IN THE VALLEY IS OFTEN A WEATHER VANE OPINION FOR THE NATION. WE HAVE BROAD REPRESENTATION OF ALL GROUPS AND INTERESTS, BOTH COMMODITY AND NON-COMMODITY USERS; ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND EXPLOITERS; PEOPLE WITH PURELY PROVINCIAL INTERESTS; AND THOSE WITH A MUCH BROADER NATIONAL INTEREST.

AND THAT BRINGS US TO THE SECOND PART OF MY DISCUSSION. WHAT IS OCCURRING IN THE AREA OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT?

SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM, THE FOREST SERVICE HAS BEEN IN THE ROLE OF PRINCIPLE PROTECTOR OF LONG-RANGE PUBLIC INTERESTS. THIS CHARTER IS BASED ON THE PREMISE OF "THE GREATEST GOOD FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER IN THE LONG RUN". THIS HAS BEEN A GOOD PREMISE AND STILL IS. AS A GENERALITY, IN THE PAST IT WAS NECESSARY FOR US TO BE THE ARBITRATOR BETWEEN SHORT-TERM LOCAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND LONG-TERM NATIONAL PUBLIC INTERESTS.

IN MANY LOCALITIES AND SITUATIONS THIS IS STILL OUR JOB. BUT THINGS ARE CHANGING RAPIDLY AND THE REPRESENTATIVE POPULATION THAT IS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE BITTERROOT VALLEY IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE THE CASE THROUGHOUT THE NATION. THERE ARE THOSE IN THE GENERAL PUBLIC WHO ARE JUST AS INTERESTED IN THE LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY OF THE LAND AND IN ITS STEWARDSHIP AS ARE THE FORESTERS AND THE FOREST SERVICE. MANY OF THEM ARE PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE IN OTHER DISCIPLINES. OTHERS ARE INTERESTED LAYMEN WHO FOR THE FIRST TIME HAVE THE AFFLUENCE AND SPARE TIME TO CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH THE "GOOD LIFE". WE ARE SEEING A RADICAL SHIFT IN LIFE STYLES AND VALUES. THE RECENT FIGHT AGAINST THE SST IS A GOOD EXAMPLE, AND OF COURSE, THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF OTHER SIMILAR EXAMPLES. THIS CHANGE IS HEALTHY AND IF WE CAN ADJUST TO IT, WILL LEAD TO A BETTER ALLOCATION OF THE SCARCE RESOURCES THAT WE HAVE. WE NOW RECOGNIZE THAT WE MUST BRING THESE INTERESTED PEOPLE INTO THE PROCESS OF PUBLIC LAND DECISION MAKING. IT MUST NOT BE A MANIPULATIVE PROCESS WHERE WE SET OUR DIRECTION AND THEN SELL IT THROUGH THE VARIOUS PUBLIC RELATIONS APPROACHES. INSTEAD, IT MUST BE A PARTICIPATIVE PROCESS WHERE WE INVITE PEOPLE INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, PROVIDE THEM WITH KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE SITUATION, AND PARTICIPATE WITH THEM IN MAKING THE DECISIONS. WE MUST BE OPEN AND CANDID. THE TIME FOR SECRET STRATEGY AND GAME PLAYING IS PAST.

ON THE BITTERROOT NATIONAL FOREST WE ARE CHANGING OUR PAST APPROACHES TO PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT. SINCE WE HAVE A VARIED PUBLIC WITH BROAD INTERESTS, WE CAN GREATLY IMPROVE OUR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. WE ARE FOLLOWING A PREMISE THAT THROUGH PARTICIPATION OF THE PUBLIC WE CAN COME TO A MUCH CLOSER DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND BASE OUR DECISIONS ACCORDINGLY. THERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE DANGER THAT WHEN WE ARBITRATE BETWEEN THE SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC

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VALUES AND THE LONG-TERM PUBLIC INTEREST, THAT WE AS AN AGENCY COULD BECOME SELF-SERVING AND PATERNALISTIC. IN THOSE LOCALITIES WHERE THE PUBLIC INTERESTS ARE MORE DIVERSE AND MORE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NATION AS A WHOLE, WE CAN AVOID THIS DANGER THROUGH PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT. I WOULD LIKE TO GO THROUGH A FEW OF THE APPROACHES THAT WE ARE STARTING TO USE IN PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT JOBS FACING THE BITTERROOT IS THE UPDATING AND REVISION OF THE TIMBER MANAGEMENT PLAN. THIS PLAN MUST BE BASED ON A NEW AND VIABLE MULTIPLE USE PLAN. IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THE MULTIPLE USE PLANNING AND THE TIMBER MANAGEMENT PLAN, WE ARE ESTABLISHING AN ADVISORY GROUP OF 12 TO 15 PEOPLE WHO WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCESS. BY STARTING NOW WITH THE ADVISORY GROUP, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO FOLLOW THROUGH FROM INVENTORY TO THE FINAL DECISION. WE HAVE LEARNED THROUGH EXPERIENCE THAT THE SELECTION OF THE PEOPLE IN THIS ADVISORY GROUP IS CRUCIAL TO PUBLIC CREDIBILITY. WE ARE GOING TO START WITH THREE MEMBERS WHOM WE FEEL ARE PARTICULARLY ASTUTE CONCERNING THE VARIOUS FACTIONS IN THE VALLEY AND WHO ARE RESPECTED BY THE PEOPLE. WE WILL HAVE THEM PARTICIPATE WITH US IN THE SELECTION OF THE REMAINING INDIVIDUALS.

A SECOND APPROACH THAT WE ARE USING IN PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IS THE CREATION OF AD-HOC GROUPS. AN EXAMPLE WAS THE AD-HOC ADVISORY COMMITTEE THAT WAS RECENTLY CREATED FOR THE MAGRUDER CORRIDOR. THIS GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF HELPING US DEVELOP THE ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO THE MAGRUDER CORRIDOR AND TO PLAN FURTHER PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN THE FINAL DECISION MAKING. THIS GROUP MET FOUR TIMES AND THEN WAS DISBANDED. IT

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PROVIDED A GREAT DEAL OF ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING THE ALTERNATIVES AND WAS ABLE TO HELP US GREATLY IN DETERMINING ADDITIONAL PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT NEEDS. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT IN THIS CASE, THE ADVISORY GROUP FELT THAT THE PUBLIC WAS SO POLARIZED AROUND THE ISSUE OF WILDERNESS VERSUS DEVELOPMENT FOR THE MAGRUDER CORRIDOR THAT IT RECOMMENDED THE FOREST SERVICE ARBITRATE, MAKE THE DECISION, AND THEN PRESENT IT TO THE PUBLIC FOR COMMENT.

ANOTHER APPROACH IS THROUGH INDIVIDUAL PERSON-TO-PERSON CONTACTS ON CRITICAL TIMBER SALES, ROADS, AND OTHER ISSUES. ON SALES THAT WE CONSIDER CONTROVERSIAL, WE ARE GOING TO THOSE PEOPLE WE FEEL HAVE AN INTEREST AND ARE DISCUSSING IT WITH THEM. THIS IS BEING DONE AS EARLY IN THE PLANNING PROCESS AS POSSIBLE. IN SOME CASES, WE HAVE EXPANDED THIS INDIVIDUAL CONTACT TO GROUP CONTACTS. WE ARE FINDING THAT THIS APPROACH TO PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IS PARTICULARLY PRODUCTIVE. THE RANGERS ARE DEVELOPING MORE OF A SENSITIVITY TO THE SENTIMENT AND DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE IN THE VALLEY.

A FOURTH APPROACH THAT WE ARE USING IS PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN REVERSE. WE ARE PURPOSELY INVOLVING OURSELVES MORE AS A PART OF THE COMMUNITY IN WHICH WE LIVE. WE FEEL THAT PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT MUST BE A TWO-WAY STREET AND OUR PEOPLE ARE PARTICIPATING MORE IN VARIOUS GROUP ACTIVITIES, BOTH AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOREST SERVICE AND AS INDIVIDUALS.

NONE OF THESE THINGS THAT I HAVE MENTIONED ARE NEW TECHNIQUES. THEY HAVE BEEN USED MANY TIMES IN MANY PLACES. IN FACT, WE PREFER NOT TO THINK IN TERMS OF TECHNIQUES. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A COOKBOOK APPROACH WILL NOT WORK. INSTEAD OF DEVELOPING NEW TECHNIQUES, THE REAL CHANGE THAT IS TAKING PLACE IS IN OUR ATTITUDE AND BELIEFS ABOUT PUBLIC PARTICIPATION. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO

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"MANIPULATE AND SELL" IN THE WAY WE HAVE IN THE PAST. WE ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE THAT WILL LEAD TO BETTER PLANS AND ACTIONS.

THAT BRINGS US TO ASSESSING WHAT LIES AHEAD IN THE PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT FIELD. WE MUST TAKE A POSITIVE APPROACH TO PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT, BUT WE MUST BE FULLY REALISTIC. THE ROAD AHEAD WILL STILL BE BUMPY. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IS NOT GOING TO SOLVE ALL OUR PROBLEMS, NOR IS IT GOING TO BE EASY. IT IS VERY TIME CONSUMING. WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH SCARCE RESOURCES. CONFLICTS ABOUT THE ALLOCATION OF THESE RESOURCES ARE GOING TO CONTINUE. THERE WILL BE FORCES AND COUNTERFORCES.

ON THE BITTERROOT, WE SEE SOME IMMEDIATE CONFLICTS ARISING. WE HAVE ONLY A LITTLE OVER 1 YEAR'S TIMBER CUT UNDER CONTRACT. WE HAVE A NUMBER OF SALE PACKAGES IN THE PROCESS AT THIS TIME BUT MANY OF THEM ARE GOING TO BE DELAYED PENDING CHANGES OF DESIGN. THESE CHANGES HAVE BEEN RECOMMENDED BY THE TASK FORCE AND ARE NEEDED TO MEET TODAY'S ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS. BECAUSE OF THE CHANGING MANAGEMENT APPROACH WE ARE TAKING, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SELL ONLY ABOUT A QUARTER OF OUR PLANNED 40 MILLION SELL FOR THE LAST 6 MONTHS. WITH THIS REDUCED SALE FIGURE AND THE SMALL VOLUME UNDER CONTRACT, YOU CAN SEE THAT THERE IS A MAJOR CONFRONTATION AHEAD OF US. NEITHER THE ENVIRONMENTALISTS NOR THE TIMBER INDUSTRY PEOPLE WANT TO SEE A PUBLIC VOTE ON THE ISSUES. THEY BOTH FEEL THAT THE FINAL DECISION WILL HAVE TO BE MADE BY THE AGENCY, BUT THEY BOTH WANT TO BE INVOLVED IN THIS FINAL DECISION.

EVEN IN THIS EMOTIONALLY CHARGED SITUATION, PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT WILL LEAD TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON ALL SIDES AND A BETTER DECISION.

IT APPEARS TO US THAT PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN LAND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS IS GOING TO INCREASE AND CONTINUE. IT IS THE TEMPOER OF THE TIMES. PEOPLE ARE NOT CONTENT TO RELY ON EXPERTS AND AUTHORITIES. THEY ARE WANTING TO BE INVOLVED. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER IMPLEMENTING THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT MAKES PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT AND CONTROVERSIAL LAND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS A REQUIREMENT. RECENT COURT CASES AND ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS DO THE SAME. AS A PROFESSION, FORESTERS MUST ACCEPT THIS AND REALIZE THAT IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY, NOT A BARRIER.

BEFORE I CLOSE, I'D LIKE TO DWELL FOR A MOMENT ON AN ASPECT OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT THAT IS OFTEN A BARRIER TO US AS PROFESSIONAL FORESTERS. WE FEAR THAT UNTRAINED PEOPLE WILL BEGIN TO DICTATE THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF OUR JOB. THIS FEAR IS SOMEWHAT SUPPORTED BY SOME OF THE ATTACKS ON CLEARCUTTING. OPPONENTS HAVE SOUGHT AND PROPOSED UNSOUND QUASI-SCIENTIFIC REASONS FOR OPPOSITION TO CLEARCUTTING. OFTEN IN THESE CASES, THEIR REAL OPPOSITION IS TO LOSS OF ESTHETIC AND AMENITY VALUES.

WE ARE FINDING THAT A PARTICIPATIVE APPROACH TO LAND USE PLANNING ELIMINATES MUCH OF THE CONFUSION. ONCE THE KEY ISSUES ARE IDENTIFIED, THE ATTACK ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS DIMINISHED. IT IS IN THE AREA OF LAND USE PLANNING THAT WE ARE FINDING THE MOST VALID PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT, NOT IN THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF SILVICULTURAL SYSTEMS.

IN CLOSING, I'D LIKE TO STRESS THAT AS A NEWCOMER TO THE BITTERROOT, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THE CONTROVERSY AROSE NOT BECAUSE OF THE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES. THEY ARE NOT UNIQUE. RATHER THE CONTROVERSY AROSE BECAUSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LOCAL PEOPLE AND THE NATIONAL FOREST. IF WE ARE CORRECT IN OUR


BELIEF THAT THE BITTERROOT IS A WEATHERVANE FOR THE FUTURE, THEN WE CAN EXPECT THE PRESENT TRENDS OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT TO CONTINUE.

Speech by Orville Daniels, Supervisor, Bitterroot N.F. to the Society of American Foresters at Section Meeting in Burley, Idaho, on February 20, 1971.

APPENDIX II

This section contains a pamphlet entitled "Integration of Forest Planning into Ecosystem Management". A respondent notes the attractive, glossy appearance which masks the largely incomprehensible jargon found within (page 39).

**PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY MAKING:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**



**Bitterroot Ecosystem Management Research Project
Boone and Crockett Wildlife Conservation Program**

Working Paper 95-2

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"To be truly successful, environmental policy must look first to the needs and desires of the human beings who charge or regulation may affect, now or in the future. And it must take notice of what the need or want to know about the justifications for change, how change will take place, and how it could affect their daily lives. Such a sensitivity, however, does not always characterize environmental decision-making today (Marcel Chotkowski LaFollette 1983)."

INTRODUCTION

The Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield (MUSY) Act of 1960 stipulated that five contemplated uses of national forest lands: outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes (Coggins and Wilkinson 1987), should be achieved and maintained "in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national forests without impairment of the productivity of the land (Coggins and Wilkinson 1987:611)." "None of these possible uses * * * is given priority status (Coggins and Wilkinson 1987:27)." This policy fostered single-focus internal and external advocacy factions. Experts attempted to incorporate all respective resources in policy formulation. They however, spoke different languages, and the process they used lacked a standardized way by which they could assess and make resource trade-offs. Planners attempted to overcome these and other obstacles making planning difficult by turning to economics. Economic models used in their analyses emphasized efficiency, technical aspects of resource management and rational choice theory, and assumed that conservation was always in the public interest. The public eventually wearied of watching scientists and agency personnel formulating decisions in a behind-the-scenes "black box" which hid how resource trade-offs were made. Cost/benefit analysis and other quantitative, rational models failed to uncover political norms held by citizens and to assess ethical issues of policy ends (Knopp and Caldbeck 1990).

On June 4, 1992, F. Dale Robertson, chief of the USDA Forest Service (USDA FS), issued a memo to all regional foresters and station directors entitled Ecosystem Management of the National Forests and Grasslands. The document, which incorporated lessons learned during the previous three years in the New Perspectives program, states that "an ecological approach will be used to achieve multiple-use management." An ecological approach is systemically holistic, which may require advocacy factions to consider the impact of individual land use on all other contemplated uses. Chief Robertson (1992) outlines "three very important points" for the success of ecosystem management: public involvement, conservation partnerships, and land manager/scientist partnership.

This paper provides an overview of the literature on public participation and collaborative processes. It serves as a prelude to a follow-up paper which will identify potential obstacles to effective public participation in ecosystem management (specifically in the Bitterroot National Forest), discuss relationships not only between public involvement and the further development of conservation partnerships, but also between public involvement and land manager/scientist partnerships. The follow-up paper will then focus mainly on collaborative process remedies to overcome obstacles and facilitate constructive advocacy group cooperation.

REVIEW OF PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Conflict in Single-focus, Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Management

Natural resource conflict is an ongoing event (Daniels and Walker 1994 work in progress) which occurs "when there is disagreement over values or scarce resources (Daniels et al. 1993:2)." A natural resource dispute is an identifiable, issue-specific episode of a conflict which is settled when parties find a mutually acceptable basis for overcoming the issues that they disagree on. The conflict or underlying difference in values often continues despite parties successfully resolving a dispute (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990, Daniels et al. 1993). Conflicts and disputes inevitably occur in natural resource management due to questions about who, where and how forest resources should be used. Ignoring or avoiding conflict frequently results in crisis management and should therefore be avoided. Agencies, such as the Forest Service, must accordingly learn how to effectively manage conflicts and disputes (Daniels and Walker 1994 work in progress).

The Forest Service reached impasses with many natural resource conflicts and accompanying disputes generated during the previous era of Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield management (roughly 1960-1990). The Agency's task of managing disputes grew in difficulty during this period due to an increase in the number of conflicts (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Kessler and Salwasser (1994 in press) describe how the agency previously tried to overcome conflict impasses by becoming instrumentally involved in the wording and passage of the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield (MUSY) Act in 1960. The Act, unfortunately, failed to manage resource conflicts as effectively as hoped:

"Before long the heavy emphasis on timber production came into conflict with other uses and values that Americans desired from national forest lands. One result was passage of the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act (1960), seeking a more equitable balance in national forest management. Perceiving that even the 1960 Act did not fully correct imbalances in Forest Service programs, Congress passed additional legislation specific to the Agency... (Kessler and Salwasser 1995)."

Other authors (Irland 1975, Bammel 1986) also acknowledge that the Forest Service's goal of harmony stated in the MUSY Act of 1960 and later reaffirmed in the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976 probably never was attainable.

Why did the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act fail to resolve existing conflicts? **First**, it was unrealistic for Congress and the Forest Service to assume that mandating harmony to managers of competing resources would effectively control conflict. They found it difficult to facilitate activities of people who sought diverse uses from the national forests and to ensure that they lived in agreement with their social and ecological surroundings. An agency can neither force resource users to live in harmony with their environment (Hough 1988), nor with each other (Irland 1975). Unfortunately, the multiple-use philosophy assumed that "biological harmony of [these] uses is paralleled by consensus among competing groups of resources users. That assumed harmony among user groups does not exist (Irland 1975:263-4)." **Second**, a larger number of Americans sought an increased number and greater diversity of goods, services, and values from their natural resources (Ewert 1993, Salwasser et al. 1993). Hough (1988) notes that growing populations demand more resources and space, and create a situation where conflict is more likely to occur. In this situation, new and emerging uses often conflict with traditional extractive uses such as timber (Kessler and Salwasser 1995).

A related **third** factor creating additional conflict is the increased public concern and awareness about environmental issues which has existed since the early 1960s (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Hendee (1984) notes that public support for environmental programs has broadened in recent years, membership in environmental organizations such as the National Wildlife Federation and Sierra Club has proceeded to grow and political activism by individuals has continued unabatedly. Greater public involvement in managing public organizations has occurred concurrent with citizens' increased environmental concern, awareness and advocacy (Thomas 1990). **Fourthly**, Daniels and Walker (1994 work in progress) recognize that multiple elements involved in modern conflicts add to their complexity and prevent quick and easy resolution. They divide the elements adding to conflict complexity into two categories. The first category, party-based elements of complexity, includes: "(1) the number of parties [also Hough 1988], (2) deeply held values, (3) diverse incentives, (4) cultural differences, (5) varied forms and degrees of symbolism, and (6) perceptions of

standing (Daniels and Walker 1994 work in progress)." The authors also examine structural-sources of complexity. Elements in this second category are "(1) multiple issues, (2) power imbalances related to alternatives, (3) multiple venues, (4) scientific and technical uncertainty, (5) legal and jurisdictional constraints, and (6) an entrenched conflict industry (Daniels and Walker 1994 work in progress)." Some of these will be explored in greater detail later in this paper.

A **fifth** factor is the multiple sources of conflict in public natural resource disputes, many of which go beyond simple agency allocation of resources. Issues which have fueled resource conflicts on national forest lands include competing social and economic interests, conflict over facts, conflicting values and perspectives pertaining to "if" and "how" natural resources should be managed, contradictory statutory mandates to agencies, and different incidences of costs and benefits (Irland 1975, Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Different environmental values and perspectives held by involved interests remain the greatest source of conflict fueling public disputes (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Ineffective public participation is a **sixth** explanation why the agency has failed to resolve many past conflicts and is the primary focus of this paper (i.e., the Forest Service failed to effectively manage emerging conflicts by involving affected parties in planning and management functions.) Public participation affects how conflicts over agency decisions evolve since there are several ways that conflicts can be played out (Daniels et al. 1993). Public involvement, participation or consultation are general terms defined as the means of "providing citizens with opportunities to take part in governmental decisions or planning processes (Glass 1979:180)." Who are legitimate participants? Various definitions of public participants exist. Thomas (1990:436) defines relevant publics as those "organized or unorganized groups of citizens or citizen representatives who (a) could provide information useful in solving the issue or (b) could otherwise affect the ability to implement the eventual decision."

Public involvement or participation is a familiar topic with the Forest Service. In fact, Congress appears to have mandated formal public involvement more explicitly to the Forest Service than any other federal agency (Daniels et al. 1993). **Statutes** mandating public involvement include: **the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946**, **the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969** and following regulations written by the Council on Environmental Quality, **the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972**, and **the Forest and Rangeland Resources Planning Act (RPA) of 1974**, which was amended by **the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976**. This legislation requires that the Forest Service "provide for public participation in the development, review, and revision of land management plans (16 USC 1600, Sec. 6(d))." Multiple precedents established by case law also influence the agency's policy on citizen involvement

(Bammel 1986, Coggins and Wilkinson 1987, Gericke et al. 1992, Daniels et al. 1993). The overwhelming number of legal requirements pertaining to participation allows citizens to involve themselves at multiple points in the planning process:

“(1) identification of public issues, management concerns and resources opportunities, (2) development of planning criteria, (3) inventory and data collection, (4) analysis of the management situation, (5) formulation of alternatives, (6) estimation of the alternative’s effects, (7) evaluation of the alternatives, (8) draft forest plan, (9) final forest plan, and (10) implementation and monitoring (O’Loughlin 1990).”

The ability to participate in the making of decisions, however, is determined not only by statutory and judicial mandates, but more importantly by who controls information flow (who, when and to what extent parties contribute information to influence management decisions), and who can afford the time and energy to be involved in these processes.

Kathlene and Martin (1991) state that citizen participation techniques in general fail to effectively inform officials about people’s desires. Daniels et al. (1993) further contend that participation procedures used by the Forest Service have failed to provide citizens with enough control over management decisions to effectively resolve conflicts created by competing uses. They support this contention with several instances where the Forest Service was accused of using public participation to only marginally change their decisions or to merely sugarcoat prefabricated decisions. Perceived undermining of the participation processes occurred during the RARE II process in several states and in planning endeavors in southern Oregon. The next several sections examine why agencies in general, and specifically the Forest Service, find it difficult to involve people in decision making.

Officials Hesitate to Involve Publics to a Greater Extent

Kathlene and Martin (1991) assert that most impediments to involvement go “beyond the citizens’ control. It is the officials who decide what type of citizen forum will be used, how much information will be provided, when in the decision process citizen participation will be elicited, and how important citizen input will be in deciding public policy (49).” Agency representatives tend to view themselves either as citizen advocates or technical experts. Technocratic officials’ hesitate to more fully integrate citizens’ input in management. Many legal and administrative concerns however support this hesitation (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, Creswell 1988, Pottapchuk 1991). **First**, leaders feel that by sharing power (which includes sharing information) they are limiting their own ability to act (also Kathlene and Martin 1991). **Second**, officials feel that they violate procedural law by involving publics to a greater extent. The law often prohibits agency personnel from communicating with parties involved in specific rate requests (*ex parte* communication prohibition). In

addition, agency members are prohibited from holding public meetings without adequate notice, or from engaging in processes which might result in personal conflicts of interest.

Third, public involvement creates a large number of conflicting demands which officials must reconcile in the absence of clear decision-making criteria. **Fourth**, officials are unable to delegate decision-making responsibilities, such as fully embracing the end result of a collaborative process prior to its completion. Administrators must also ensure that a final decision is consistent with professional rules of conduct, agency goals and statutory mandates. Although current policies and programs emphasize citizen involvement, participation is often superseded by, or conflicts with other explicit and implicit priorities. Participation must therefore also be conducted in a manner consistent with other preferences (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, Creswell 1988, Pottapchuk 1991).

Several other factors deter administrators from involving people in decision-making. **Fifth**, participatory meetings often attract politically alienated people who take part to voice general resentment, discontent of their role in the public process and their distrust of officials. In fact "many people do not actually *want* distributional solutions to their complaints and conflicts (Rowe 1989:151)." This estranged segment of the population is characterized by low position or occupational prestige, wariness of public officials, provincial perception of the world, lack of community activism, and nominal social group membership. (Most of these factors, however, may be the result of: parties observing that other interests feel that their opinion is more substantial or legitimate; use of technical jargon by officials which inhibits participants (Magill 1988, Magill 1991); and, lack of government forums to express citizens' concerns on other issues). Granting greater access to disenfranchised citizens often leads to greater polarization and conflict (Twight 1977). In addition, if there is a lack of interpersonal liking and trust between competing groups, they will frequently exaggerate differences between rivals and themselves to build solidarity, identity, and commitment within a group, and to strengthen their bargaining position. Publics often overstate differences between agency and personal interests. This is especially true with members of conservation (preservation) organizations (Twight and Paterson 1979).

A manager's negative attitudes toward public involvement can be a **sixth** obstacle. Paternalistic managers often fail to legitimate public involvement in planning, or recognize citizens' usefulness in providing innovative solutions. They assume that the majority shares their views about resource management to the degree that they often fail to hear what the public is saying. They additionally believe that those elements of the public, without experience or credentials, who disagree with them, should be educated about the scientific validity of their methods (even though off-site and altruistic interests also concern citizens (Knopp and Caldbeck 1990)).

In essence, they tend to disregard local resource managers and users, and often ignore the resources that the local population utilizes, even when these individuals significantly affect the condition of the resources.

Two aspects of the forestry profession contribute to the exclusion of local users: a tendency to base decisions on technical expertise (Shepard 1992 and McQuillan 1993 respectively, wrote that foresters, unfortunately rely overly on technical aspects to the degree that political and ethical aspects are excluded from management decisions) and a possible anti-local sentiment (i.e., natural resource managers view local abuse of the resource as the source of the problem which the forester must solve). Unfortunately, dissenters rarely change their minds after they are educated. This kind of mindset by Agency personnel can and does lead to repeated conflicts between the Forest Service and publics (Hacker 1983, Magill 1988, Fairfax and Fortmann 1990, Knopp and Caldbeck 1990, Magill 1991, Manring 1993).

“Many resource managers are academically and psychologically ill prepared to acknowledge the legitimacy of public demands to participate in natural resource planning. Even more managers fail to see how the public can actually provide innovative solutions to problems created by these demands. We resource professionals tend to believe that our views are already widely shared by other people or groups and that our services are responsive to public desires....We attempt to resolve conflicting demands, in part, through public involvement or education. But often we would rather change the public's mind about management practices than become more responsive to public interests. We seem keenly interested in convincing others that our knowledge is scientifically sound and that it serves their best interest (Magill 1988: page-facing 200).”

Magill (1988) identifies several traits which might explain the above situation: “forestry students are loners, are somewhat reserved, are disinclined to initiate social interaction,...are predisposed toward independent decision-making and autonomous action [and] are tough-minded and politically conservative (Magill 1988:page-facing 200).”

The tendency for the forestry profession to ignore public input and to base decisions solely on technical factors seems to be changing. At the recently convened national ecosystem management forum (Keystone Center 1993), participating managers recognized that they needed to include the public in decision-making processes which were traditionally limited to agency representatives and private land owners. Several participants commented that involvement should extend to development and implementation of programs, and that citizens should help define goals and objectives at earlier stages of planning. Various participators supported involvement of local and national interests. Some argued that local parties are: better informed about the resource, community oriented, and more likely to be personally affected by the outcome (they also noted that most land use planning occurred at the local level). Advocates of larger-scaled interests stated that it was necessary to include national- and state-level organizations due to: the non-static boundaries of an

ecosystem, the importance of ecosystems to the nation, and the need to set a national ecosystem precedent (Keystone Center 1993).

Magill (1991) also finds other evidence pointing to a change in the forestry profession's perspective on involvement: an increase in public involvement programs (partnerships and marketing efforts), and greater acceptance of the social characteristics of natural resource management among students and agency personnel. (This is especially demonstrated by the existence of the Association of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (AFSEEE)).

A related **seventh** factor is that Forest Service personnel, usually trained in biological and physical sciences, maybe inadequately prepared for the difficult task of involving people of managing conflicts (Daniels et al. 1993, Daniels and Walker 1994 work in process). An **eighth** component is the lack of structural motivators enticing agency officials to incorporate parties when resolving conflictual issues. Officials need incentives, especially when they are faced with numerous impediments to integrally involve publics. **Ninth**, the complexity of forest issues and conflicts may overwhelm agency employees, and deter them from attempting to manage conflict.

Finally, obstacles can work in conjunction with each other to form an impossible "Catch-22" situation for agency personnel. An official fearing that a decision may be overturned or appealed will take a defensive stance and will attempt to create a "bullet-proof" decision. Citizens, sensing this confrontational and suspicious attitude will, in turn, become confrontational. This unfortunate cycle will continue to harm or destroy agency/citizen relationships (Daniels et al. 1993, Daniels and Walker 1994 work in progress).

Existence of these factors prevents agency personnel and citizens from establishing trust. Trust is, however, a necessary ingredient for successful conflict resolution. Trust and rapport allow parties to communicate and initiate dialogue, precursors to achieving and initiating agreements (Carpenter and Kennedy 1977, Hough 1988). To bring about citizen efficacy, officials must demonstrate to participants that positive payoffs will result from their involvement. This involves making relevant information accessible; soliciting and integrating public opinion early in the formulation process; and, demonstrating that agency representatives will act on information received (Kathlene and Martin 1991). Policy makers must reformulate the question asked from 'how can the agency fulfill procedural requirements with or without active citizen participation?;' to 'how can communication be improved between an agency and its constituents to bring about effective problem solving?'

Statutorily-defined Participation in our Representative Democracy Fails to Resolve Conflicts

Bammel (1986) and Daniels et al. (1993) describe how existing laws contribute to public involvement in national forest management. The RPA of 1974 mandates largely non-descript public input in planning and the NFMA of 1976 creates an institutional procedure for ensuring this input. O'Loughlin (1990) and Behan (1990) characterize the NFMA as a Congressional cop-out. They state that the Forest Service was mandated multiple-use directives in such ambiguous terms to avoid Congressional accountability. Congress, through the NFMA statute, handed the Forest Service the thankless task of preparing forest-by-forest plans. By 1990, dissatisfied interests had appealed all previously completed plans.

These statutes, along with judicial precedents, stipulate that the Agency at least allow a specified period for public comment, publish legal notices in a minimum number of papers, etc.. Unfortunately, the Agency rarely went beyond the involvement stipulated by statutes when incorporating affected parties into decision-making. Parties subject to this formal process, usually lacked access to decision-making channels at earlier stages when the Forest Service crafted alternatives to be considered. Instead, participants were forced to view the process as a plebiscite where pre-crafted alternatives were "voted" on according to the number of people who commented on each issue. A situation emerged where certain vested interests exerted pressure on officials; alienated individuals expressed resentment; and, a majority of parties were regularly excluded (Bammel 1986, Daniels et al. 1993).

Unfortunately, the situation described above where parties have inequitable access to government channels is not limited to the Forest Service's formal public participation process. Sociocultural barriers limit many stakeholders' involvement with unrepresentative interest groups dominating participation forums (Kathlene and Martin 1991). Parenteau (1988) describes the situation favorable to political elites, in many cases industrial entities, found in many administrative agencies. Industry regularly exerts greater influence in decision-making than other parties.

The author notes that public participation theoretically balances citizens' and industry's ability to influence policy formulation. Industry, however, continues to exercise greater control over information flow because bureaucracies frequently favor industry's input and neutralize other stakeholders. **First**, agencies' regularly turn to and rely on regulated industries for information on their service or their product. **Second**, their (agency/industry) frequent communication results in a rapport not established between agencies and grassroots organizations. **Finally**, officials frequently fail to employ information collected by non-industry groups. This structure of decision-making often discriminates against citizens. Unfortunately, their lack of

organization, and knowledge and use of advocacy techniques limit citizen participation. Despite public participation amelioration of certain hardships or prohibitive costs, grassroots groups must still frequently contend with a lack of information, and carry the burden of proof in civil suits (Parenteau 1988).

The ineffective and inequitable scenario painted above is commonly found in our representative democracy. The theory of **representative democracy** maintains that decision-making should be allocated to those chosen representatives of the public elected or appointed to perform that task. Unfortunately, two weaknesses of representative democracy emerge: **(1)** elected officials can act only as general stewards due to their broad mandate; and, **(2)** elected representatives lack adequate technical knowledge to make informed substantive decisions (Parenteau 1988). These inherent obstacles in our present representative democracy lead political decision-makers, unable to satisfactorily deal with constituent's concerns, to focus solely on promoting '**negative freedom**,' protection from intrusion and coercion by other people (Parenteau 1988).

Failure of Traditional or Conventional Procedures to Effectively Involve People

Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) criticize the traditional or conventional methods employed to resolve conflicts in a representative democracy. Policy-makers ensure negative freedom by focusing on the maintenance of process integrity (i.e., fulfill procedural requirements) instead of formulating solutions which address the substantive interests of involved parties. (Nevertheless, certain procedural requirements such as sufficient notice, make as much sense in conventional government forums as more participatory ones.) People are soon dissatisfied with the participation process when they are no longer meaningfully involved.

The following statements describe the disadvantages of our current participatory efforts, most of which are exclusionary and fail to focus on problem solving. Our present representative democracy entails: minority parties being forced to suppress their views until they comprise the majority or seek administrative or judicial relief; short-term commitments to problems and programs by officials until their terms-of-office expire (this usually results in ineffective and inefficient solutions); the overly simplistic "yes-no" context of voting; and, legislators' reliance on lobbyists for public input and information. In addition, technical and legal complexities, often purposely employed to exclude non-professionals, prevent effective implementation even when all parties agree upon the problem. And finally, a winner-takes-all mentality results in inappropriate court rulings on technical questions and the widespread use of advocacy science (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

Author Dan Kemmis (1990:53) provides an example when he wryly comments on a popular conventional institution, the public hearing. "In fact, out of everything that happens at a public hearing--the speaking, the emoting, the efforts to persuade the decision maker, the presentation of facts--the one element that is almost totally lacking is anything that might be characterized as 'public hearing.'" In addition to non-productive antics, low attendance, especially in earlier stages, also characterizes public hearings. Many citizens hesitate to participate in forums due to: limited interest (polls showing citizen concern about future conditions in the forest, however, refute claims of publics' insufficient concern (Knopp and Caldbeck 1990)), and ignorance of government procedures, merits of certain issues and the costs/benefits of their involvement (Kathlene and Martin 1991).

Other inherent disadvantages of conventional procedures exist. Citizens with higher socioeconomic status tend to take advantage of public hearings and get appointed to citizen advisory boards, while input of minorities and nontraditional interests is limited to dependent service and advisory groups. Public hearings also frequently result in: citizens holding unrealistic expectations, agencies glossing over fundamental value differences (Daniels et al. 1993), and testimony heard being suspect (since only a small segment of the public is invited or enticed to attend) (Bultena and Rogers 1974). Citizen advocacy councils promote direct access and input, but limit participation to a select few. Citizen surveys provide a large cross-section of the population the opportunity for input, however communication is one-directional and occurs at one point in time. The limitations of this technique prevent it from being a dynamic, interactive process (Kathlene and Martin 1991). The resulting "crisis of governance" manifests itself with:

"the proliferation of powerful single-interest groups and a resulting paralyzing diffusion of power; overregulation by the growing bureaucracy of an inefficient state administrative apparatus; a glut of costly and untimely litigation; an apathetic citizenry; and the resulting general moral, economic, and political decline of the United States relative both to its own past and to current powers such as Germany and Japan (Franks 1993:46)."

The end result of these process-driven procedures is a situation where all parties concerned are able to exercise veto power in a variety of ways (Ireland 1975); a situation aptly termed by Kemmis (1990) as the '*politics of stalemate*.' One of the most obvious ways that citizens exercise veto power is through the appeals process. Number of appeals can therefore be seen to inversely reflect public satisfaction with the participatory process. (Gericke et al. (1992), however, found that the number of appeals indicates poorly the effectiveness of a participation effort.) Nonetheless, this evaluation method does not favorably measure citizens' satisfaction with the Forest Service. The number of appeals on Forest Service decisions ballooned in recent years, reaching into the thousands in the late 1980s. The Agency, faced with this seemingly

insurmountable administrative obstacle, tried to limit the appeals process in 1992 (Daniels et al. 1993, Kessler and Salwasser 1995). Kessler and Salwasser (1995:180) describe publics' feelings and reactions to the lack of public involvement:

"The many conflicts surrounding national forest management--and the flurry of appeals and litigation by various citizen's groups--were vivid testimony that people had not been adequately involved in the decisions that affect them. Although public involvement was integral to the planning process of the 1980s, many people felt denied of a truly meaningful role in shaping land-use decisions. Perhaps the process was too stilted, or too restrictive; or simply that the mechanistic planning model could not handle the kinds of concerns and desires that people for the national forests and grasslands."

In addition to a high number of appeals, survey results and process reviews which evaluated Forest Service participation activities provided additional evidence of citizens' dissatisfaction (Daniels et al. 1993).

A New Approach Is Needed

Authors state that a new decision-making approach is needed to overcome these institutionalized obstacles to public involvement. Bammel (1986) advocates overhauling the statutes directing public participation in the national forests which fail to involve publics early enough and to a great enough extent. He recommends creating forums where the Agency and publics would engage in on-going dialogues. Moreover, this forum would replace formal statute-driven participation. Success of such a forum would depend on the level of trust between involved citizens and Forest Service employees, and whether both the Agency and publics participate productively. (I.e., parties, recognizing that these stale-mating strategies do not serve their self-interest, attempt to incorporate all interests and emerge with a common solution.) Bammel (1986), by supporting such a position, argues for a fundamental change from a situation where the Forest Service sought legal compliance to one where they actively involved citizens in decision-making. Manring (1993:20) similarly reiterates and describes this necessary change in Agency perception of involvement.

"'Serving the People' once meant making professional resource management decision *for the public*. As professional land managers, Forest Service officials knew what was best for the land and decided what was in the public interest. Increasingly, 'Serving the People' is coming to mean making decisions *with the public*. Making decisions 'with the public' implies that the representative members of the public define their own management values and objectives."

The theoretical and practical reasons for incorporating publics are grouped under two main headings or purposes in the literature. Various authors identify these same purposes but name them differently in their analyses. The **first purpose or method** discussed above is labeled the administrative perspective, citizen involvement, or democratic model by different authors. It *involves citizens in planning and decision-*

making to develop rapport and trust between publics and agencies, and thereby increases public acceptance of a policy, plan or decision (Irland 1975, Glass 1979). In addition, agencies can build trust and rapport outside of public participation forums through such activities as hiring locals as seasonal laborers and fire crew members instead of contracting; reducing the number of personnel relocations so that a rapport between agency officials and the public is established; communicating with the public outside of official channels; using every opportunity to present the agency's point of view; and, demonstrating to the public in various ways that the agency is acknowledging their concerns (Hacker 1983).

Unfortunately, most bureaucracies which limit participation to this one purpose often maintain control of information gathering and dissemination with information flowing unidirectionally from the agency to citizens (Arnstein 1969). Although agency personnel continue to tout that they are acting on the public's behalf, citizens often increasingly question officials' assessment of what constitutes the "public interest." For example, many natural resource agencies determine public interest based on: benefit-cost ratios, endorsements of project goals by leaders, results of public hearings and recommendations of citizen advisory groups (Bultena and Rogers 1974).

The **second purpose or method** is named the citizen perspective, citizen action, or race conflict model by different authors. This method *actively involves the publics in decision-making to improve plans, decisions, and delivery of services* (Irland 1975, Glass 1979). Citizens, more integrally involved in a two-way information exchange early on in the process, can better direct the research effort, and more freely access information. This, obviously, allows them to more clearly direct and influence resource allocation decisions (Knopp and Caldbeck 1990). Daniels et al. (1993) advocate adding this second approach, stating that it creates an exemplary situation. "Ideally, public participation provides a forum where the scientific information and values of the publics and the agency can be integrated so that the final decision is viewed as both desirable and feasible by the broadest portions of society (Daniels et al. 1993:5)." Characteristics of this more democratic process include: clear, unambiguous and comprehensive choices commonly understood by all; trade-off decisions made by individuals; an easily-understood process to arrive at collective decisions; and, holistically presented and utilized results from participation assessments (Knopp and Caldbeck 1999).

It is, however, difficult to determine which conception of citizen involvement agencies have adopted if decision-making occurs in a black box hidden from public view (Knopp and Caldbeck 1990). Nevertheless, the two purposes (actively involving citizens in decision-making and developing positive public relations) are not mutually exclusive. In fact, agencies should attempt to achieve both simultaneously, because programs that balance the two likely will be judged successful by all concerned parties (Irland 1975, Glass 1979).

Several political theories and concepts legitimate extensive citizen involvement as a source of policy-making input in a democratic society. Knopp and Caldbeck (1990:14) boldly contend that "our society is based on the premise that people should be involved as directly as possible in the process of government." One theory advocates that those citizens most affected by a decision should participate in the making of that decision. (This theory, called **direct democracy**, implicitly prescribes who should be involved in the participation process) (Parenteau 1988). The principle of **natural law**, like the theory of direct democracy, advances protection through direct involvement for those people whose rights or property are more greatly affected than the general public. Stakeholders frequently seek protection from arbitrary actions of public agencies (Parenteau 1988). Citizens involved in decision-making in a direct democracy exercise '**positive freedom**,' the right and duty to make collective decisions.

The incorporation of direct democracy and 'positive freedom' into our society would force a re-conceptualization of individuals from one of mass consumers to one of active, responsible agents in a dynamic community (Parenteau 1988); or more simply put, it revitalizes the meaning of citizenship (Kemmis 1990). Most agencies, however, rarely attempt to achieve this level of involvement which was previously described as the second purpose of participation. They instead, tend to utilize public participation to accomplish only the former purpose aimed at increasing, both agency rapport with citizen constituents, and acceptance of administrative actions.

Pottapchuk (1991) examines these different conceptions or purposes of public involvement. He draws upon Arnstein's (1969) and Connor's (1988) ladders of decision-making and public participation to formulate a model which details ordered levels of shared decision-making. His typology categorizes power relationships which are determined by the party(ies) deciding and supporting an outcome. The model begins with the "dual purpose" understanding of participation discussed in preceding paragraphs. The author, then, arranges a gradient with involvement ranging from a means of creating public support, to that where agencies not only gain citizen support, but also actively involve those recipients of a policy or a service when making decisions (Table 1). A variety of situations or participation programs falls under each of Pottapchuk's categories. (It should be noted that if the "government" is the initiating party in each of Pottapchuk's scenarios, "is decision-making really shared?")

Table 1: Pottapchuk's (1991:163) table demonstrates that participation entails multiple scenarios ranging from citizen exclusion to citizen control.

Levels of Shared Decision Making

Government Decides

Government Consults With Individuals and Decides

Government Consults With a Representative Group and Decides

Government Works With a Representative Group And They Jointly Decide

Government Delegates Decisions to Others

Is a New Approach Feasible?

Despite the bureaucratic obstacles to more effectively involving publics, a more participatory effort seems possible in light of successes with past federal programs. The national trend toward actively involving people in federal decision-making began with the Housing Act of 1954. This early effort made citizen involvement a program goal. Critics denounced the endeavor because the program lacked focus and structure, and implementers failed to envision a desired result of participation (Glass 1979). Furthermore, other agency priorities, such as the ability to predict the range and timing of outcomes, eventually conflicted with the goal of citizen involvement. Despite objections of this effort, similar expanded participation programs have played an integral role in subsequent federal policy formulation.

Federal agencies, including the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Forest Service, have utilized alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques for many years. Additional federal agencies adopted these techniques after passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 (Manring 1993). (For a more thorough discussion of the purpose and intent of these statutes see Susskind, Babbitt and Segal (1993). See Montana House Bill 317 for a state-level example of an ADR statute.) Natural resource agencies, in particular, have emphasized collaborative public participation programs as a tool for conflict management on public lands (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

The Forest Service is an agency attempting to increase citizen involvement. In addition to carrying out the participation procedures specified in pertaining statutes, the Forest Service also has attempted to institutionalize collaborative efforts. This includes providing ADR training opportunities for employees at all levels for a decade, and formally codifying on its own initiative a regulation on dispute resolution procedures in 1988. This regulation explicitly authorized negotiations between Agency officials and citizens who were administratively appealing decisions on forest plans, timber sales, oil and gas leases, and grazing permits (Manring 1993).

Despite attempts to implement more effective participation procedures, conventional decision-making processes with formally mandated citizen involvement remain the norm. Unsurprisingly, they often fail to resolve the increasing number of conflicts which emerge in natural resource management (Daniels et al. 1993). As described above, failure is largely due to the fact that these processes frequently exclude affected parties, and frequently focus on procedural compliance instead of substantive citizen involvement and effective problem solving (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Manring (1993) also notes in regard to the Forest Service's attempt to incorporate ADR practices, that there is a significant difference between authorizing negotiations and instituting an effective ADR system. For an agency to effectively implement such a system it must force a cultural change at the organizational and individual level. This includes a willingness to: use dispute resolution processes; implement resulting agreements; and, address employee motivation, resources and the internal and external organizational environments preventing effective ADR adoption. To overcome institutional barriers, Ziegenfuss (1988) suggests using an individual troubleshooter or an ombudsperson to help change culture, goals, and values; and, to improve technical processes in management, organizational structure and quality of psychosocial life.

The principal way that federal natural resource agencies are attempting to bring about the necessary cultural exchange to effectively implement an alternative dispute resolution system is through ecosystem management. Keiter (1990), an early advocate of ecosystem management, once optimistically stated that conventional processes, primarily federal legislation, would adequately address citizen concerns through a self-evolved form of ecosystem management. In this work, he first describes the on-going management transformation from a resource-based to an ecosystem approach, and then details how NEPA, along with substantive statutes, e.g., the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976, etc., would result in a more holistic framework. The ecosystem framework created by the inter-workings of these federal statutes, would: promote interagency cooperation, analyze cumulative

regional impacts, and incorporate biodiversity and aesthetic values in management decisions because these objectives are alluded to, or explicitly stated in public land laws.

Daniels et al. (1993) also favor involving citizens within an ecosystem context. The authors find the desirability of an ecosystem approach especially true today when the increasing size and complexity of natural resource issues lessens the likelihood that an agency, such as the Forest Service, will make decisions satisfactory to many diverse publics. The Forest Service traditionally has made decisions as a single entity with modest consultation with the public and other agencies. Current factors, including the legislative mandates mentioned by Keiter (1990) and the current interest in ecosystem management, however, are forcing the agency to examine the way it has traditionally made decisions.

The Forest Service has fortunately taken a more proactive stance toward implementing ecosystem management. The agency's New Perspectives program in 1990, and the later ecosystem management directive issued by the chief in 1992 attempted to expose the agency to more diverse views and make it accountable to public concerns. Chief Robertson hoped with these actions to quell the growing public mistrust of the agency. He clarified how the Forest Service would involve people in its ecological approach:

“By ecosystem management, we mean that an ecological approach will be used to achieve the multiple-use management of the National Forests and Grasslands. It means that we must blend the needs of people and environmental values in such a way that the National Forests and Grasslands represent diverse, healthy, productive, and sustainable ecosystems (Robertson 1992:2).”

As mentioned in the introduction, the ecosystem management memo outlines **two fundamental ways to involve publics**: encourage **management partnerships** with other private and public parties and promote **grass-root participation** in planning. Robertson (1992) envisioned the Agency pulling together economic and ecological factors along with social information obtained through partnerships and participation to define forest management objectives. The Forest Service later expanded the memo's direction on public involvement in other documents (for instance, the USDA Forest Service 1994).

The Forest Service's proactive attempt to involve citizens seems necessary in light of current statutes' inability to consistently incorporate publics. Knopp and Caldbeck (1990) wrote that “it is not enough to assume that volunteer organizations or public interest groups will adequately or fairly represent the total spectrum of public values. Likewise, we cannot rely on the current process to achieve a correct balance between commodity and environmental interests (14).” Keiter (1994) in a more recent article, partially rescinded his earlier contention that existing statutes would successfully create a working *de facto* framework for ecosystem management. He wrote that, “the fact is that few, if any, of the principal laws governing public

land management are modeled upon contemporary ecological principles. Moreover, Congress has incorporated often conflicting substantive goals into the organic laws governing the public lands, particularly in the case of multiple-use lands (Keiter 1990:314)."

Keiter (1994) remains aware of the importance of public participation as a means to identify management objectives. He wrote that the necessity of employing prescriptive legislation for the management of public lands is dependent on agencies' abilities to successfully involve publics and combine their values with scientific conclusions.

"Because public involvement plays such a critical role in establishing management priorities today, land managers must be prepared to integrate public values into ecosystem management policies.... Given the important roles that scientific judgment and public sentiment must play in formulating ecosystem management policies, it is imperative that agency officials begin defining the role of public involvement in resource management decision-making, including the relationship between public values and scientific conclusions. If they cannot meet this challenge, then the only alternative is to seek additional congressional guidance through ecosystem legislation (Keiter 1994:320-1)."

The importance of greater citizen participation seems self-evident in this contemporary era of natural resource management, however what planning methods are available to agency personnel? Which are most useful within the ecosystem management context? And how should an agency such as the Forest Service implement participatory efforts?

Authors Suggest How to More Effectively Involve Publics in Planning and Management

The Forest Service when pursuing an ecological or ecosystem approach must identify which planning form(s) are most conducive to integrating stakeholders' input into the process. In response to their participation mandate, the Agency has identified more than 30 one- and two-way methods of integrating public involvement. Most common methods include mailings, newspaper and magazine articles, newsletters and brochures, "spit and whittle" informal contacts, and public presentations. On the other hand, least utilized were television documentaries and magazine advertisements. In addition researchers found that surveyed Forest Service personnel favored two-way communication. Those surveyed selected small group activities as the most important technique followed in descending order by: informal public events, on-site visits, phone/mail contacts and large meetings. By 1992, the Agency had spent an estimated 1,005 person-years on public participation, an average of 16 person-years per forest. Research also reveals that a relatively small number of forests spent an exceptionally large amount of time in participation efforts (Gericke et al. 1992).

In addition to selecting participation techniques, the Forest Service must also determine when in the process they should allow citizen access. Although past research found participation activities concentrated in the early and late stages with one-way communication transpiring in the middle stage, the study of Gericke et al. (1992) finds different results. The authors detect that two-way communication occurred during all stages of the process. Unfortunately, different Agency representatives were usually involved at different points in the process. District rangers and members of the planning staff were most frequently present during on-site meetings. Unfortunately, lack of personnel continuity may foster frustration or distrust. Frequent personnel transfers in the Agency may therefore further aggravate citizen dissatisfaction (Gericke et al. 1992).

A knowledge of planning theories can aid forest officials when determining how and when to involve citizens. Hudson (1979) created a useful typology, which lists and describes current planning theories, and identifies favorable and unfavorable characteristics of each. **Synoptic planning** is the traditional and dominant quantitative form typified by the process of setting goals, identifying policy alternatives, evaluating means for specified ends, and implementing decisions (e.g., economic analysis of best land use). **Incremental planning**, also referred to as "muddling through" (Lindblom 1959), involves making decisions based on intuition, experience, rules of thumb, and endless consultations (e.g., determining inventory stock levels). (Incrementalism shares characteristics with adaptive management (Lee 1993).)

Transactive planning empowers people by creating and implementing policies through face-to-face contact with those affected by decisions (e.g., negotiating an environmental dispute). **Advocacy planning** prescribes normative solutions, usually through litigation, to correct social injustices (e.g., affirmative action). Finally, **radical planning** incorporates both a form of spontaneous activism based upon an idealistic but pragmatic vision of self reliance and mutual aid (e.g., actions of the environmental group Earth First), and a more critical and holistic examination of large-scale processes, including class structures, economic relationships, media and cultural manipulations, social movements, conflicts, and struggles (e.g., identifying and changing the underlying political and economic factors which influence development projects throughout the world).

Hudson (1979) evaluates each theory based upon the following criteria: public interest, human dimension (holistic context for evaluating), feasibility, action potential (implementation potential), substantive theory (involves substantive issues), and self-reflective theory (explicitly recognizes theory's limitations) (Table 2). The author advocates combining several theories, hence the acronym SITAR (Synoptic, Incremental, etc.), in lieu of the usual reliance on one planning method. Combining methods would minimize the short-comings of each particular planning process. (He does not advocate combining all mentioned planning methods, but

instead limiting to the ones which are most beneficial.) Kaufman (1979), in response to Hudson's article questions the insightfulness of his SITAR analogy noting that:

“the blending of planning styles is much more commonly done in the practice of planning than adhering exclusively to a single style. Single string players are probably the exception in planning organizations. Although the purist might become queasy about some of the bastardized mixtures of styles, my reading of contemporary planning practice leads me to the conclusion that elements of the synoptic, incremental, advocacy and even transactive styles are often mixed together in the real world of planning (Kaufman 1979:404).”

Table 2: Each SITAR planning tradition emphasizes certain characteristics of participation. To maximize benefits, the author advocated using several planning styles (Hudson 1979:392).

| <u>The SITAR Traditions</u> | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Major criteria or descriptive characteristics of planning theory | Synoptic planning | Incremental planning | Transactive planning | Advocacy planning | Radical planning |
| Public interest | O | O | O | X | X |
| Human dimension | | | X | | O |
| Feasibility | X | X | | | |
| Action potential | O | O | O | | O |
| Substantive theory | | | O | | O |
| <u>Self-reflective</u> | | | O | O | O |
| Explanation of Table: | | | | | |
| X indicates major strength or area of concern | | | | | |
| O indicates partial or one-sided treatment | | | | | |
| blank cells indicate characteristic weaknesses | | | | | |

Different styles, however, might be appropriate at different stages in the planning process. Knopp and Calbeck (1990) for instance, states that direct public involvement (transactive planning) appears most appropriate for broad land-use allocation decisions when technical knowledge (synoptic planning) is less relevant. Nevertheless, Robertson (1992) suggests, consistent with Hudson's conclusion, that the Forest

Service should compliment its current management efforts with a combination of planning theories. He, moreover, urges for the adoption of several types of planning in an attachment to the ecosystem memo entitled Working Guidelines for Ecosystem Management. They are (as defined by Hudson) incremental, synoptic and transactive planning.

“Get people involved in planning and carrying out project work [transactive planning]. Involve interested and affected people in the full process of making decisions about common resources; plan as if you are in a fishbowl to make sure everyone who wants to has access and knows what is going on; make conservation partnerships the rule rather than the exception.... Involve scientists [synoptic planning] through adaptive management [incremental planning].... Integrate resource management for operational efficiency (Robertson 1992:6).”

A review of three final analyses of decision-making methods concludes this section: one evaluates objectives achieved with different public participation methods; the second defines legitimate involvement; and, the third bases decision-making on the attributes of the core problem.

Glass (1979) suggests that the multiple techniques used in participation programs accomplish different objectives (Table 3) (see also Kathlene and Martin 1991). Objectives of participation should be identified before selecting techniques. He provides a typology which associates methods of participation with objectives of: information exchange, education, support building, decision-making supplement (providing decision-makers with supplemental information), and representational input. The author includes several creative techniques in his arrangement: the nominal group process ranks recommendations; analysis of judgment assesses problems using mathematical models; value analysis ranks the consequences of adopting various proposals; and, the delphi method projects the aggregated consensus of participants. Glass (1979) elaborates further on included techniques and categories, and concludes his discussion by advocating, like Hudson (1979) a multifaceted approach which comprises many participatory methods. A user of Glass' typology would evaluate the participatory process based on whether specified objectives were realized.

Table 3: Designers and users of participation forums should match techniques used with desired objectives and purposes (simplified from Glass 1979:183).

Objectives, Purposes and Techniques of Citizen Participation

| Objectives | | | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | Information exchange | Education and Support Building | Decision-making supplement | Representational input |
| Techniques | 1. Drop-in centers | 1. Citizen advisory committees | 1. Nominal group process | 1. Citizen survey |
| | 2. Neighborhood meetings | 2. Citizen review boards | 2. Analysis of judgment | 2. Delphi process |
| | 3. Agency information meetings | 3. Citizen task forces | 3. Value analysis | |
| | 4. Public hearings | | | |

Unlike previously discussed authors, Irland (1975) states that the appropriate criterion for evaluating a decision-making process is its legitimacy (Table 4). He recognizes that the form of participation determines the possible range of outcomes, and highly suggests that parties external to the government should also decide process objectives. Four components legitimize a process in the eyes of concerned parties: effective communication between the agency and publics, independent appraisal and review, balancing of long-run economic values, ecological considerations and equity issues, and, finally, meaningful appeal procedures. In addition, Knopp and Caldbeck (1990:14) found that legitimacy of a process "rest[s] on the autonomous choices of individuals, equally considered, as full participants in the discourse of governance in any institution."

Table 4: Irland (1975) writes that legitimacy of a process determines its success. The author suggests adoption of several actions to increase citizen acceptance of a participation effort.

Citizen Participation - A Step Toward Legitimacy

1. Go beyond using the federal registrar to inform citizens of government activities affecting them.
2. Be aware that advisory boards, used merely to satisfy requirements, usually lack participation legitimacy.
3. Assist in funding ad hoc study groups.
4. Utilize NEPA requirements effectively to further citizen involvement.
5. Design participation systems which utilize public input and feedback in planning.
6. Use lessons learned from past federal participation programs (e.g., Great Society agencies).
7. Integrate high-technology systems into planning to communicate, teach and model.

Thomas (1990:435) theorizes that the degree of public involvement “desirable in making a decision varies depending on the relative needs for quality and acceptability in an eventual decision.” Some problems demand greater public involvement; others demand less. In this scenario, a manager assesses the level of public involvement by determining the relative quality, or substantive (e.g., legal or cost) and acceptability requirements or limitations. With this information, a manager can assess the level of involvement which can range from an autonomous managerial decision to a jointly resolved public decision.

The latter half of this document examines collaborative or consensus approaches to resolving disputes. Daniels et al. (1993) contend that collaboration more effectively integrates public involvement than past participation efforts. These approaches, synonymous with Hudson’s transactive planning style, also are alluded to in the Robertson (1992) ecosystem management memo and are extensively discussed in the literature.

LITERATURE REVIEW OF COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES

Collaborative Versus Conventional Approaches

One possible approach to resolving conflicts in natural resources is collaborative processes or agreements. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) differentiate between traditional conventional approaches and consensus or collaborative approaches in resolving public disputes. Conventional approaches include traditional administrative, legislative, and judicial forms of decision-making (i.e., an agency, judge, or elected

representative makes decisions "in the public interest" following established rules and precedents). Collaborative or consensus approaches, on the other hand, are more innovative, flexible and adaptable alternatives to conventional methods (Daniels and Walker 1994 work in progress), and include facilitation, mediation and arbitration.

Use of collaborative methods in natural resource decision-making often benefits agencies for the following reasons: **(1)** agencies using traditional techniques cannot adequately address by themselves the complex issues which emerge with environmental conflict; and, **(2)** participants who involve themselves in collaborative processes bring additional resources to the decision-making arena that the agency needs to successfully manage conflict (Daniels et al. 1993). Daniels et al. (1993) and Daniels and Walker (1994 work in progress) distinguish between the two approaches. Collaborative methods, as contrasted with conventional ones, are usually: less competitive and more accepting of other parties; based on joint learning and fact finding; oriented toward exploring underlying value differences; all-inclusive when spreading the responsibility for implementing the decision; and, on-going processes.

Other authors, Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) also differentiate between the two approaches:

"The major differences between traditional [i.e., conventional] and environmental dispute settlement (EDS) [i.e., collaborative] processes are really rooted in two different conceptions of 'public involvement.' In the traditional process, public involvement is limited[,] inputs...are multiple and often conflicting, [and c]onstructive criticism and offering of alternatives by citizens are certainly permissible; whether or not action is taken on these suggestions, however, is the decision of the authorities in charge of the relevant areas. In the...[EDS] processes, in contrast, a citizen group's role in *processing multiple inputs* and in decision-making is much more direct (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990:22)."

Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) further define these methods by clarifying where conventional and consensus approaches should each be used. Distributive disputes, those revolving around allocating resources (including natural resources), should be addressed with collaborative methods. Constitutional disputes which address social norms and values should be handled using conventional practices and institutions (e.g., the judicial system).

The Collaborative Process

Advocates of the collaborative approach assert that it is superior to traditional forms of decision-making because the process is more inclusive and focuses on problem solving. The capability of collaborative approaches to resolve differences is based upon parties' willingness and ability to verbalize, research, brainstorm ways to merge, and package interests (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

“Issues that a citizen group raises are acted upon (or purposefully not acted upon) with the citizen group participating. Data are acquired and analyzed and trade-offs made with direct participation of the citizen group. Alternatives are developed and evaluated collaboratively. Additionally, through strategically participating in an alternative process, a citizen group can become involved in implementing whatever decision is eventually reached, thereby expanding its influence on a particular decision (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990:22).”

The process allows involved groups to comprehensively understand what parties hope to gain through negotiation, the different values placed on various disputed items, and the reasons disputants seek certain items. In addition, parties also discover items both internal and external to the original dispute that stakeholders are willing to barter, what organizational, financial and temporal factors limit parties' ability to negotiate, etc. (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Parties using consensus approaches may or may not be assisted by a third-party intervenor. However, Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) expressly favor assisted forms of agreement over unassisted forms. They define the roles intermediaries play in three types of third party processes: facilitation, mediation, and non-binding arbitration (these processes will be discussed later in the paper). Regardless, both assisted and unassisted situations are characterized by the following process phases (Figure 1).





Figure 1: The collaborative process is an iterative one consisting of three primary stages: prenegotiation, negotiation and implementation (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

The three phases of consensus decision-making begin with **prenegotiation**. In this stage all participants collectively initiate the process; stakeholders select representatives; parties establish protocols and set an agenda; and, all participants jointly gather information (see Carpenter and Kennedy's 1977 discussion of information sharing which is also used to reduce or deter the chances of conflict). Completion of this phase sets the stage for negotiation. **Negotiation** entails searching for solutions where all parties gain; packaging the solutions; documenting the agreement; making parties accountable to the process; and, ratifying the document. **Implementation** concludes the process with parties fitting the collaborative agreement into the formal decision-making structure, monitoring compliance, creating a context for renegotiation, and action (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Authors throughout the literature further elaborate on collaborative agreements using models or general principles.

Collaborative Models

Several models are useful to consider when implementing or designing collaborative processes. Three standard models commonly discussed which involve third-party intervenors are facilitation, mediation, and arbitration. However, issues of parties' control over process and solution, and intervenor's neutrality, style, and competence must usually be addressed before an intermediary can successfully enter a dispute (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Parties to a collaborative agreement should, nonetheless, select a model based upon perceived difficulty in resolving their conflict. Although any of these strategies might be deemed appropriate for multiple situations, stakeholders should evaluate which strategy to use based on personal, social/political, and cultural values, as well as perceived cost and control requirements (Slaikeu 1989). For instance, of the three primary models discussed in this section, less difficult, difficult, and extremely difficult conflicts would probably utilize facilitation, mediation, and non-binding arbitration, respectively (Figure 2). In addition, Slaikeu (1989) suggests that parties to a conflict avoid the extremes of the continuum (avoidance and unilateral power play) because they result in parties losing the greatest control over outcome.

Figure 2: Various strategies for resolving disputes can be placed on a continuum, and grouped, according to how the decision is reached, and who makes the final decision to resolve the conflict (Slaikeu 1989:395).



Facilitation is the simplest of the three forms. It is used when parties need assistance focusing or moderating a discussion. The facilitator guarantees that meetings are held in a fair and neutral environment, arranges meetings, ensures notes and minutes are kept, and enhances discussion through various communication and role playing activities (e.g., opinion surveys, brainstorming sessions, etc.) (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). (See Doyle and Straus 1982 for a extensive description of facilitation.) Conciliation, a similar technique, "is used to improve the attitudes different parties hold toward each other, for the purpose of encouraging reasonable discussion and, where necessary, rational bargaining (Carpenter and Kennedy 1977:21-22)."

Mediation is by far the most common assisted method to resolve environmental and third party disputes (SPIDR 1991), and continues to increasingly become the process of choice for most commercial and corporate disputes (Slaikeu and Hasson 1992). Several factors contribute to mediation's greater utilization than other assisted forms. It is used more often than arbitration because: it has a higher success rate and higher participant satisfaction than arbitration; it costs less in time and money if it is administered effectively; and, it more positively affects the relationships of the stakeholders (Goldberg and Brett 1990). Participants favor mediation because they: believe mediators understand the dispute to a greater extent compared to those who reside over court or arbitration processes; enjoy the relative lack of formality found with mediation; and, think mediation focuses more on practical concerns. Like other collaborative forms, arbitration still exists as a useful alternative, especially if parties are unable to successfully mediate their dispute.

Furthermore, mediation more substantively involves the intervenor than does facilitation without removing parties' control of process design and final outcome. The mediator usually conducts private meetings or caucuses with each party to discover how participants can work together better. This usually requires that he or she has a working substantive knowledge of the conflicting issues to understand which interests are tradable. The mediator, nonetheless, must remain neutral, and not impose a perceived "best" solution on the parties. He or she should, however, question unfair or unworkable processes, and modify processes until parties devise a feasible solution (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). (See Moore 1986 for a comprehensive discussion of mediation.)

Daniels and Walker (1994 work in progress), however, question the usefulness of standard mediation theory and practice because these techniques are usually oriented toward solving two-party disputes, and often cannot be used when parties refuse to compromise or negotiate away certain natural resources (e.g., old growth forests). They, instead, advocate that parties utilize a similar method named collaborative learning (both mediation and collaborative learning involve external intervention to promote constructive dialogue, argument and negotiation to improve the immediate situation). Collaborative learning, however, unlike mediation is not preoccupied with reaching a settlement (Table 5) (Daniels and Walker 1994 work in progress). Despite these authors criticisms of mediation, a great number of users have found this method to be quite flexible and adaptable. For instance, the collaborative form of mediation has been successfully used in the formulation of policy guidance, regulations, and legislation. In addition, mediated forms of policy making are gaining increasing acceptance, and in many cases, are becoming institutionalized (Ehrman and Lesnick 1988).

Table 5: Collaborative learning encourages systems thinking, joint learning, open communication, and focuses on appropriate change. These five notions summarize the method (Daniels and Walker 1993).

Characteristics of Collaborative Learning

- Redefining the task away from solving a problem to one of **improving** a situation.
- Viewing the situation as a set of **interrelated systems**.
- Defining improvement as **desirable and feasible change**.
- Recognizing the considerable learning--about science, issues, and value differences will need to occur before **implementable improvements** are possible.
- **Working through** the issues and perspectives of a situation.

Arbitration entails moderators actively involving themselves in the crafting of a solution. Parties still design the process and decide on a final outcome, however, the arbitration process forces decision-making. Various strategies of non-binding arbitration include private judges, panels, or mock trials (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Techniques exist which are similar or related to non-binding arbitration. Most obvious is binding arbitration, where parties are required to accept the decision handed down by the arbitrator. This aspect makes binding arbitration unacceptable for most public disputes because it is legally unacceptable for unauthorized third party intervenors to replace the mandated responsibility and authority of an agency or official (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987).

Med-arb or mediation-arbitration brings together the techniques of mediation and arbitration. The mediator changes roles to that of an arbitrator if mediation fails to resolve the conflict (see Table 6 for a comparison of the roles of mediator and arbitrator). A final form of arbitration is final offer arbitration. This alternative dispute resolution (ADR) technique entails parties alternatively suggesting possible solutions until the arbitrator selects the offer he or she feels is equitable. This form causes parties to present increasingly fairer scenarios in the hope that the arbitrator won't handicap them by selecting an offer from another disputant (Ury, Brett and Goldberg 1988).

Table 6: Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution or SPIDR (1991: 9 of Appendix A) lists useful skills for third-party neutrals. Parties engaged in a conflict can use such a list of skills to aid them when shopping for an intervenor.

Helpful Skills for Mediators and Arbitrators

Mediators

- Earn trust and maintain acceptability
- Convert parties' positions into needs and interests
- Screen out non-mediatable issues
- Help parties to invent creative options
- Help the parties identify principles and criteria that will guide decision-making
- Aid parties when they assess non-settlement alternatives
- Understand the negotiating process and the role of advocacy
- Encourage parties to make their own informed choices
- Help parties assess whether their agreement can be implemented

Arbitrators

- Make decisions
- Run a hearing
- Distinguish facts from opinion
- Write reasoned opinions

Collaborative Principles

This section presents principles used to collaboratively resolve general public disputes, those employed in environmental dispute settlement (EDS), and lastly ones obtained from the modeling of collaborative action. Two pioneers in the field of collaborative approaches, Carpenter and Kennedy, (1985) describe a set of principles for a successful collaborative process. **First**, parties need to communicate with each other (despite an adversarial environment) to analyze the conflict and understand the problem. **Second**, those involved must fashion a strategy which defines the problem, determines an appropriate conflict-management goal, and then identifies participants, allowable activities and a neutral location. **Third**, parties should understand that improving human relationships by managing behaviors and encouraging social interaction is as important as gathering technical data. **Next**, they must understand that failure to communicate information prompts parties to misinterpret the context of the problem. **Fifth**, parties must agree on the assumptions and methods used to gather basic data. **Sixth**, the collaborative effort must give affected parties ownership in the design and process of the solution. **Finally**, participants must realize that effective and long-lasting solutions are based on stating and merging interests, not on defending positions.

Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) typify the method used to solve disputes presented in their collection of case studies as environmental dispute settlement (EDS). The characteristics which differentiate EDS from the more general category of collaborative approaches are: this process focuses on *environmental* disputes, distinguishing it from the broader classification of public disputes; *dispute* denotes a specific episode of an on-going conflict; and, the more limited nature of a dispute allows parties to arrive at a *settlement* or the end of a specific conflict episode (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). They define three key characteristics or principles of EDS:

- “1. Voluntary participation by the parties involved in the dispute.
2. Direct or ‘face-to-face’ group interaction among the representatives of these parties; and,
3. Mutual agreement or consensus decisions by the parties on the process to be used and any settlement that may emerge (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990:19).”

Finally, Axelrod (1984) bases his theoretical principles on computer model simulations. He embraces a Hobbesian interpretation that cooperation will occur only if it is based upon self-interests. The computer model simulation is based on a situation known as the prisoner's dilemma. Individual selfishness, in this situation, results in a worse outcome than would have been achieved with mutual cooperation. Two runs of computer simulations are used to determine the best strategy for cooperation. The winner of both runs was

the program called TIT FOR TAT. The strategy used by TIT FOR TAT was based upon four principles: avoid unnecessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player cooperates; retaliate for defection; forgive after retaliating; and, clarify behavior so that the other player learns which actions result in rewards (Axelrod 1984).

The following propositions or principles emerged from running the program. **First**, the best strategy is determined by the environment (Axelrod 1984). **Second**, the player using the strategy TIT FOR TAT requires a long period of future interactions with other involved parties. **Third**, any strategy based on cooperation must be ensured of a long enough period of future interaction to retaliate for uncooperative actions. **Fourth**, for a collaborative strategy to be collectively stable, players using the strategy must attack at the very first defection of another player. **Fifth**, a scenario where all players adopt non-collaborative strategies is also collectively stable and can only be invaded by clusters of collaborating individuals. **Sixth**, clusters of collaborators who invade non-collaborators are most successful (invade more quickly) when they are maximally discriminating between fellow cooperators and non-collaborators. **Seventh**, cooperating strategies cannot be invaded by either single parties or clusters of parties utilizing non-collaborative strategies. Failure to meet the conditions listed above by Carpenter and Kennedy (1985), Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) and Axelrod (1984) could handicap or halt a collaborative process.

Three Collaborative Approaches

Uses of collaborative agreements can be grouped into **three categories**. The first focuses on addressing conflict whereas the latter two focus on resolving disputes. Dukes (1993) and Kemmis (1990) examined the use of collaborative agreements to accomplish the **first** purpose of **transforming government**. This transformation attempts to rid participatory processes of their procedure-based focus. Publicly-directed collaborative efforts would be more responsive to citizen's concerns, including those involving issues of equity and social justice. Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1988) introduce the **second** approach, **dispute resolution systems**. Designers of these systems organize a hierarchy of procedures, including convening clauses (Slaikeu and Hasson 1992). Institutionalized systems direct conflicting parties to use more localized collaborative processes early on in a dispute and then turn to more external and less cooperative procedures if these earlier efforts fails. The **third** and final approach is resolution of **stand-alone disputes**. A vast number of authors writing about ADR methods such as Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) and Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) focus on this use of collaboration.

The Transformative Approach

Dukes (1993) identifies two purposes of conflict resolution: the managerial purpose and the transformative purpose. Usually conflict resolution is used to overcome managerial shortcomings, especially the stalemating of governance. This is evident in both practice and research: practitioners frequently emphasize their neutrality when resolving conflicts, and the collaborative literature focuses almost exclusively on process and cases, thereby ignoring causes of conflicts. Thus, by focusing solely on the value-neutral management of conflict, people involved in the ADR field indirectly exclude issues of social justice and government reform.

Dukes (1993) further wrote that the professional should recognize that conflicts emerge because of problems with modernity. (See Arnstein 1969 and LaFollette 1983 respectively, for discussions of how participation processes frequently circumvent addressing issues of social justice, and how environmental decision-making, including ones utilizing collaborative processes, favors the affluent.) Problems with modernity in the public sector include: disintegration of community; alienation from institutions and processes of government; and an inability to solve public problems and resolve public conflict. Collaborative approaches, however, can effectively serve as a vehicle to correct these problems by: engaging the community, making government responsive, and developing a capacity for problem solving and conflict resolution. In other words, collaborative practitioners should do more than support the status quo by band-aiding government policies. Instead of merely fulfilling procedural requirements, they should additionally address citizens' concerns by overcoming the shortcomings of contemporary policy-making.

Kemmis (1990) views collaboration as a tool to transform the relationship between citizens of western states and federal natural resource agencies. Collaboration would serve as an effective tool to build trust among parties from both the political right and left. In this context, ADR processes would allow local citizens to find common ground, organize and exert pressure on federal entities to end external dominance over their land, economy and ultimately their lives. The unfortunate situation faced by the westerner deals:

“not only with a procedural politics, but also with a version of imperialism which encourages this kind of behavior.... [I]t is not simply that they are expected to present adversarial cases to a neutral third party, but to a “fed”--to a representative of a remote, powerful [federal] government which owns most of the land and resources upon which their livelihood and well-being depend.... The alternative carries two inescapable implications: a challenge to nationally centralized control of western resources, and a new capacity for western adversaries to work out their own destiny among themselves (Kemmis 1990:126-128).”

Dispute Resolution Systems

The majority of the literature on dispute resolution systems, starting with Ury, Brett and Goldberg’s (1988) analysis, focuses on internal conflicts in private sector organizations. Unfortunately, the current literature remains quite sparse on dispute resolution systems application to the public sector. The round table forum idea espoused by many provincial governments in Canada seems to be in line with the dispute resolution systems approach and current ecosystem management literature. British Columbia round tables share an ADR system’s approach in that they start with more collaborative forms of dispute resolution and then fall back on rights- or power-based mechanisms to resolve conflicts. Since the overall goal of round tables is to reach consensus, designers include procedures which make reaching consensus more likely. One such procedure is forcing dissenters to justify refusing a proposition. The forum also incorporates fallback mechanisms if consensus cannot be achieved (The British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy not dated).

The British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (not dated) also advances using round tables to plan for the sustainable futures of local areas in the Province (characteristics found in Table 7 also help define roundtables). A concurrence with ecosystem management is the recognition that “the economy, the environment and social well-being are all connected to each other (The British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy not dated).”

Table 7: Local roundtables in British Columbia, Canada attempt to merge sustainable and collaborative characteristics or principles (adapted from the British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy not dated)?

Characteristics of Roundtables

- **Promotes Sustainability** - equally involves environmental, economic and social factors
- **Multi-stakeholders** - representatives are present from each major sector of the community
- **Continuing Bodies** - ability to adapt to change while still pursuing the goal of sustainability
- **Consensus-Based** - common understanding and agreement are necessary for sustainability

So, what does a round table do? A round table: (1) drafts a vision, principles and goals of a sustainable community; (2) provides information, teaches skills and encourages efforts in sustainable living; (3) reviews

government policies and programs to ascertain if they reflect the vision and principles of sustainability; (4) addresses specific issues of local concern; (5) monitors the state of local sustainability; (6) helps resolve conflicts over land and resource use; (7) enhances community self-sufficiency through networking; and (8) organizes or undertakes sustainability-oriented projects. It should be noted that government representatives, either political or bureaucratic, usually serve in an advisory capacity as ex-officio members but also serve in rare cases as members with full voting privileges (The British Columbia Round Table on the Environment and the Economy not dated).

Manring (1993) examines the Forest Service's dispute system design. As mentioned previously in this paper, a strong potential exists for the agency to use collaborative approaches with: codified regulations explicitly authorizing negotiations between Forest Service officials and appellants, and with passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and Negotiated Rulemaking Act in 1990. Despite this strong impetus and the training of agency personnel in ADR techniques for the last decade, obstacles remain which prevent complete and effective implementation of a dispute system.

The **first** obstacle to increased collaboration is lack of agency understanding or acceptance of the current sociopolitical realities. For instance, the risk of judicial or Congressional intervention is quite high if traditional administrative appeal procedures are used. Use of negotiations in lieu of traditional procedures will reduce the likelihood that external agents will decide dispute outcome, and will make agency personnel more knowledgeable about the socio-political realities external to the bureaucracy. The author attributes the Agency's continuing use of traditional appeals process to organization naiveté of the external political climate. (An alternative explanation is that special interest groups who use appeals, are unwilling to let go of traditional process of power (Salwasser, 1995)). Manring (1993) refers to the process of acquiring knowledge about internal as well as external aspects and their relationships as **boundary-spanning**.

A **second** concern was **education**. Manring (1993) first notes that the Agency is unwilling to advertise the fact that it is "winning" with negotiations (not having to significantly alter production of resource outputs), because such information must be disseminated to the public in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act. Appellants, aware that the Forest Service "wins" through negotiations, might be hesitant to engage in such processes, fearing that the agency's success was due to co-optation. Nonetheless, advertising successes motivates other personnel in the Agency to employ dispute resolution processes. A second shortcoming of the education of personnel is lack of training by doing dispute resolution.

A **third** concern is **differing perspectives** between the Agency and the individuals within it. Although the Agency endorses collaborative approaches, it is the lower level line officers and staff who bear the brunt of time demands of negotiations. While the use of negotiations, in lieu of conventional appeals processes, saves the Agency total work hours, lower level personnel, still expected to perform all past management activities, must now also work the additional hours demanded by collaboration. The Agency, to successfully institutionalize ADR procedures, must reward officers and staff for engaging in the longer process of negotiation, instead of meeting deadlines with quickfixes. Such steps are characteristic of cultural changes which must take place in the Forest Service for dispute resolution to be successful.

Stand-alone Disputes

Daniels et al. (1993) examine the use of collaborative approaches to resolve stand-alone, natural resource disputes. The authors ascertain that resolution of disputes using collaborative processes is logically consistent with ecosystem management.

“Since the focus of land management is changing from specific resources (stands of trees or herds of big game) to ecosystems, collaboration appears better suited to the planning and implementation tasks than does traditional public involvement. It arranges the relationships between the stakeholders in a manner that more closely matches the resources and responsibilities that each brings to the process (Daniels et al. 1993: 9-10).”

These authors conduct case study research to: examine decision processes outside the traditional single agency/public participation model; determine whether these alternative processes develop a collaborative tone; and, discover whether collaborative processes achieve more positive effects than traditional methods. After investigating 65 natural resource disputes, the researchers evaluate cases based on the following criteria:

(1) Stakeholder Access - Agencies (principally the Forest Service in this study) usually included all parties involved in a dispute except in rare instances where they purposely excluded participants by not inviting them, or by focusing on rules and issues which limited certain parties' involvement. Inclusion of new participants into the process rarely represented a problem. To a large degree, parties regulated the extent of their involvement in the collaborative process based upon the results expected from their participation (Daniels et al. 1993).

(2) Joint Learning/Fact Finding - Parties quite willingly shared information. Furthermore, they used the learning forum to debate factual information and to present their side of issues. They, however, rarely divulged information they thought might be used against them (Daniels et al. 1993).

(3) Exploration of Value Differences - Participants often explored underlying values through an exercise where they envisioned the ecological/setting desired, and then translated that vision into value statements. Agency representatives, it seems, found it most difficult to express organizational values. Instead, they would constantly refer to policies or mandates statements (Daniels et al. 1993).

(4) Discussion of Interests versus Positions - Research revealed that interest-based dispute discussions, reflecting integrative/collaborative strategies, have a greater likelihood of achieving some substantive progress toward settlement than position based-discussions, which indicate distributive/competitive strategies (Daniels et al. 1993). (Also see Fisher and Ury 1981 for comparison of interest- and position-based settlement).

(5) Shared Implementation Responsibility - Jurisdiction responsibility is a significant issue in public land disputes. A collaborative agreement does not automatically ensure that the line officer will adopt arrived-at recommendations. There are instances (e.g., Willamette National Forest) where a Forest Service official rejected a collaborative outcome. Participants in these cases, who frequently develop a sense of ownership during the process, usually react negatively to the officer's withdrawal, of what they perceive to be, a commonly agreed upon solution (Daniels et al. 1993).

Instances exist where the Forest Service "successfully" used collaborative decision-making as part of ecosystem management. The San Juan National Forest mediation case, although it took place prior to the ecosystem management era, resulted in disputing parties successfully collaborating using EDS (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). It provides a useful illustration of how a collaborative process works. (See Appendix I: San Juan National Forest Mediation for a detailed example of a successful collaborative process. Positive and negative elements of the process are explained below.)

San Juan National Forest Mediation Analysis: This mediated process was largely successful. Participants' ability to resolve their dispute to everyone's satisfaction was due to three characteristics: strong ties maintained between representatives and respective constituents; use of experts to resolve differences and build a common base of knowledge; and, great attention given to the implementation process. Nevertheless, starting the resolution process presented just as formidable an obstacle as any other point in

the proceeding. There are two reasons an EDS process was ever started: attorney Danielson was familiar with these processes, and Forest Supervisor Sweetland agreed to the idea.

Another potential obstacle to starting a collaborative process, is finding intermediaries to assist the stakeholders. The third party to the dispute, the Mediation Institute, would only select disputes which they thought parties could resolve in a timely, fashion and which avoided certain issues (e.g., wilderness). Although the Forest Service was able to finalize its decision at any point throughout the process, it wisely waited until the end of negotiations since the other parties were organized well enough to successfully oppose a pushed-through transportation plan (using administrative appeal process or litigation). Citizens also had an incentive to mediate: they could more actively involve themselves in decision-making than with the administrative appeal process or litigation. Although the final proposal did not implement all that had been agreed upon, it was significantly more than they would have received with traditional processes (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Nevertheless, successful resolution of natural resource disputes using ADR processes cannot be assumed. This is, in large part due to the significant number of potential obstacles which prevents collaboration from existing as a conflict panacea.

Potential Obstacles

Collaborative processes will not remedy or resolve all conflicts or disputes. In fact, it has been suggested that only a minority of conflicts are amenable to collaborative resolution. The key to effectively using these approaches is to readily identify where these methods will be useful (Daniels et al. 1993). This includes identifying obstacles preventing a successful collaboration.

Cost and Other Hard-to-Measure Elements of Effective Processes

The first perceived obstacle for both agencies and citizens is the additional front-end costs, both human and monetary, associated with using collaborative processes in lieu of conventional ones. Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) discuss citizen costs of participating:

“Most of the processes...entailed a tremendous time commitment for all participants.... There was, in addition, a resource drain on the citizen organizations, which encountered difficulties in keeping their constituencies abreast of, and interested in, the progress of the environmental dispute settlement process (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990:xv).”

Government agencies often incur similar monetary and time expenses. Using as an example U.S. Corps of Engineers' water management studies, Irland (1975) notes the high cost of effective participation. In these studies, involvement expenses comprised 10 to 15 percent of the multi-million dollar study cost. Furthermore, costs are high for other agencies. For instance, the Forest Service's previous cost estimates of the overall national forest planning effort, including public involvement, ranges from \$3 million per forest plan, to \$200 million for the entire process (Gericke et al. 1992). Moreover, Gericke et al. (1992) estimate that the Agency spent \$32 million or more on public participation for the 61 forests surveyed. Unfortunately, this estimate fails to capture citizens' costs preparing for, traveling to, and attending Forest Service meetings, and sending correspondence. The authors also estimate that resolving appeals has cost the Agency \$950,000 for all forests.

Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1988), nevertheless, contend that of the three ways to resolve disputes: reconciling interests, determining rights, and determining the party with the greatest power - the former is cheaper and more rewarding than the latter two. They identify the following costs of conventional processes which resolve disputes based upon the following sequence: power, rights and interests.

“...the hours wasted in futile quarreling, the ruinous expenses of lawsuits and strikes and the strain on valued relationships. In organizations, these costs translate into losses in productivity and performance. In personal relationships, they translate into dissatisfaction and tension. At the extreme, the costs that designers seek to avoid are divorce, plant closings, injuries to life and limb, and the senseless destruction of war (Ury, Brett and Goldberg 1988:169-72).”

Slaikeu (1989) concurs with of Ury et al.'s contention that collaborative approaches are more cost effective. He writes, “resolutions that are deferred to higher authorities are more costly than those where the parties themselves make final decisions. Litigation is easily more expensive than resolution through direct negotiations or mediation (Slaikeu 1989:397).” Other factors, in addition to high monetary costs, inhibit agencies' use of collaborative approaches. For instance, expenses incurred during an ADR process are paid for from an agency's own program budget instead of out of the General Counsel's office, as is the case with adversarial litigation. Furthermore, agency dispute resolution specialists have been given their ADR responsibilities as additional tasks without being allocated extra resources. Unfortunately, funds to carry out most ADR activities must be found in existing budgets (Susskind, Babbitt and Segal 1993).

Slaikeu and Hasson (1992) redress the cost issue in a second article and state that parties must establish to what extent dispute resolution systems control the cost of conflict. Accounted costs should include: tangible items, such as legal fees, as well as hidden expenses, such as staff time spent resolving disputes and

satisfaction of disputants. Gericke et al. (1992) categorize expenditures in the following groups: time (person-years for preparation, travel, activities themselves, and analysis of public comments), monetary (salaries of people involved minus clerical, travel, and miscellaneous), and number of appeals and time and cost to resolve. Slaikeu and Hasson (1992) suggest that a manager could best address the cost/benefit of using ADR practices by examining an organization's flow of disputes.

Thomas (1990) and Gericke et al. (1992) identify another obstacle hindering implementation of a successful ADR system: defining and later measuring effectiveness. First, decisions primarily reflect the desire to reach consensus and compromise, and often exclude quality or substantive concerns. In addition, goals which can be defined are often difficult to measure or account for due to their intangible nature. Third, uniform information to assess public participation effectiveness for past disputes (such as in the Forest Service) is not available. Gericke et al. (1992) note the lack of documentation. "[W]ithout adequate detail about public participation it is difficult to assess benefits and costs, as well as to adapt efforts to meet the changing needs of society during the continuing planning process (35)." Despite the difficulties of measuring intangible factors, parties should include the following variables to capture the full value of public participation: trust or distrust in an agency, possible increase or decrease in conflict, and future benefits. Like the accounting system of forest roads, the cost of citizen involvement should be amortized over future rounds of planning. Finally, Gericke et al. (1992) found that number of appeals indicates poorly the effectiveness of a participation effort.

When considering expense, it should be kept in mind that several activities, such as using internal mediators, may reduce the monetary cost to agencies of using ADR processes (Susskind, Babbitt and Segal 1993). Costs of a neutral, however, are still not completely eliminated. An agency using an internal intermediary must pay for travel, start-up and training expenses. Unfortunately, stakeholders from outside the agency, may refuse to collaborate with organization personnel serving as neutrals. It is best, therefore, to suggest using as intermediaries, staff members who work in a different branch of an agency.

Other authors (Ury and Fisher 1981, Susskind and Cruikshank 1987) state that for certain stakeholders, cooperative methods of resolving conflict may be more costly than conventional ones. Each party must, therefore, determine the conventional technique which best fits their needs, or in other words, their Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) (Ury and Fisher 1981, Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). They must additionally determine whether this conventional approach, or an alternative collaborative one, is more beneficial. Other stakeholders, however, may alter a party's BATNA by increasing the cost of a conflict,

or utilizing other means which improve the perception of using a collaborative approach. This will thereby make that party more willing to engage in an ADR process (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, Hough 1988).

A stakeholder's criteria for determining the more advantageous method should extend beyond time and monetary expenses, and include such factors as risk, uncertainty, and trust between parties (Hough 1988). Ury, Brett and Goldberg (1988) detail how organizational managers can design cost-effective and beneficial dispute systems by laying out six principles (Table 8). Although such systems use both collaborative and conventional methods, they emphasize the use of collaborative approaches over power- and rights-based conventional approaches.

Table 8: An Effective Dispute Resolution System utilizes the following sequence of procedures to institutionally resolve disputes - interest-based, rights-based and finally power-based (Ury, Brett and Goldberg 1988:171).

Six Principles for Designing an Effective Dispute Resolution System

1. Focus on interests by encouraging the use of interests-based negotiation and mediation;
2. Provide rights and power "loop-backs"—procedures that turn the disputants' attention back to negotiation;
3. Provide rights and power "backups"—low-cost means for resolution if interest-based procedures fail;
4. Prevention—to build in consultation to head off disputes before they arise and post-dispute feedback to prevent similar disputes in the future;
5. Arrange all procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence; and,
6. Provide motivation, skills, and resources necessary to make all these procedures work.

The different opinions elicited by various authors demonstrate that the debate ascertaining whether collaborative processes are less costly than conventional ones is not settled. Activities at the federal level in the 1980s and 1990s to incorporate ADR into policy-making, most notably passage of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, were driven by monetary and time concerns. Enormous expense and delay were associated with litigation and snail-pace speed characterized decision-making in many federal agencies. However, opponents of these statutes during

legislative hearings voiced concerns that benefits received from dispute resolution might fall short of their costs (Susskind, Babbitt and Segal 1993).

Time has failed to produce an answer to this question. Despite the existence of articles addressing cost concerns of ADR, Susskind, Babbitt and Segal (1993:72) note that, "no existing evaluation instruments have yet been developed that adequately capture the costs or benefits of ADR, either qualitatively or quantitatively." (Rowe 1989 also makes this point.) Gericke et al. (1992) identify additional research needs: constructive and destructive forms of public participation for particular situations; the level of participation necessary; relationship dynamics during the participation process; and the influence of participation on management decisions.

Is it wise for the Forest Service to embrace a collaborative approach to ensure more active participation by citizens or is such a move too expensive? The Forest Service, it seems, has committed to use participatory decision-making regardless of time and economic costs.

"To rebuild understanding for the land and resource stewardship and to restore individual and community responsibility for land and resources, we [the Forest Service] must make participatory decisionmaking and interpretation integral parts of ecosystem management; not luxuries only if time and budgets permit. Experience with New Perspectives projects showed that direct participation in resource management projects was a key to giving people a change to reconnect with the land, to build their communities, and to educate resource scientists and managers (Salwasser 1994 in press)."

Gericke et al. (1992:38) also note, in regard to inefficiencies in the national forest planning process, that "costs of such involvement may be high in particular instances, but equity may be more important than efficiency." Concurrent with its commitment to increase collaborative decision-making, the Forest Service is attempting to restrict traditional public input, specifically the administrative appeal process, because it is currently overwhelmed by the number of appeals (Daniels et al. 1993, Keiter 1994).

Citizen and Agency Suspicion of ADR Practices

In addition to the obstacle of prohibitive costs, citizens frequently fear co-optation when participating in collaborative decision-making. Members of the public often question their ability to participate as equal partners because of the enormous power discrepancy between federal agencies and themselves (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Central government has at its disposal legal and enforcement mechanisms, inaccessible to most citizens (Hough 1988). Moreover, in certain situations, a history of co-optation by agencies already exists.

“Historically, citizen organizations involved with government or business groups have seen their interests co-opted through familiar techniques: appeals to common values, requests that citizens put their trust in government or in business, and participation processes in which citizen interests have been overwhelmed by the expertise of other interest groups (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990:1).”

Agencies, such as the Forest Service, however, may avoid public suspicion of collaborative approaches by both educating people about public negotiation and providing resources necessary for parties to actively participate in such a process (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Public ignorance of collaborative practices is understandable since “negotiation...is carried on with few accepted guidelines and without established traditions (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990:1-2).” Agency personnel are also skeptical of the process. Their doubts about ADR are understandable, since it involves unfamiliar, and therefore risky procedures. Many officials fear that collaborative processes will remove their control over decision outcomes. Others are concerned that ADR will eventually be required or prescribed as a universal panacea, instead of being a procedure that they can voluntarily engage in. Education, an effective way to combat citizen hesitation to engage, is also the most fundamental way to overcome skepticism found in agencies: training programs could increase the number of personnel who understand ADR procedures; pilot programs could demonstrate the effectiveness of negotiations; and, officials could share stories of successful collaborations (Susskind, Babbitt and Segal 1993).

Collaboration Is Inconsistent with Organizational Objectives or Culture

Participation in collaborative decision-making might be inconsistent with the internal and external objectives of citizen group(s). **First**, resources expended by an organization to participate in decision-making may not be worth the material rewards gained. **Second**, alternatives to collaboration (e.g., litigation) may benefit groups more than collaborative decision-making methods (a more advantageous BATNA). **Third**, negotiated issues may not be of high principle importance to an organization. **Fourth**, the organization may lack the power and resources to take part as a party to a negotiation. **Finally**, collaborative involvement might endanger the organization’s survival (i.e., affect the number of new members, membership retention, donation level, etc.) (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Similar disincentives, in addition to perceptions of prohibitive monetary and time costs, also exist in agencies. Since ADR responsibilities are seldom included in job descriptions, officials hesitate to use ADR procedures because they involve risks beyond their specified employment duties. For instance, using collaborative

approaches offers few immediate rewards. Moreover, employees who use ADR processes risk receiving poor performance evaluations if deadlines or tasked duties are not met or completed. In addition, some agencies value “beating” agency adversaries. In this cultural context, personnel engaging in adversarial forms of decision-making, such as litigation, are more likely to be rewarded than those using more cooperative procedure (See Table 9 for a list of obstacles that agencies encounter when attempting ADR practices) (Susskind, Babbitt and Segal 1993). Unfortunately, institutionalized procedures often defer disputes to higher authorities to be resolved conventionally, instead of by more collaborative approaches. Moreover, organizational bylaws often specifically describe the steps by which upper-level or external parties rule on disputes. In addition, most organizations know how to contact an attorney and start the litigation process but are unfamiliar with the process of hiring a neutral and initiating ADR procedures (Slaikeu 1989).

Table 9: In light of current obstacles found in agencies to implement ADR practices, Susskind, Babbitt and Segal (1993:69-72) offer several recommendations to make the Administrative Dispute

Recommendations for More Effective ADR Procedures

1. Increase information dissemination (particularly results of pilot projects within and among agencies).
2. Evaluate the viability of “inside” neutrals; stay open to the possibility of increasing the use of outside neutrals.
3. Change the culture of federal agencies, so that good settlements are valued over winning or “being right.”
4. Commit to systematic evaluation of all ADR efforts.
5. Encourage the use of dispute system analysis and design.

Resolution Act more effective.

Finally, the environmental perspective espoused by parties involved in collaborative decision-making may influence, positively or negatively, their opinion of collaborative processes. A party’s negative view of the collaborative process would inhibit their involvement. Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990) examine the three dominant social paradigms or perspectives on conflict, their preferred response to conflict and their view of environmental negotiations, respectively, as follows:

Perspective one

- environmental and economic development concerns are compatible, however they create specific disputes which emerge in response to the on-going need for adaptation, misunderstandings, and deviant behaviors;

- decision-makers prefer to respond to conflicts by educating learners and using specialized courts to assist in problem-solving; and,
- advocates of this perspective view negotiations as a supplementary tool where collaboration identifies common interests.

Perspective two

- conflict and consensus exist among disparate interest group with political pluralism promoting and accommodating differences;
- decision-makers prefer to respond to conflicts by creating legislation, regulating, adjudicating, and negotiating; and,
- advocates of this perspective view negotiation as an extension and a refinement of a long-established practice but differences exist on how it should be institutionalized.

Perspective three

- conflict is deep and pervasive in society due to different economic groups and theoretical principles with authorities de-emphasizing and contending groups emphasizing conflicts;
- decision-makers prefer to respond to conflicts by building, enhancing, and eventually using power to force compliance; and,
- advocates of this perspective view negotiation as a last resort and something often used to delay or co-opt parties (simplified from Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990:11).

CONCLUSION

Publics have increasingly involved themselves in national forest management since the 1960s. Growing environmental concern and awareness and use of forest resources caused people to demand more from their national forests (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Congress, however, attempted to make the Forest Service more accountable to public concerns through the RPA of 1974 and the NFMA of 1976 (Bammel 1986). (The RPA mandated involvement, and the NFMA detailed a prescriptive procedure for public involvement (Bammel 1986).) Unfortunately, these and other statutes, in addition to judicial precedents, failed to provide for an efficient, effective process for routine public participation in agency decision-making (Irland 1975, Daniels et al. 1993).

The Forest Service frequently has failed to resolve natural resource disputes on public lands (Daniels et al. 1993). Unfortunately, conflicts have continued to escalate, often remaining unamenable to resolution with

traditional decision-making approaches. These methods emphasize finding technical solutions and educating publics about resource management (Magill 1988). Although conflicts and accompanying disputes inevitably occur when scarce resources are allocated, the Agency's traditional approach to addressing Government leaders have felt that sharing power limits their own ability to act. Although conflicts and accompanying disputes inevitably occur when scarce resources are allocated, the Agency's traditional approach to addressing conflicts falters frequently, bypassing both solicitation of citizens' input and garnering of public support for decisions. Personnel within the agency have hesitated to include citizens to a greater extent in management decisions for several reasons (Twight 1977, Twight and Paterson 1979, Bammel 1986, Magill 1988, Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, Creswell 1988, Pottapchuk 1991):

- Government leaders have felt that sharing power limits their own ability to act.
- Officials are leery of violating procedural laws by involving people to a greater extent.
- Public conflicts are more likely to surface or escalate with increased public involvement.
- Participatory meetings often attract alienated people who voice general resentment.
- Officials are often unable to promise involved parties that they will accept their recommendations.
- Managers sometimes fail to legitimate public involvement.
- Agency personnel lack training and motivation to involve citizens.
- Complexity of forest issues involved in conflict prevents easy and quick resolution.

In addition, traditional political processes focus on procedural compliance instead of substantive problem-solving (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Furthermore, representative democracy provides inequitable access for stakeholders, and external parties often decide conflict outcomes. Moreover, institutionalized barriers to involvement exist in the following conventional institutions: public hearings, citizen advocacy councils and citizen surveys. Bammel (1986) recognizes that the continuous nature of conflict necessitates a forum where the agency and citizens engage in an on-going dialogue. A forum to promote dialogue would carry public participation beyond just developing rapport and trust between the agency and parties. It would also integrally incorporate public input when defining problems, directing research, formulating alternatives, and disseminating information. Pottapchuk (1991) building on Arnstein's (1969) and Connor's (1988) models demonstrates the different levels of public involvement possible, as: government decides; government consults with individuals and decides; government consults with a representative group and decides; government works with a representative group and they jointly decide; and, government delegates decisions to others (Pottapchuk 1991).

Is it possible for the Forest Service to integrally involve publics in ecosystem management; possibly delegating some decision-making autonomy to citizens? A federal precedent already exists for greater participation, which started with the Housing Act of 1954. In addition to a strong federal precedent, Keiter (1990) argues that current procedural and substantive statutes could incorporate publics' concerns in a self-evolved form of ecosystem management. The Forest Service, nevertheless took a more proactive approach to involve people in ecosystem management with its 1990 New Perspectives program (Salwasser 1994 in press), the ecosystem management directive issued in the 1992 Robertson memo, and the recent manifesto "The Forest Service Ethics and Course for the Future." (Thomas 1994). The memo and subsequent manifesto explicitly detail how the Agency would seek greater citizen involvement through management partnerships, and grass-roots participation during planning. The Forest Service's proactive effort, however, is now perceived to have been necessary. Keiter (1994) in a more recent article applauds the Agency's efforts and partially rescinds his earlier arguments by recognizing that current laws are not enough to advance an ecological approach.

The Forest Service, when attempting to more effectively involve publics, can utilize a number of planning methods or traditions (Hudson 1979). In an attachment to the ecosystem memo, Robertson (1992) implicitly alludes to three methods: synoptic, incremental and transactive planning. Different methods of public involvement accomplish various participation objectives such as: information exchange, education and support building, decision-making supplement, and representational input (Glass 1979). Participatory techniques may also be evaluated and selected based on a criteria of legitimacy (Irland 1975). Similarly, managers may determine appropriate level of involvement and technique by ascertaining substantive requirements and citizens' acceptability of agency representatives making the decision. The latter half of this paper focuses on collaborative processes due to Robertson (1992) alluding to them in his memo, and the extensively discussions about this topic in the literature.

Collaborative processes differ from traditional or conventional processes in that agencies directly involve citizens when processing multiple inputs and formulating alternatives (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990). Moreover, collaborative processes more effectively address distributive disputes, whereas conventional processes remain more suitable for deciding social norms and values. The collaborative process is three-staged consisting of **pre-negotiation** where parties create the negotiation setting, **negotiation** which entails parties finding mutually beneficial solutions, and **implementation** (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Models and principles further describe types of collaboration. The principle **models** discussed are **facilitation**, **mediation** and **arbitration**. These models are respectively listed based on greater third-party involvement which becomes necessary as disputes become more difficult to resolve (e.g., arbitration involves extensive

third-party intervention and is used largely for resolving extremely difficult disputes) (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). In some instances, parties may need to resort to litigation if collaboration fails or is not in the best interest of stakeholder(s) (Slaikeu 1989). To further aid stakeholders, multiple lists of collaborative **principles** exist. The sampler included in this review ranges from general principles applied when resolving **public disputes** (Carpenter and Kennedy 1985), to those employed with **environmental dispute settlement** (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990), and finally those discovered with **computer modeling cooperative behavior** (Axelrod 1984).

Three approaches summarize the various types of collaborative processes. **First**, the **transformative approach** seeks to correct modern problems of community disintegration, alienation from government institutions, and inability to solve problems by using collaborative processes (Dukes 1993). Second, the **dispute resolution system approach** involves designers organizing and institutionalizing hierarchies of procedures. Parties are directed to try to resolve disputes locally and collaboratively. If these early efforts fail, parties then resort to rights- and power-based forms of resolution (Ury, Brett and Goldberg 1988). Although a legal and administrative framework for a dispute resolution system currently exists in the Forest Service, lack of boundary-spanning, limited education and differing perspectives prevent successful implementation (Manring 1993). Finally, the **third approach** is resolution of **stand-alone disputes**. Daniels et al. (1993) develop criteria for evaluating collaborative decision-making which include: stakeholder access, joint learning/fact finding, exploration of value differences, discussion of interests versus positions and shared implementation responsibility.

Crowfoot and Wondolleck's 1990 case study of the San Juan National Forest demonstrates the feasibility of resolving disputes collaboratively in the national forests. The authors list three characteristics of the dispute which led to successful resolution: strong ties maintained between representatives and respective constituents; use of experts to resolve differences and build a common base of knowledge; and, the great attention given to the process of implementation. The case highlights conditions which make it possible to initiate the mediation process. It illustrated how the process provided incentives for parties to remain accountable to the collaborative effort.

Collaborative processes, however, should not be viewed as a panacea to natural resource or other types of public disputes. A number of obstacles exist to successfully completing a consensus agreement. They include (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987, Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990):

- Up-front costs of collaborative agreements may deter parties from participating;
- Citizens are concerned about co-optation by the agency;
- Resources expended to participate may not be worth material or ideological rewards gained;
- Organizations may lack resources to participate as equal partners;
- Participation might negatively affect the well-being of an organization;
- Parties with certain environmental perspectives may view collaborative methods negatively; and,
- Participants may benefit to a greater extent by using a conventional instead of a collaborative process (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or BATNA).

Other points deserving mention which emerge from the literature are the lack of uniform criteria for evaluating collaborative agreements, and consensus on whether effective standards for judging have been previously devised. In addition to this source of confusion, various authors present different accounting systems for cost and time criteria. Unfortunately, the absence of uniform measurements to evaluate collaboration promotes piecemealed gathering of information, which, in turn, results in compromised research. It seems timely for leaders in the collaborative field to devise a list of criteria and techniques for assessing ADR procedures to ascertain advantages of collaborative processes versus conventional ones, to determine when and when collaboration should be employed, etc..

In conclusion, the literature suggests that collaborative decision-making might resolve the increasing number of conflicts on national forest lands. The Agency's proactive stance to implement such a framework suggests that the Forest Service will continue to employ integrative planning approaches to go beyond earlier decision-making methods. Collaborative approaches promise to more effectively involve publics as was evident in the San Juan case (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990) and the cases examined by Daniels et al. (1993). Despite pertaining statutes and collaborative training, cultural and institutional barriers within the Agency have prevented full implementation of a system for dispute resolution. Moreover, the option of using other processes should be maintained since collaborative decision-making is not a panacea to resolve disputes. In addition, other methods might more effectively accomplish objectives, and should therefore be explored.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: San Juan National Forest Mediation

Facts: The San Juan National Forest is located in southwest Colorado, in a mountainous area twenty miles northeast of Durango and adjacent to Vallecito lake. Approximately 300,00 to 400,000 people visit the area each summer to partake in resort activities including boating, fishing and hiking (backpackers access an adjacent wilderness area) centered around the lake. Recreation activities are critical to the regional economy. The majority of businesses are locally-owned resorts or enterprises which provide services to people visiting the resorts (four national forest campgrounds, two private trailer parks and numerous private residences). Two additional resorts exist in the adjacent region. Another important recreation activity besides camping, is hunting which nets \$500,000 in licenses annually. Elk and deer bear young within, and migrate throughout the area. Sheep and cattle owners, some with permits to graze their livestock on public lands, also contribute to the regional economy (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

The Forest Service developed a draft environmental assessment (EA) of its transportation plan. The EA analyzed a road system primarily designed to provide access for logging in an area east of Vallecito Lake. Delayed adverse public reaction to the draft EA, however, surprised Forest Service officials since the draft forest plan issued a year earlier produced little public comment about the concerned area. A principal party to the dispute, the Vallecito Chamber of Commerce had not previously commented on the draft forest plan, however, a change in the presidency of the Chamber along with greater awareness of FS activities and its impact on tourism caused its members along with others related to the resort business to oppose the transportation plan (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

The draft EA contained seven alternatives that varied in terms of: (1) location of the road corridor; (2) proposed number of road miles built; (3) type of road use planned; (4) and, whether or not roads would link the Vallecito area to the Beaver Creek area (the adjacent east side area). The various alternatives were linked to timber harvest measures, such as acres and volume logged, and harvest methods. The Forest Service identified impacts on wildlife and recreation opportunities from the proposed activities. The Agency eventually identified eight proposed timber cuts with respective sales dates which were to take place within the next ten years. The size of the operation (which excluded small, local timber companies) and the

associated impacts on wildlife, water quality and recreation, however, drew negative reaction from various parties (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Conflict: Negative reaction to the draft EA coalesced in a non-standard way. Although the Forest Service published a notice in the local paper that it was considering transportation alternatives, the announcement was overlooked by local citizens. One of the original disputants, Chamber vice-president and resort owner Guenivere Marrs, was informed of the proposed plan by retired state game warden Gene Bassett who resided in the area. After informing Chamber president Donna Carrington of the proposed transportation plan, she set up a meeting with district ranger Tom Cartwright, and Division of Wildlife representative Mike Zgainer, for the purpose of educating citizens about proposed alternatives, and another with forest supervisor Paul Sweetland to inform him of the Chamber's opposition. Forest Service officials discussed the plan and proposed mitigation measures at two meetings hosted by the Chamber. Unfortunately for the Forest Service, Chamber members expressly opposed the plan despite mitigation efforts. Opposition to the plan increased, due in large part to Chamber members criticizing the agency's plan vocally and through letter-writing and telephone efforts (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Issues: The Forest Service contended that it needed to remove overmature timber, timber plagued by spruce budworm and pine beetle, to maintain forest vitality. Roads included in the transportation plan were necessary to remove logs from harvest sites, and would increase opportunities for motorized recreation. Opponents, in response to the Forest Service contentions, asserted that: (1) the plan was incompatible with the tourist-based economy of the area; (2) proposed activities would destroy the scenery viewed from the lake; (3) activities would interrupt wildlife reproduction and migration, and increased miles of road would result in increased hunting and poaching; (4) logging trucks traveling over narrow roads and dam spillways represented probable safety hazards; (5) the Forest Service was remiss in communicating with affected publics; and, (6) concerns existed about erosion in the designated logging areas (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Several events further escalated the dispute. Newspaper articles favorable to the opponents' views were published. The forest supervisor surprised at the amount of opposition and the little support for the plan, responded with a guest editorial in the local paper. A second major development was that wealthy Texan and owner of an affected inholding, Keith Graham, Jr., hired Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund attorney Luke Danielson. Danielson reviewed the EA and wrote letters identifying principle weaknesses of the document. The Vallecito Chamber conditionally joined Graham, Jr. as an affected party in a possible suit against the

Forest Service, despite the Chamber's lack of funds to compensate the lawyer. Third, evidence of greater grass roots opposition emerged. A petition containing 1,182 signatures of citizens who opposed the proposed project was sent to local Congressman Ray Kogosvek (D-Colo). Politicians representing visitors to the area, including Senators Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and John Tower (D-Texas) and the governors of Colorado and Texas, inquired about the transportation proposal. Finally Kogosvek, the one responsible for passage of the 1980 Colorado Wilderness bill, indicated his strong desire to quickly resolve the dispute (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

The Mediation: The opposing attorney Danielson approached the forest supervisor and indicated that, in light of present opposition, disputing parties would soon administratively and probably judicially appeal the transportation plan. Danielson suggested working the dispute out "on the local level" in lieu of the appeals process. After agreeing, the attorney and the agency settled on The Mediation Institute, which hails from Seattle, WA, to assist parties in resolving the dispute. They then selected 26 initial participants who they felt represented the cadre of existing views. The Institute agreed to involve themselves after learning about the dispute (that it lay outside the wilderness conflict) and the potential for settlement (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Day 1: Mediators had several immediate tasks: gain credibility and acceptance from involved parties; establish meeting protocol; explain goal of conciliation and compromise, and define consensus. The mediation began with a discussion of ground rules. Two key ones emerged: one specified how involved parties would deal with the press, and the second excluded wilderness designation as an issue to be considered in the dispute. The parties along with the mediators discussed how the group would deal with the absence of the president of a large, local lumber company.

Each participant introduced him- or herself and stated their needs and concerns for the area. At this time, parties were informally arranged according to traditional alliances. These alliances are consistent with a "we versus them" mentality. The Forest Service related with commodity interests to oppose the other assembly comprised of resort interests, residents, the Chamber, and Graham, Jr.. Forest Supervisor Sweetland stated, however, that the Agency did not view itself as a participant, but instead solely would provide information to the disputing parties. In addition, Sweetland stated that he would take recommendations on advisement (i.e., he was not going to bind himself to the mediation results). The mediator summarized each party's needs (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

After parties identified their needs, the mediators told the parties to break into self-selected groups to talk. As people proceeded to cluster according to similarities in their views, the perceived differences between groups soon narrowed. People established personal rapport with others. Fluid small groups emerged with members rotating around the room and gathering information about the concerns and needs of other interests. Groups discovered that cattlemen preferred rangelands without roads to reduce the possibility of livestock rustling, and that timber interests felt that planned roads were excessive. Unfortunately, the large size of the group hindered progress, so interests established new groups with a spokesperson (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1993).

The mediators completed the day by summarizing progress made on the first day; two major changes occurred among the group members. First, participants had come to see the area as a unit rather than just perceiving individual interests. Second, interests agreed on their concerns, if not on how to address them. By the end of the first day, the Vallecito coalition (the coalition first opposing the Forest Service) replaced its stance of a no-change alternative to one realizing that access was needed from the west side and that small-scale logging and low-impact recreation might be permissible in certain instances. The group's direction was in no way shaped by the Forest Service proposals (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Second Day: The designated delegates selected at the end of the first day along with the absent lumber representative met. Mediators pulled the lumber representative aside, informed him of his blunder by not showing up the previous day, indicated that Wilderness designation was outside the scope of the discussion, and educated him on what transpired the first day. The Vallecito coalition presented a proposal which they crafted the night before. Parties outside the coalition pointed out flaws, however delegates discussed alternatives to correct recognized problems. The mediators passively watched the process, thereby granting greater control to the participants. Parties overcame the impasse when it was proposed that the area be divided into two viewsheds. Separating the areas divided the issues. Most of the delegates were solely interested in the west side viewshed. Common ground emerged and the group was able to create a list of recommendations (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Final Stages: The Forest Service acknowledged that it agreed with eighty percent of the group's recommendations, and suggested that further study be conducted on two sites. Parties agreed on the process of studying the two sites. Later, after hiring technical experts to research the two contentious areas, the Forest Service eventually accepted ninety-eight percent of the recommendations. The other parties decided that appealing the decision because of the two percent disparity was not in their best interest. In

addition to formulating and implementing recommendations, the involved parties formed the Pine River Advisory Council (PRAC). It represents each local, multiple-use interest and exists as an independent party to provide public input in forest management decisions (Crowfoot and Wondolleck 1990).

Appendix II: Suggestions for More Effective Public Involvement

Education:

- Decrease hesitation to collaborate by educating people about negotiations
- Increase information dissemination of ADR efforts (particularly the results of pilot projects)
- Train agency personnel by doing dispute resolution

Costs:

- Evaluate viability of 'inside' neutrals; stay open to use of outside neutrals
- Compensate involved agency and citizen representatives for time and expenses of ADR
- Allocate funding for ADR programs (e.g. pay out of General Counsel's office like litigation)

Institutional Culture:

- Understand internal and external socio-political realities through boundary spanning
- Change culture to where a good settlement is valued over winning or being right

Evaluate, Improve and Institutionalize Collaboration:

- Focus on interests not positions
- Provide resources to other stakeholders to allow equal involvement
- Engage in joint learning/fact finding
- Share implementation responsibility
- Systematically document and evaluate ADR efforts
- Use dispute system analysis and design
- Keep other planning methods available; utilize when appropriate or as fallback mechanisms

Citizen Reassurance:

- Hire locals as seasonal laborers and fire crew members instead of contracting
- Expose Agency to the public through 'spit and whittle' contacts, public presentations, etc.
- Promote better citizen/personnel rapport by reducing the number of personnel relocations
- Invite all stakeholders to collaborative meetings
- Demonstrate to citizens that you are listening to their concerns
- Make public Agency decision-making